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ABSTRACT 
BEFORE LANGUAGE: THE RAGE AT THE MOTHER 
Claire Pajaczkowska 
The thesis argues that psychoanalysis is a necessary 
component of cultural analysis. It is argued that existing 
syntheses of psychoanalysis and political theories tend to 
limit the recognition of the relative autonomy of psychic 
reality by offering accounts of the social determination of 
subjectivity. 
The contemporary reappropriation of psychoanalysis by 
feminist theorists has formulated new explanations of the 
social position of women as the 'second sex'. The 
challenge of feminism to traditional theories of culture 
and society includes questions of how sexual difference 
informs the transformation of thought into language, how 
language determines theory, and how theory conceptualises 
the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. 
The contradictions within existing syntheses of 
structuralism, Marxism and feminism are described, and the 
differences between psychoanalysis and sociology are traced 
through the the critical reception of Freud's Totem and 
Taboo by anthropologists. The validity of Freud's concept 
of the Oedipus complex is explored, and it is suggested 
that despite the limited acceptance by anthropologists, 
Totem and Taboo contains a valid theory of the relation of 
the subject to society. Freud's work is relocated within 
the paradigm of evolutionary biology to provide a 
materialist analysis of psychic structure that is not based 
on linguistics. A study of the origins of language reveals 
the complexity of the historical factors determining the 
co-evolution of representation, the maternal function, and 
the structuration of psychic reality. 
New discoveries about the pre-Oedipal dyad that underlies 
the Oedipus complex have shown the effects of infantile 
dependence and maternal care on adult subjectivity, and it 
is argued that factors such as the unconscious fear of 
dependency and of women are of particular significance for 
feminist thought. 
It is argued that the theory of pre-Oedipal and pre-
linguistic subjectivity can make intelligible aspects of 
ideologies of racism and sexism that are not fully 
explained by sociological or political theory. The 
mechanism of projection or projective identification, it is 
argued, provides a specifically psychoanalytic contribution 
to existing theories of culture. 
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Introduction 
The past twenty years have witnessed an increase in 
the recognition of the importance of the politics of 
representation as a determining feature of the social 
position of women. This thesis is a contribution to the 
debate on the place of sexual difference in the politics of 
representation. The idea that systems of representation 
and misrepresentation, recognition and misrecognition, can 
have a determining effect on people's lives is not a new 
one; indeed it is the basis of the Marxist theory of 
ideology. However, the recognition that these systems of 
representation do not derive so much from social reality as 
from psychic reality is a recent development in political 
theory, a development that is crucial for feminism. 
The range of political practices that can be taken to 
constitute the oppression of women includes their economic 
exploitation in the workplace : 
- as a predominantly reserve army of wage labourers; 
- as part-time workers with little job security and little 
institutional support, such as childcare facilities; 
- as unpaid domestic workers in the home, with almost no 
social recognition of the work of childrearing; 
- as absent from the majority of the decision-making 
processes forming the laws to which they are subject; 
- as actively excluded from positions of cultural, religious 
or artistic authority; 
- as victims of, witnesses of, and, probably most damaging 
of all, perpetrators of the immense cruelty towards women 
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that is a standard feature of all human societies. 
Some of these forms of oppression are common to other 
social groups, the working class, ethnic and immigrant 
populations in colonialist communities, children - whose 
needs are systematically misrepresented - and the 
physically disabled, whose disabilities are consistently 
misrepresented. Therefore many of the practical attempts 
at changing these structures of exploitation and oppression 
are made in collaboration with these other groups. 
Much of feminist theory is the search to understand 
the failure of practical attempts at ameliorating 
intolerable working or living conditions. In a sense, we 
need to think only when things go wrong. Theory may be of 
direct use, for example to guide specific practic~l 
projects; or theory can be of less immediate practical use, 
to produce new questions for guiding thinking about 
practice. This thesis is concerned with the second type of 
usage of theory, that is, with producing new ways of 
thinking about old and familiar problems. 
The basic question of the thesis is really "Why is it 
so difficult to think about women?"; to think rationally, 
realistically and helpfully about women, their place in 
society and their representation. Thinking about women, 
the social position of women, and the representation of the 
difference between men and women, without repeating 
stereotypes, is extremely difficult. Not only can this be 
deduced from experience, as it is just as difficult for 
women as for men; but this can also be deduced from the 
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great number of explanations of social exploitation, 
poverty, inequality, misrepresentation and so on, which 
manage to formulate systematic and logical theories only by 
either completely avoiding all reference to the question of 
sexual difference, or by lapsing into irrationality and 
fixed stereotypes when women are discussed. 
One of the places from which to start to answer the 
question, of why it is so difficult to think about women in 
a realistic and helpful way, is by comparing the different 
representations of women that exist in the various 
explanations of women's social position. 
One can start by comparing the type of difference 
that differentiates women from men, with other types of 
differences, such as those which differentiate between men, 
between individual men and groups of men, between 
communities, between nations, and especially 'races', 
between adult and child, between culture and nature, 
between human and inhuman. And (although these comparisons 
alone would be enough to fill the feminist research agenda 
for several generations), one can also speculate as to 
whether the human capacity for making such differences, for 
thinking in categories, is itself informed by the reality 
of sexual difference. 
When I began reading about, and thinking about, the 
irrationality governing the social position, and the 
misrepresentation of women, most explanations emphasised 
the power of social institutions such as the economy, the 
workplace, the state and the family in determining women's 
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experience of themselves. The meaning of women's lives was 
explained, almost entirely, as being derived from factors 
external to themselves and their identity as women. The 
category 'women' was often conceptualised as a category 
produced by the conjunction of a number of political and 
historical structures, with no intrinsic meaning in itself. 
Therefore, I began this research assuming that the 
work of the thesis would be to describe the effect of 
social structures, and especially symbolic structures, on 
the psyche. I started from a perspective of social 
determinism, comprising both culturalist and structuralist 
theories and concepts, assuming that subjective experience 
is largely determined by economic, historical and social 
forces. Most feminist research seemed to indicate that 
gender identity, like class identity, and, later, cultural 
and ethnic identity, was a specific construct of social, 
symbolic and historical forces. And feminists also claimed 
that gender identity could be transformed through political 
or ideological restructuring of institutions. 
Therefore this thesis was, initially, to have 
explored the social metaphors of sexual difference and to 
demonstrate how these create, construct or determine the 
subjective experience of sexual difference. I was hoping 
that the linguistic analysis of metaphor might throw some 
light on the symbolic divisions of 'masculine' and 
'feminine' in our society. It seemed clear that sexual 
difference was used, for the purposes of social 
classification, in a metaphoric way. 
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Linguistics, it seemed, would help to produce a more 
precise description of sexual difference as a social 
metaphor. The structuralist and culturalist theories, 
developed in anthropology, literary theory, film theory and 
cultural studies, have found ways of uniting the social 
determinism of socialist politics and Marxist analysis, 
with the symbolic determinism of textual analysis and 
semiotics, and a psychoanalytic account of subjectivity. 
A variety of different syntheses, contradictory to a 
greater or lesser degree, co-exist in the many forms of 
structuralism to be found within social and cultural 
analysis. Those that start from a theoretical and 
political basis in Marxism emphasise the primacy of class 
contradiction and economic determinism. From the 
perspective of Marxist-feminist theory, the family is 
described as a social structure belonging to the political 
superstructure, exercising its power through "familial 
ideology", although sometimes intervening directly in the 
economic mode of production. Marxist-feminist theory of 
the family acknowledges that the family as reproductive 
unit pre-dates capitalism but emphasises that that since 
the growth of capitalism the biologically reproductive unit 
has become secondary to the socially reproductive unit. 
Within this genre of theory there exists a long-standing 
controversy over the primacy of the forces of 'production' 
and 'reproduction', and over the articulation of the 
history of 'patriarchal' social relations and 'class 
contradiction'. As a theoretical controversy it raises 
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questions of the structural status of gender, such as 
whether sexual difference is to be conceptualised as an 
effect of social institutions and practices, or whether 
sexual difference has a structuring function. 
As a political controversy, it impinges on questions 
about how to prioritise specific struggles or campaigns on 
the political agenda. Questions about how women should 
organise, in relation to political parties and government, 
institutions and organisations at work, and structures in 
the private sphere, at home and in personal relationships, 
are also raised through the debate on the relative 
determination of the processes of production and 
reproduction. Most of the texts from the first wave of 
post-war feminism centred on the articulation of women's 
history and the history of class society, either in a 
diachronic or a synchronic form (Rowbotham 1972 and 
Mitchell 1972). 
For classical Marxists the suggestion that sexual 
difference might have an autonomous structuring function in 
society, that was quite separate from the contradictions of 
capital and class, was equated with "bourgeois feminism" 
and consequently attacked. Radical feminism, which 
suggests that sexual contradiction has a more basic and 
fundamental structuring function than class, or economic 
structures, was subject to a number of contradictory 
representations. It was seen as both 'middle class' and 
'extremist', both naive and calculating (opportunistic), 
the ideology of the reactionary 'housewife' and the 
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ideology of the 'career' woman. The theoretical critiques 
of ideologies of the "eternal" human nature had been 
originally advanced in order to challenge the 
preconceptions of a dominant middle class, whose values 
were assumed to be universal values, whose standards were 
absolute. Applied to ideologies of gender, the critique of 
the "eternal feminine", or essential differences, was aimed 
at challenging the institutionalised sexism based on 
preconceptions of masculine values, and replacing this with 
a more flexible or open system of negotiating male and 
female collaboration. In this respect the critique of 
essentialism seemed a positive and progressive step towards 
a materialist and feminist theory and a genuinely radical 
practice. 
However, the theoretical critique of essentialism in 
relation to gender, seemed to have become repetitive, 
fixed, unquestioning, as the term was used without 
explanation as an automatically negative judgement. It 
often seemed to have passed from an active, dialectical 
process into the fixed rigidity of dogma. The artificial 
fixity of this negative critique of gender essentialism, 
which sometimes took on the form of a kind of law of 
feminist and Marxist theory, produced opposition in the 
form of forces of reaction. Reactionary ideologies of 
mysticism and idealisation equated science with masculine 
delusion and patriarchal oppression, and reacted with 
ideologies of anti-intellectualism. Nevertheless, it seems 
that feminism now urgently needs to reconsider the theories 
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of the interaction of bodily, mental and socio-symbolic 
structures and to address the questions which have been 
rejected as "essentialist". The extraordinary emphasis 
placed on the role of social structure in determining 
subjectivity, integral to the sociological basis of most 
cultural and anthropological analysis, seems to be 
operating as a form of denial. What is being denied? 
The first chapter, which comprises a series of 
inquiries into the method of feminist research, argues that 
a psychoanalytic method is an indispensable part of what is 
loosely termed a "science of sexual difference". In these 
inquiries attention is drawn to the forms of knowledge 
produced by the component discourses of this 
interdisciplinary science. Debates from the philosophy of 
science indicate that, however it is defined, and however 
its method adjudicated, science necessarily has an object 
which it sets out to describe in as realistic a way as 
possible. The history and philosophy of science provides 
many ways of conceptualising the scientific method of 
description, of defining an object of knowledge, and of 
deciding the meaning of realism. I made much use of these 
philosophies in setting out to use the concept of science 
to describe the theoretical work of the thesis as a 
contribution to a science of sexual difference. A 
substantial body of thought had popularised anti-scientism 
as a politically radical practice. Many Marxists and 
feminists, seeking initially to demystify the concept of 
scientific thought through analysing the social and 
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historical influences on concepts from the natural 
sciences, developed a critique of the concept of science 
itself. It was being claimed that science should primarily 
be understood as a discursive practice, as one discourse 
amongst many with no greater claims to truth than any other 
discourse. As part of a broader cultural movement away 
from realism and toward subjectivism this critique of false 
objectivity was an integral part of feminist cultural 
theory. At the outset the ideas of "discursive relativity" 
seemed useful and attractive, they appeared to offer a 
genuinely democratic account of knowledge and reality. The 
critique of science as a fictitious "master narrative", as 
suggested by post-structuralism, was a logical extension of 
Foucault's redefinition of science as sociology of 
knowledge, or discourse. The idea of science as a search 
for truth was replaced by the idea of science as discourse. 
I found the more useful explorations of science as 
discourse to be those that attempt to reveal the implicit 
subjectivities of particular sciences, showing the tension 
of subject-to-object relations, without necessarily thereby 
dissolving the concept of the object into the subjective 
practice. The work of Kristeva on linguistic science, the 
work of Devereux on psychology, of Jacob on biological 
science, all served as examples of this process. Each 
sought to strengthen the meaning of science as realism, or 
truth, by including within this the truth of a systematic 
understanding of subjectivity. 
It seemed that sexual difference was a central part 
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of this subjective access to truth, or objective reality, 
and that the relation between sexual difference and truth 
could be explored further. 
This formulation, which emerged towards the end of 
chapter 1, sounded very similar to some Lacanian tenets. 
It seemed to be a psychoanalytic formulation, or 
definition, of the question of feminism's relation to 
science and truth. 
There are several existing theoretical paradigms for 
articulating the discourses of Marxism, feminism, 
structuralism and psychoanalysis. The work of Julia 
Kristeva, Juliet Mitchell, Luce Irigaray, Laura Mulvey, 
Stephen Heath and contributors to debates in journals such 
as New Left Review, Screen, m/f, Feminist Review, has 
provided a rich and compelling problematic for formulating 
the problems of identification, subjectivity, and sexuality 
in relation to language and social structure. I found this 
work inspiring, and particularly admired the breadth of 
scope and application of the theoretical work. The concept 
of theoretical practice was being used in a number of ways, 
giving it a meaning which expanded Althusser's restricted 
definition. The interdisciplinary theory of the politics 
of representation was being developed across a broad range 
of cultural practices. Theory, history, textual analysis, 
representational practice and political practice were 
interconnected in the structuralist paradigm. Using 
Althusser's reformulation of the role of cultural 
reproduction, and the part played by ideology in that 
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reproduction, the structural paradigm drew parallels 
between Levi-Strauss' study of myth and Lacan's 
formulations on the unconscious. 
As well as admiring the breadth of scope of this 
paradigm, it was the apparent unity of theory that drew me. 
It was only when gradually confronted with the 
contradictions of this paradigm that I began to realise 
that the apparently systematic, orderly and cogent 
formulations it produced were internally contradictory. 
Firstly, there was the problem of how to resolve 
Levi-Strauss' structuralist premise of the primacy of 
exchange relations with the Marxist theory that production 
determines exchange relations. Many critics had speculated 
over whether structuralism was to be understood as a 
revolutionary departure form the positivist sociological 
tradition, or whether its foregrounding of symbolic 
structure was a typically idealist doctrine characteristic 
of the ideology of late capitalism. Some seemed to leave 
the contradiction unresolved, others to substitute for 
Marxism a less determinist form of socialist thought, 
"libertarianism" or "socialist humanism" for example. It 
was important to conserve the Marxist view of the power of 
economic structure to mould social and cultural 
institutions, to maintain Marxist versions of materialism. 
But it was equally important to give full recognition to 
the discoveries made by women's political experience, about 
the centrality of the politics of representation and the 
fact that very often "consciousness" (as Marx termed it) 
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does determine "life". Especially if "consciousness" is 
understood as "including" the unconscious, as it was later 
defined. Althusser had certainly taken on the Lacanian 
deconstruction of "consciousness", and had used this to 
formulate some very demanding questions. Defining ideology 
as an omni-historical reality, he nevertheless sought the 
"history of ideology". Locating psychic processes and 
unconscious systems of representation as the centre of the 
"decentred subject" of ideology, he implied that psychic 
structure is the material basis of ideology. 
The Althusserian theory is both rigorous and exact 
but my personal doubts about the validity of the paradigm 
became the real starting point of the thesis. The 
structuralist paradigm leaves no space for ambiguity, or 
doubt, and yet these seemed most real to me. My intuitive 
understanding contradicted what I "knew" to be the case 
through education and theory. It was necessary to find, or 
begin to build, a non-idealist, non-mystical, materialist 
account of feminine intuition. The structuralist paradigm 
did not recognise feelings or emotions as facts, only as 
effects. without recreating an ideology of romantic 
subjectivism, it is important that the part played by 
emotional reality should be fully recognised in feminist 
theory. What is the influence of affective states such as 
pleasure or pain, certainty and doubt, safety and fear on 
the process of thinking, and on the representation of 
thinking in the system of theory and science? Is there a 
science of emotions, where feelings might be recognised as 
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facts? How can subjective states of emotions be used in 
ascertaining the nature of objective reality? How can 
emotional facts be compared with or articulated with 
tangible facts such as historical, written, documents, or 
measurable facts such as numbers, statistics, dates, 
economic or social quantifiable data? 
Traditionally, the concept of fact has excluded all 
reference to subjectivity, so that the concept of an 
emotional fact is not easy to accept. Descriptions of 
emotional facts have traditionally been the realm of 
religion, theology, poetry or art, and especially music. 
Also women have traditionally been represented as 'more 
emotional' than men, often in such a way as to imply this 
is an impediment to rational knowledge or true perception. 
More recently, psychologies have sought to describe 
emotional facts in a more systematic and scientific way. 
Psychoanalytic theory in particular suggested that 
subjective perception, based on emotional experience, is 
the only basis for arriving at objective knowledge or 
truth. This paradoxical, scientifically revolutionary 
fact, which is the basis of the practice of psychoanalytic 
therapy, seemed to parallel the concept of feminine 
intuition, giving a scientific description of a 
systematically undervalued female experience. It was, in 
the Gramscian terms, a transformation of 'commonsense' into 
'good sense'. 
If this was true of therapeutic practice, how could 
psychoanalysis be used to study culture? Can 
13 
psychoanalysis be used to study culture? Having "already" 
discovered psychoanalysis in the form of structuralist 
theory, the answer to the question seemed self-evident. 
Yes, psychoanalysis is used to study culture if it is used 
as an adjunct of linguistics and historical materialism to 
provide an account of the socialisation of the subject 
through language and the symbolic. Otherwise 
psychoanalytic interpretations of culture were criticised 
as 'reductive', 'essentialist', 'ahistorical', 
'individualist'. Althusser had chosen neo-Freudian theory 
because it remained true to Freud's description of 
intrapsychic conflict. Lacan redefined intrapsychic 
conflict as that of a subject decentred in language. Both 
of these were judged in positive terms in opposition to 
"ego-psychology" of orthodox and especially medically-based 
psychoanalysis. Through Lacan, psychoanalysis was seen as 
compatible with historical materialism and revolutionary 
Marxism. Within a slightly different paradigm, Kristeva, 
Mitchell, Mulvey and Heath used the Freudian and Lacanian 
theories because of their central concern with the 
structuring function of sexual difference. The alliance of 
psychoanalysis to revolutionary communism was modulated in 
the direction of a, no less formidable, demand for the 
"overthrow of patriarchy". 
Lacanian theory, as will be discussed in chapters 2 
and 3 and 4, accords overriding significance to the 
topographic aspect of Freudian metapsychology. Freud's 
method was based on a metapsychology comprising three 
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theoretical axes, an economic description of mental energy 
or drives, a dynamic description of intrapsychic conflict, 
and a topographical description of the mind as a spatial 
"map". The basic metapsychology in 1900-1918 included a 
schematic topographical description of the different types 
of functioning in the nervous system governing 
consciousness, these were the "systems Cs, Pcs, and Ucs", 
(Conscious, Preconscious and Unconscious). Each system 
used a different method of conducting and discharging 
nervous energy and the unconscious system was divided from 
the others by an impermeable "barrier" of censorship. 
Later, in 1923, Freud developed a second topography which 
described the operations of the mind in terms of the 
"agencies" of id, ego and superego. Both topographies are 
currently used simultaneously, and Lacan employs Freudian 
terminology as well as his own topography of the 
"Symbolic", "Imaginary", and "Real". But whereas Freudian 
theory places great importance on the instinctual and 
conflictual aspects of the mind, such as constitute the 
central material of affective life, Lacanian theory accords 
more significance to the topographic aspect. 
Lacanian theory is not, substantially, a theory of 
affectivity, nor of libidinal or instinctual activity. The 
body is discussed only insofar as its anatomical structure 
is reproduced as representation in mental structure. The 
Freudian id, so directly connected to bodily experience, is 
for Lacan transcribed into a "discourse of the Other", a 
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discursive rather than bodily reality. This shift of 
emphasis is what permitted Althusser's appropriation of 
psychoanalysis as an adjunct to historical materialism. 
This movement away from bodily and affective states to 
discursive phenomena is what made Lacanian theory more 
compatible with feminist theory within the structuralist 
and Marxist paradigm. The value of this formulation can be 
judged by its widespread usage and the wealth of debate and 
controversy it generated; the past fifteen years have shown 
a rapid growth of Lacanian-based study in academic 
disciplines. 
What makes Lacanian theory compatible with the 
structuralist paradigm is that it thereby becomes the 
foundation of subjectivity. Lacan's usage of Saussurean 
semiology is derived from the intermediaries of Jakobson 
and Levi-Strauss, and whilst Jakobson's concerns are mainly 
with phonology and poetics as linguistic structures, Levi-
Strauss and Saussure are unambiguously Durkheimian in their 
concept of language as a social law. But whereas Lacan 
uses Levi-Strauss, the latter is unequivocal in his 
rejection of a psychoanalytic explanation of social 
structure; the description of totemism he gives is a purely 
structural one which he conceives of as quite autonomous: 
As affectivity is the most obscure side of man 
there has been the constant temptation to resort to 
it, forgetting that what is refractory to explanation 
is ipso facto unsuitable for use in explanation. We 
know virtually nothing of anxiety itself, and it is 
for biologists of the future to show us some order in 
this phenomenon. (1) 
Here the rejection of the psychological reality of social 
structure is evident, as for Levi-strauss' structural 
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anthropology the psyche is quite simply an 'internal' 
correlate of an external social reality, even psychological 
explanation is erased since 'biology' is identified as the 
future source of information on anxiety. 
The second and third chapters of the thesis explore 
in greater detail, and in depth, the history of this 
misunderstanding between anthropology and psychoanalysis. 
But before describing the anthropological critique of 
psychoanalysis, the socialist critique should be spelled 
out. Althusser's acceptance of the Lacanian doctrine 
should not be held as indicative of a more general 
acceptance, by socialism, of psychoanalysis itself. Apart 
from the work of a few socialist psychoanalysts, and the 
work of the Frankfurt School in pre-war Germany and in the 
United States, socialism and psychoanalysis have mostly 
been understood as mutually exclusive. 
The socialist critique of psychoanalysis is as varied 
as its range of critics, but it is possible to generalise 
across the range of critiques and find points which are 
common to all. Marxist theory usually criticises and 
rejects psychoanalytic theory on three counts: as being 
'individualistic', as being 'essentialist', and as 
'ahistorical'. What validity is there in these criticisms? 
The critique of psychoanalysis as 'individualistic' 
is one which socialists share with anthropologists and 
social scientists, who are apprehensive that it attempts to 
explain social events and social structures in terms of 
individual needs. But it is based on a misapprehension, as 
the concept of the individual is not a psychoanalytic 
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concept. Whether human beings are understood according to 
the first Freudian topography, as constituted by a dynamic 
interaction between the mental and physical systems of the 
unconscious, preconscious and conscious, or whether 
conceived according to the second topography as comprising 
the conflicts between ego, superego and id, the human being 
is defined as a divided subject. The idea of the 
completely unified self as in-dividual is understood as one 
of the ego's defences against the more difficult knowledge 
of one's more conflicting motives and impulses. 
The relation between 'internal' psychic processes and 
'external' social entails a complex interaction of 
identificatory mechanisms such as projection and 
introjection. The boundaries of the 'self' are often 
defined in relation to the body's physical edges, the skin, 
the sensory organs, etc., but may be based on an imaginary 
version of the physical boundaries. The bodily metaphors 
for the subject are ubiquitous in gesture, thought, art and 
language, and pre-Oedipal experience of the body is 
predominant in such metaphors. Oral metaphors include such 
terms as "thirst" for knowledge, "biting" wit or satire, 
"hunger" for knowledge, "devouring" information, a "half-
baked" idea and "half-digested" knowledge; and in the arts 
the evaluation of introjected imagery is defined in terms 
of "taste". These metaphors are all those of oral 
introjection, one aspect of the mechanism of identification 
which is constitutive of the subject. The other aspect of 
identification is projection which is often used 
defensively for the protection of the 'self' from criticism 
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and self-dislike. The metaphors associated with projection 
are almost all to do with expulsion, rejection, denial and 
with anal excretion. The connection between the 
psychological process of identification and the organic 
processes of incorporation and excretion is not only 
metaphoric. K. Abraham has noted: 
The first vital relation of the infant to 
external objects consists in sucking up into its 
mouth a substance that is suitable for it and 
accessible to it. In its embryonic life, the first 
organ that is formed in connection with the earliest 
simple process of cell division is the so-called 
'blastophore', an organ which is permanently retained 
... For a time, in embryo, there exists an open 
connection between the intestinal canal (rectum) and 
the caudal part of the neural canal (canalis 
neurentericus). The path along which stimuli may be 
transmitted from the intestinal canal to the nervous 
system might thus be said to be marked out 
organically. (2) 
The imaginary body which is to be found in metaphors of 
behaviour, language and all symbolic processes differs from 
the real, organic body in that the former is a pre-Oedipal 
body the experience of which is retained in unconscious 
memory, whilst the latter is simply an organic entity. Of 
course the two continue to interact and affect one another, 
as Freud and Fliess discovered when analysing hysterical 
symptoms. But whereas Freud and psychoanalysts have 
described the imaginary body as one determinant of the 
ego's mechanism of identification ("the ego is first of all 
a body ego": Freud), and as a vestigial infantile 
experience, the sociological theories try to conceptualise 
the imaginary body as a product of social structure. For 
example, Mary Douglas and Edmund Leach have each proposed 
that the subjective experience of the boundaries that serve 
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to differentiate 'internal' and 'external' space derives 
from symbolic systems that exist to demarcate social space. 
Symbolic systems, they argue, have their own level of 
determinacy, so that the body is only socially significant 
insofar as it is the bearer of representations of the 
social space. 
Of course the body is not the only component of the 
subject understood in psychoanalytic terms, since the 
division of the subject propels the human being into symbol 
formation and eventually into culture. The socialist 
critique of psychoanalysis as a study of the individual, or 
of intrapsychic processes only, is often complemented by 
the structuralist concept of the subject, as developed by 
Foucault, Derrida, Barthes and Lacan. However it seems 
increasingly true that this concept of the 'divided 
subject' or 'decentred subject' is a Freudian concept that 
has simply been emptied of its specific content, the 
Oedipus complex and infantile sexuality, and has been 
redeployed as a concept of a psychic structure containing 
only social representations. The dialectic between social 
determinants is complicated, and when describing the 
Oedipus complex for example it is impossible to determine 
whether it exists in order for society and culture to be 
possible, or whether the latter exists in order to contain 
it. But there has been a tradition of undue emphasis on 
the determining aspects of symbolic and social structures 
which has obscured the reality of psychic process. It is 
thus not only incorrect but also hypocritical to use 
knowledge of social systems to obscure psychic reality and 
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then criticise psychoanalysis for being about the "obscure 
side of man". The Freudian metapsychology is used to 
describe the processes in individuals, and the unconscious 
was always defined as a 'collective' unconscious by Freud. 
If the individual is understood as one aspect of the 
subject, as a particular representation of the self, or 
ego, it becomes possible to define the dialectic between 
psyche and social structure. The ego is made up of 
conscious and unconscious representations of the body, real 
and imaginary bodies, and includes identifications with 
other subjects and other parts of subjects. The ego also 
comprises adaptations to reality and the demands of the 
superego. But it is a central condition of the subject 
that it is interconnected, through the necessary, 
involuntary and partly unconscious process of 
identification, with others. It is not only the superego 
or the symbolic that connects subject and society but the 
ego itself. Identity, or the idea of an individual, is a 
product of a more active process of identification, which 
is common to subjects, groups, institutions, and which 
forms the basis of social structure. 
When psychoanalysis is criticised as a doctrine of 
idealism, this is usually from the basis of the traditional 
philosophical distinction between idealism and materialism. 
Many Marxists think that psychoanalysis suggests that ideas 
have an existence that is independent of material reality. 
From the perspective of historical or dialectical 
materialism, psychological theories seem to explain 
'consciousness' or mental processes within terms of a 
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conceptual framework which takes little account of material 
reality. 
The concept of essentialism is also derived from the 
philosophical distinction between 'essence' and 
'appearance', and the dualism which defines these 
categories as opposites. From the perspective of 
dialectical materialism, essentialism is defined as 
follows: 
Essence is a sum total of all latent ties, 
relations and internal laws determining the main 
features and trends in development of a material 
system. Appearances are individual phenomena, 
properties or processes expressing outward aspects of 
reality, a form of manifestation and revelation of 
some essence ... Essentialists ascribe an ideal, 
divine origin to the essence of things and contend 
that it is primary in relation to material things. 
( 3 ) 
Essence, as an embodiment of 'internal laws', is comparable 
to the concept of structure in structuralist theory, and a 
fully materialist analysis must define 'system' in relation 
to 'structure', or 'appearance' in relation to 'essence' 
through empirical and theoretical forms of knowledge. 
Essentialists are unable to account for the history of the 
structure or 'internal laws' except through an idealist 
account, such as a religious or mystical 'divine origin', 
and so are unable to define the interaction of 'essence' 
and 'material system'. 
As the term 'essentialism' has acquired a critical 
value as an unquestionable negative judgement, its meaning 
has altered. Connotations of 'essence' in the sense of a 
concentrated distillation, a physical substance such as a 
liquid, or an intense smell, have been added to the 
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original philosophical meaning. Thus the critique of 
undialectical thinking has become confused with the 
cerebral separation from the baser sensorial register of 
touch, taste and smell. 
Ironically, the contemporary socialist feminisms that 
have formulated the most forceful critique of classical 
psychoanalysis as "essentialist" or idealist, have often 
opted for a Lacanian version of psychoanalysis. The 
latter, they suggest, places less emphasis on the 
significance of the 'drives', instincts and the biological 
basis of mental activity, and is thus more compatible with 
existing theories of gender identity within the social 
sciences. However it seems more likely that the Lacanian 
version is the more idealist, and essentialist. Lacan, 
working with a Levi-straussian concept of the symbolic, 
sees the unconscious as a predominantly signifying 
structure, and sees language as the basic material of the 
psyche. As I argue in greater depth in the second chapter 
of the thesis, Levi-Strauss combines this symbolic 
determinism with a form of physiological reductionism, 
since he locates the structure of signifying systems within 
the neuro-anatomy of the brain, in an entirely metaphoric 
way. Neuronic 'firing' is seen as analogous to phonemic 
difference and the creation of meaning in language. 
Although social structure is derived from an innate 
capacity for humans to recognise the "exigency of the rule 
as rule"; the laws of social structure, linguistic 
structure and anatomical structure are defined as 
analogous. Unsurprisingly, this idealism is based on an 
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idealisation of masculinity; the Levi-Straussian theory of 
kinship defines the rules of alliance as the exchange of 
women, Lacanian theory defines language as phallocentric. 
Why should this be the case? Is there a sexual logic 
underlying the formulation of abstract categories such as 
those of 'materiality' and 'idealism'? For the Lacanian 
Marxists and feminists the structuralist theory is directly 
compatible with their preconceived notion of materialism. 
Removing the 'essentialist' references to the body, in the 
economic framework of the Freudian metapsychology's theory 
of the instincts and drives, the science of linguistics is 
called upon to fill the gap, and so produce a 'unified' 
materialism of psyche in society. This theory presents an 
apparent orderliness but many contradictory formulations, 
such as are to be found in Mitchell's psychoanalysis and 
Feminism (1974) for example, which are discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter. 
psychoanalysis, I contend, contains an entirely 
materialist theory of mind, and although it shares many of 
its objects with theories of language, culture, history and 
religion, it is not inextricably linked with these or 
dependent on them for its materialism. Although it defines 
mental structures as autonomous areas of human activity, 
without reducing mind to any of its physiological, 
anatomical or genetic components, psychoanalysis is 
ultimately a 'biology' of the mind. How is biology to be 
conceptualised other than as a physiological, anatomical or 
genetic analysis of living matter? In what way could 
psychoanalysis be said to include a "biological 
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materialism"? Ernst Mayr has defined biological theory as 
comprising different types of analytic method: 
The word biology suggests a uniform and unified 
science. Yet recent developments have made it 
increasingly clear that biology is a most complex 
area - indeed that the word biology is a label for 
two largely separate fields that greatly differ in 
method and basic concepts. These are 'functional' 
and 'evolutionary' biology. The functional biologist 
is vitally concerned with the operation and 
interaction of structural elements, from molecules up 
to organs and whole individuals. Functional 
biologists deal with proximate causes and ask 'how' 
questions .... The chief technique of the functional 
biologist is the experiment, and his approach is 
essentially the same as that of the physicist and the 
chemist. Indeed by isolating the studied phenomenon 
sufficiently from the complexities of the organism he 
may achieve the ideal of a purely physical or 
chemical experiment. In spite of certain limitations 
of this method one must agree with the functional 
biologist that such a simplified approach is an 
absolute necessity for achieving his particular 
objectives. The spectacular success of biochemical 
and biophysical research justifies this direct though 
distinctly simplistic approach. The evolutionary 
biologist differs in his method and in the problems 
in which he is interested. His basic question is 
'Why?', 'How come?'. Every organism, whether an 
individual or a species, is the product of a long 
history, a history that dates back more than two 
thousand million years. There are no 'absolute 
phenomena' in biology. Everything is time bound and 
space bound, the animal or plant or micro-organism he 
is working with is but a link in the evolutionary 
chain of changing forms, none of which has any 
permanent validity. (4). 
Mayr describes the functional biology as a teleology, 
it deals with 'proximate causes'; and evolutionary biology 
as a teleonomy dealing with 'ultimate causes'. So if we 
accept Mayr's judgement on the state of biological theory 
it is possible to conceive of psychoanalysis as a part of 
the evolutionary approach to understanding the species in 
terms of its history. Without reducing psychic reality to 
the functional biologist's concepts of physiology, anatomy, 
or the neuro-chemical processes of the organism, it is 
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reasonable to define Freudian psychoanalysis as a 
materialist theory. 
Of course, Freud did start from the perspective of 
functional biology, and had been very much influenced, 
through Brucke, by the work of Helmholtz who could be 
described as a functional materialist. Freud's early work 
such as the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) was 
partly an attempt to relate psychological processes of 
memory, perception, recognition and representation, 
directly to the neurological systems of the brain and 
central nervous system. Later Freud's search for 
'proximate causes' in psychic processes was supplemented, 
and then supplanted, by his inquiries into the longer term 
history of human culture, and psychoanalysis was firmly 
located within evolutionary science. Indeed the most 
recently discovered of the metapsychological papers, 
rediscovered in 1987, is an account of the phylogenetic 
method in psychoanalysis. The theory of psychic 
development was based on a version of the so-called 
biogenetic law, accounting for the way in which the 
anatomical development of the foetus in the womb is 
correlated to the development of the libidinal stages in 
childhood and to psychic development in maturity. The 
biogenetic law, discussed more fully in chapter four, is a 
theory of recapitulation, which seeks to relate the 
morphology and psychology of existing forms to the pattern 
of evolution of their predecessors. The form of 
recapitulation of ancestral forms that is specific to 
humans, and some other primates, is that of paedomorphosis, 
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the retention of "juvenile, even larval, characteristics in 
adult life" (Medawar, 1985). 
Although frequently dismissed as a vestigial remain 
of an unfortunately nineteenth century "flavour" (Mitchell, 
1974), Freud's version of the biogenetic law is a vital 
part of the general metapsychology. More recently, 
Sulloway's study in the history of science Freud, Biologist 
of the Mind (1980), demonstrated the centrality of this 
evolutionary perspective in the metapsychology and indeed 
throughout Freud's work. Many contemporary psychoanalysts 
have continued this line of inquiry. In the 1940s Susan 
Isaacs and Paula Heimann showed that the concept of the 
drive (the psychic representation of instinct) can be 
readily linked to hormonal processes, and can be traced 
through biochemical changes. The effect of hormones 
becomes central in defining the effects of unconscious 
phantasy and infantile drives on the process of adult 
maturation. Hormones have the function of regulating the 
onset and the termination of processes of physical growth, 
they are also central in effecting sexual behaviour. The 
relation between the genetic influence on growth and the 
psychological processes is impossible to determine in any 
exact, functional, way. But it is clear that human 
diphasic sexuality, with two periods of growth, in infancy 
and following physical maturity, is an evolutionary 
development produced by paedomorphosis. Medawar and 
Medawar (1985) state: "The genetic system of a species is 
the whole of that which provides for the transmission of 
genetic information from one generation to the next. ~ 
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most important element is the mating system." (p.116). 
There is no doubt that the Freudian view of the human 
'mating system' as governed by the Oedipus complex is fully 
compatible with this theory and that it serves to amplify 
and illustrate how such transmission is reproduced. The 
human evolutionary development of extended dependence, 
prematurity at birth and diphasic sexual growth, produced 
by the 'paedomorphic' form of recapitulationism, is 
governed by the hormones. 
The relative rates of development of the several 
parts of the body .•. are not invariant. One of the 
most interesting, and from an evolutionary point of 
view one of the most important, departs from a set 
tempo and order of differentiation in that whereby 
organisms become sexually mature at a relatively 
juvenile stage, what is in effect an adult therefore 
retains juvenile, even larval, characteristics in 
adult life (5). 
The interaction of genetic, instinctual and 
psychological factors in producing the human capacity for 
symbol formation and language is more fully discussed in 
chapter four on the origins of language and the origins of 
writing. Whatever the impact of the evolution of language, 
speech and symbolic behaviour on the human organism, there 
is no doubt that an accurate conceptualisation of the human 
psyche cannot describe it in a disembodied form. The 
materialism of mind is as necessary as the materialist 
description of society and of language. 
So, Freudian psychoanalysis, far from being an 
idealist or essentialist doctrine, is a strongly 
materialist theory. The problem this now raises for 
defining the interaction of psychic reality social 
structure and history, is that of three conflicting 
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material isms. The Durkheimian basis of sociology issues 
from a social or symbolic materialism, the Marxist basis of 
historical materialism bases itself, ultimately, in an 
economics, whilst psychoanalysis even as a theory of 
meaning, is ultimately based within a "biology of the 
mind". This conflict of explanatory methods has been 
discussed by Timpanaro in On Materialism (1975), who 
examines the discrepancies between the differing 
definitions of materialism and argues against recent 
Marxist structuralisms. Timpanaro stresses biological 
materialism as a necessary component of Marxist 
materialism, to ground class struggle in its appropriate 
temporal axis: 
A phenomenon like capitalism arose on the 
socio-economic level; it belongs to that form of 
historicity with an accelerated rhythm which is 
characteristic of human history alone and which is 
related to the new mode of transmitting experiences 
through learning and not only through biological 
heredity. (6) 
Nevertheless Timpanaro's "route" to biology is 
through the bodily needs such as nutrition, illness, death, 
which he considers to be insufficiently accounted for by 
historical materialism. There is no discussion of the 
extent to which gender and sexuality are part of the 
problematic. We have seen that within a Marxist model of 
base and superstructure the institutions of family, 
culture, the question of gender identity, sexual difference 
and the role of infancy are all considered to be 
superstructural forms. The Oedipus complex, and many 
aspects of the psyche itself, could be classified, in this 
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model, as ideological forms. 
In contradistinction to this the psychoanalytic model 
attributes to the Oedipus complex, infancy, and sexual 
difference, a fundamental and powerful determinacy. These 
are seen as the contradictions underlying many historical 
events, the basis of religion, culture and even the basis 
of reality itself. 
Many freudo-marxisms have sought to synthesise these 
two materialisms, although each is practically compendious; 
these syntheses have rarely proved satisfactory to either 
socialists or psychoanalysts. In using both theories we 
have two bases, each offering a description of the same 
object or, to use a spatial metaphor, each occupying the 
'space' of the other; and yet neither theory can be reduced 
to the other's conceptual system or translated into the 
terms of the other's concepts. If the base-superstructure 
metaphor is a spatial one, what if we considered, as does 
Timpanaro, the spheres of 'production' and 'reproduction' 
as time-bound processes, what are the temporal axes of the 
Oedipal complex and of class contradiction? 
The claim that psychoanalytic explanation of cultural 
forms is 'ahistorical' is part of the critique of the 
former as an essentialist or idealist doctrine. We have 
seen that Freud's biological materialism is an evolutionary 
paradigm which contains an implicit view of historical 
processes. These processes, however, do not correlate with 
the description of history offered by historical 
materialism. Although the economic mode of production, 
social superstructure and ideologies of the epochs of Greek 
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slave society, feudal Britain and late capitalist USA do 
not resemble one another, similar Oedipal structures are 
evident in narratives from each of these cultures. Thus 
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, many of the Greek myths, 
Shakespeare's Hamlet and many of his tragedies, and 
innumerable contemporary narratives found in Hollywood 
cinema, all describe Oedipal tragedies or fantasies of a 
life or death struggle between son and father, protagonist 
and the law. The forms of Greek tragic theatre are 
specific to the culture of classical antiquity, the forms 
and language of Shakespearian drama are also specific to 
the class structure of seventeenth century Britain, just as 
the forms of popular cinema are specific to an industrial 
capitalist economy. But the content of the Oedipal 
struggle does not change its basic form when other aspects 
of society change following a transformation of the mode of 
production. The forms in which the Oedipus complex may 
find expression do vary considerably in different societies 
and economies, so that although marriage always carries 
some expression of Oedipal wishes, the kinship systems of, 
say, matrilineal India, patriarchal Arab societies, and the 
nuclear family of Western Europe each give a different 
expression to those wishes. 
Marriage ritual, rites of passage, religious 
ceremonies and deities themselves all provide transparent 
representations of the Oedipal triangle in all cultures. 
Another, direct expression of the Oedipus complex is to be 
found in narrative structure as is demonstrated in chapter 
1 . 
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The controversy over the historical specificity of 
the Oedipus complex has existed since the earliest 
experiments in 'applied psychoanalysis'. In the 1920s the 
controversy between Ernest Jones and Bronislaw Malinowski , 
as to how to interpret ethnographic data on the kinship 
structure of south-west Melanesian society, was a test case 
in testing the psychoanalytic hypothesis of the 
universality of the Oedipus complex. Malinowski considered 
himself sympathetic to the Freudian view but following 
extensive fieldwork in Melanesia claimed that the data on 
the Melanesians disproved the hypothesis. Malinowski 
described a society in which there was no recognition, or 
no public recognition, of the role of the father in 
procreation, and in which the mother's brother, rather than 
the biological father, was in a position of social 
authority over the mother's sons. since boys remained on 
friendly terms with their fathers, and were only submitted 
to the harsher authority of their uncles, Malinowski 
concluded that this matrilineal society had no Oedipus 
complex, and that the latter could be said to be restricted 
to patrilineal societies only. Following the presentation 
of the anthropological report to the scientific meeting of 
the British psychoanalytic society, Ernest Jones (the 
president of the Society at that time) offered a 
reinterpretation of Malinowski's data (7). He argued that 
the "sexual ignorance" of Melanesian society was apparent 
rather than real, and that the avunculate was used to split 
the Oedipal father into two figures, each representing one 
aspect of the son's ambivalent relation to him. Thus the 
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biological father retains affectionate bonds to his sons 
whilst the 'prohibitive father' image is projected onto the 
mother's brother. This institutionalised form of defence 
against overwhelming conflict demonstrates how social 
institutions can be used to take the part of the ego in 
maintaining identification, and is an example of the 
defence mechanism of splitting and projection. A 
rudimentary defence such as this is maintained at the cost 
of denial, in this case the denial of the knowledge of the 
facts of paternity. Jones argued that the matrilineal 
kinship system was a reaction to the Oedipus complex and 
not a socially prior form. Both Malinowski and Jones 
published their analyses of the data, and their theoretical 
arguments, and Malinowski eventually agreed with Jones' 
reinterpretation. 
Wilhelm Reich also set out to show that the Oedipus 
complex was a product of a relatively recent, patrilineal, 
social structure, and that it is dependent on the western 
nuclear family of capitalism. A thorough critique of his 
hypotheses has been forwarded by Grunberger and 
Chassegret-smirgel (8). 
The first attempt to describe the Oedipus complex as 
it influences social structure, was Freud's book Totem and 
Taboo. This study also set out a history of the Oedipus 
complex, arguing that it evolved within a specific phase of 
human social reorganisation. Chapter 2 gives an account of 
the significance of Totem and Taboo in the overall pattern 
of Freud's work, and gives a historical account of the 
critical reception of this analysis of totemism. The 
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evolutionary paradigm of this aspect of applied 
psychoanalysis is outlined in relation to the conflicting 
interpretations of totemism. The evolutionary paradigm of 
this aspect of applied psychoanalysis is reassessed, and 
new evolutionary theory is used to replace the inaccurate 
and largely speculative is an example of the defence 
mechanism of splitting and projection. A rudimentary 
defence such as this is maintained at the cost of denial , 
in this case the denial of the knowledge of the facts of 
paternity. Jones argued that the matrilineal kinship 
system was a reaction to the Oedipus complex and not a 
socially prior form. Both Malinowski and Jones published 
their analyses of the data, and their theoretical 
arguments, and Malinowski eventually agreed with Jones' 
reinterpretation. 
Wilhelm Reich also set out to show that the Oedipus 
complex was a product of a relatively recent, patrilineal, 
social structure, and that it is dependent on the western 
nuclear family of capitalism. A thorough critique of his 
hypotheses has been forwarded by Grunberger and 
Chassegret-Smirgel (8). 
The first attempt to describe the Oedipus complex as 
it influences social structure, was Freud's book Totem and 
Taboo. This study also set out a history of the Oedipus 
complex, arguing that it evolved within a specific phase of 
human social reorganisation. Chapter 2 gives an account of 
the significance of Totem and Taboo in the overall pattern 
of Freud's work, and gives a historical account of the 
critical reception of this analysis of totemism. The 
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evolutionary paradigm of this aspect of applied 
psychoanalysis is outlined in relation to the conflicting 
interpretations of totemism. The evolutionary paradigm of 
this aspect of applied psychoanalysis is reassessed, and 
new evolutionary theory is used to replace the inaccurate 
and largely speculative accounts available to Freud in 
1918, so that the phylogenetic hypothesis, of a real event 
as the basis of the Oedipus complex, is fully reinstated. 
The concept of superego is explored with particular 
emphasis given to the function of superego as a vehicle of 
cultural transmission, the internalisation of prohibition, 
and the acquisition of syntax. The superego is presented 
as a concept describing the mechanism by which non-genetic 
transmission of knowledge is possible. 
The effect of supplementing Freudian theory with 
contemporary theories of evolution is to fundamentally 
challenge the former's conceptualisation of gender. The 
definition of the Oedipus complex as something completely 
distinct from its pre-Oedipal components becomes an 
inaccurate description. similarly, the Freudian emphasis 
on the father-and-son axis of the Oedipal struggle becomes 
a partial fragment of the overall triangular structure. In 
particular the historical roles of women, especially as 
mothers, is brought back into perspective. It is suggested 
that recognition of the maternal function is 
extraordinarily difficult in human culture and that this 
difficulty must be acknowledged before any significant 
changes can be made in the social position of women. 
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Chapter 1 discusses the existing political and 
historical theories which have been advanced in feminist 
theory and demonstrates how these might be usefully 
supplemented by the psychoanalytic historical perspective. 
Winnicott's account of the mother's contribution to society 
is used to explain the longevity of the misrecognition of 
the feminine function and the oppression of women. But 
although the historical perspective of psychoanalysis is 
different from that of Marxist 'historical materialism' and 
feminist social history, it is wrong to describe 
psychoanalytic interpretations of culture and society as 
ahistorical. 
If it is only the form of the Oedipus complex that is 
liable to change with varying social formations and 
economic modes of production affecting the social 
organisation of the family, what is to be made of the 
immutability of its content? What kind of historical 
method emerges from the conjunction of economic, social and 
psychological materialisms? If psychoanalysis has seemed 
to be an ahistorical method when applied to problems from 
the social sciences and humanities this is mainly because 
it has been used, in traditional academic disciplines, as 
an adjunct of either Marx's historical materialism or of an 
idealist historical method. Both of these methods tend to 
sever the concept of mind from the concept of body in order 
to conceive of the psyche as a product of a system defined 
primarily in terms of either homo oeconomicus, or homo 
sapiens. Homo sapiens is a concept which is the direct 
product of the idealist doctrine of "cerebral primacy". 
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Engels was one of the earliest critics of the idealism 
inherent in this perspective on human evolution. In his 
paper 'On the Part played by Labour in the Transition from 
Ape to Man' in 1876 Engels applied the theory of dialectic 
to the question of the determining events in human 
prehistory and was led to suppose that, contrary to the 
belief of his contemporaries, it was the development of 
toolmaking that led to the comparative enlargement of the 
cerebellum rather than brain size predetermining toolmaking 
activity. Engels' rigorous use of informed speculation was 
recently proved right following revisions in evolutionary 
science (9). The prehistoric precursor of Marx's homo 
oeconomicus was, probably, Engels' 
homo faber. 
We have seen that structuralism gives explanatory 
priority either to a homo symbolicans, of Durkheim's 
'representations collectives' or to homo loguens, the 
speaking subject of a more Lacanian order. The history of 
these imaginary protagonists of a structuralist historical 
method is explored further in chapter 4, where the study of 
existing theories of the origins of writing and of the 
origin of language facilitates a more precise definition of 
the concept of prehistory. If history is defined as the 
existence of a surviving material record of a culture then 
history begins, potentially at least, with the invention of 
writing, some two thousand years Be in the Middle East. 
For the Freudian theorist, the historical protagonist 
would be a homo infantilis, a term which has the 
disadvantage of reducing all unconscious phenomena to their 
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roots in extended human dependence on caretakers, but has 
the advantage of stressing a clear demarcation between the 
Freudian and the structuralist psychologies. 
So how are we to formulate the interrelation of the 
histories of homo oeconomicus, homo symbolicans and homo 
infantilis? If each of these 'protagonists' has a 
different history, as dictated by the conceptual framework 
of their respective theoretical paradigms, which history is 
the most 'real', or the most adequate for describing 
'reality'? To formulate the question along historical 
lines requires conceiving of a number of different time 
scales, each with its own tempo, rates of change, and laws 
of change. This then resolves some of the problems of 
using a spatial metaphor to think of base-superstructure, 
and the problem of two theories vying to describe the same 
object in contradictory conceptual terms. 
A useful example of this is to be found in comparing 
the structuralist and psychoanalytic theories of narrative, 
discussed in chapter 1. There is also a growing literature 
on the concept of history as narrative, following the 
development of theoretical studies in narratology. 
So far, examples of psychoanalytic material have been 
restricted to the analysis of manifestations of the oedipus 
complex in various cultural forms. The Oedipus complex is 
a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory, and Freud's Totem 
and Taboo argues the importance of the concept for a 
systematic and inclusive analysis of such social and 
religious forms as totemism, and, by extension, of all 
social institutions. But a more significant dynamic is 
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that of pre-Oedipal psychic structure, and although it is 
less well documented and understood, especially in its 
cultural and social manifestations, its effects are no less 
determining. To some extent the relation between pre-
Oedipal and Oedipal psychic structure is discussed and 
argued throughout the thesis, particularly in chapter 1 in 
terms of feminist politics, and in chapter 4 in terms of 
the symbolisation of sexual difference. Having started 
from a position of social, or cultural, determinism, the 
thesis became an exploration of the possibilities produced 
by the theory of psychic determinism. If the meanings of 
gender difference are a product of unconscious phantasy as 
much as of social structure what use can be made of such 
knowledge? 
The first chapter discusses the impact of psychic 
determinism on existing explanations of the social position 
of women. The questions of the historical axes of Marxism, 
semiotics and psychoanalysis are discussed in greater 
detail, in order to arrive at a concept of a history of 
sexual difference. The question of the status of intuitive 
knowledge vis-a-vis scientific method is also discussed so 
that the possibility of a "science of sexual difference" or 
a "feminist science" is proposed. An example of the 
knowledge produced by such a science is given in 
Winnicott's analysis of the meaning of woman in the 
unconscious, which raises new questions for feminist 
practice. 
In the second chapter, a description of the dialectic 
between social reality and psychic reality is given. 
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Through the study of Freud's applied psychoanalysis in 
Totem and Taboo, and the history of its reception amongst 
anthropologists and social scientists, the contradictions 
between social science and psychoanalysis are explored. 
The concept of superego is defined in terms of its 
historical, evolutionary, function and its necessity, as a 
critical concept for cultural analysis, is argued. As the 
site of the intersection of anatomical, linguistic, 
cultural and historical processes it provides a useful 
basis for understanding the meaning of political, social 
and cultural institutions. 
The fourth chapter continues the exploration of the 
connection between superego and linguistic structures in 
relation to questions of the origins of symbol formation. 
The concept of origin is discussed and its romantic 
connotations analysed. Theories of the origin of speech 
and of the origin of writing are compared and a textual 
analysis of three "proto-symbolic", prehistoric scripts 
examines the symbolic representation of sexual difference 
across three societies. Certain similarities are noted, 
including the repeated association of female with 
metaphoric representation, with maternity, and being linked 
in a couple, and with 'internal' space. The symbolism of 
femininity and masculinity is related to the pre-Oedipal 
and oedipal psychic processes. controversies within the 
psychoanalytic theory of psychic determinism are explored 
with especial reference to the representation of gender and 
sexuality. 
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In the conclusion, the main arguments of the thesis 
are drawn from the research. In addition, a further 
example of the analysis ~f pre-Oedipal psychic processes in 
cultural and historical events is given. The dialectic of 
historical materialism, and psychic materialism as 
manifested in the anti-semitism of pre-war Germany is 
described and an analysis of racist ideology in 
contemporary Britain, in terms of its role as an 
institutionalised system of projection and denial, argues 
that deep fears of one's own aggression and sadism are 
denied by the national ideology, and are projected onto a 
group designated as alien through visible difference. 
The analysis of racism as a system of culturally-
condoned direction of cruelty, without guilt, towards a 
designated 'other' or culturally-designated scapegoat group 
is shown to be similar to that of sexism. And the analysis 
argues that the politics of feminism and of anti-racist 
struggle are inextricably linked. 
The question of why it is so difficult to think about 
women is readdressed, and is considered in relation to the 
structures of knowledge and recognition in scientific and 
academic discourse. I contend that sexual difference is a 
fundamental reality which has a structuring effect on all 
systems of signification and representation. 
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What is the history of sexual difference? 
The biological fact of the duality of the sexes 
emerges before us as a great enigma, something lost to 
our knowl~dge, defying any attempt at tracing it back 
to so~ethIng else. Psychoanalysis did not contribute 
any~hIng to the clarification of this problem. It 
ObVIously belongs as a whole to biology. Freud 1938 
(1). ' , 
If any analysis of female psychology is to take 
place it is high time that a decisive break was made, 
both with biologism in general and with the specific 
contribution it makes here: that a so-called biological 
dualism between the sexes is reflected in mental life . 
... Biology is no longer relevant. In an important 
sense, on this question it has not been relevant since 
the foundation of human society. That foundation 
itself distinguished between the sexes. 
Mitchell, 1974 (2). 
The opposition between these two views of the 
construction of difference expresses a controversy which 
underlies many conflicts in both psychology and feminism. 
In its widest, most inclusive form, the controversy can be 
held to include the differentiation between 'innate' and 
'acquired' characteristics in biology or language learning; 
the opposition of conceptual categories of 'nature' and 
'culture' in social anthropology; the differences between 
'internal' and 'external' reality in philosophy and 
psychology; the ambiguity of 'organic' and 'environmental' 
determinants in the social sciences. 
In this chapter I explore a number of the fields of 
enquiry in which this opposition exists, and suggest how 
these may contribute to the construction of a materialist 
theory of sexual difference, and of the cultural 
consequences of sexual difference. The controversy within 
psychoanalytic theory has been at the heart of the 
development of a general metapsychology, as sexual 
difference is understood to be an elementary fact in the 
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mental experience of the body. In classical Freudian 
theory the human capacity to conceptualise sexual 
difference has been understood to underlie the capacity to 
symbolise, to differentiate between 'internal' and 
'external' reality, to recognise time and to use numbers, 
to differentiate between self and non-self, and to 
differentiate between external objects. Here the precise 
terms of the opposition between the classical and the 
feminist theory (as represented by Mitchell) become a 
matter of importance, and will be discussed in greater 
detail further on. 
In the field of linguistics, the opposition between 
'innate' and 'acquired' aspects of language has created 
ambiguity in the conceptualisation of 'competence' and 
'performance' as different aspects of language. connected 
with this, as Kristeva has shown, there is ambiguity in the 
concept of the speaker/hearer's intuition used, by 
linguistic science, as the sole criterion of the 
correctness or incorrectness of grammatical form (3). The 
many conflicts in theories of language acquisition, and the 
inevitable overlap between linguistics and psychology in 
formulating a developmental account of the acquisition of 
syntax, demonstrate the contradiction inherent in the 
conceptual categories of classical linguistics. Kristeva's 
theory, which suggests that objective knowledge of human 
capacities, such as language, cannot exist without an 
integral theory of subjectivity, is discussed and is used 
as one example of the necessary self-reflexivity of 
feminist thought. 
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In a parallel field, structural anthropology, there 
have been many recent applications of the binary opposition 
'nature' and culture' to the problematic of gender roles in 
culture. Some of the hypotheses forwarded by Orther (1974), 
Ardner (1975), 
Rubin (1975), MacCormack (1980), and Jordanova and Brown 
(1981) are discussed, along with the sociology of Hirst and 
Woolley (1979). 
In philosophy and theology, the debates on the 
differences between 'internal' and 'external' reality have 
been too numerous to specify, except as forerunners of the 
theories of culture and gender discussed here. One 
contemporary theory of the history and philosophy of 
science maintains that the differentiation between internal 
and external is fundamental to science, (Popper, 1975, 
1977) and the philosophy of science is of direct use in 
formulating questions for a theory of ideology. 
The many feminisms that have emerged over the last 
fifteen years have broadened the scope of cultural analysis 
and have helped to define, more clearly, the question of 
sexual difference as it impinges on social structure. At 
present, a number of very divergent currents can be charted 
within the overall field of feminist theory. Insofar as 
these all posit some theory of the relation of sexual 
difference to society and culture, these feminisms could be 
shown to imply a theory of subjectivity and ideology. I 
explore the Althusserian theory of ideology, particularly 
its twin concepts of reproduction (the aim of all 
ideological processes) and of history, in order to connect 
a number of feminist insights. 
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Methods of enquiry and forms of knowledge 
Whilst Freud and Mitchell locate sexual difference 
quite differently, in relation to biology, they both locate 
biology itself as an "elsewhere". For Freud it is a 
fundamental basis of psychoanalysis, an irreducible matrix 
which intervenes in mental phenomena in a number of forms. 
For Mitchell it is an unnecessary encumbrance, from which 
psychoanalysis can be delivered, by the coupling of 
linguistics and anthropology. The irreconcilable 
divergence between them nevertheless emanates from a 
similar starting point; each posits the field of biology as 
alien, an "elsewhere", outside of the corpus of 
psychoanalytic thought. Perhaps, to reverse the metaphor, 
a foreign body in the systematic formulation of 
psychological processes. 
I shall argue that sociological and political theories 
also tend to project the body as an "elsewhere", as a 
factor alien to their central concerns. This process has 
an intellectual variant which is most clearly manifested in 
the contemporary construction of (and fear of) a category, 
"biological reductionism" or "essentialism", which acts as 
a severe constraint on thinking in the social sciences and 
in cultural analysis. The process of projection also has a 
number of psychological and social variants, racism and 
sexism, which will be analysed alongside the intellectual 
and theoretical forms. 
If it is possible to build an integrated theory of the 
cause, effect, social and historical organisation of sexual 
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difference, this will require an unusual amount of inter-
disciplinary thought. The different fields of enquiry onto 
which the question impinges, such as psychoanalysis, 
anthropology, Marxism, feminism, have different theoretical 
and conceptual bases and different methods. Not even the 
overall theory of structuralism has been able successfully 
to mediate the epistemic conflicts that arise from these 
differences. 
At first sight the conflicts would seem to arise from 
the 'gaps' between the conceptual bases, such as the 
fundamentally synchronic methods of contemporary 
ethnologies for example. On closer investigation it 
appears that the conflicts arise more from the conceptual 
convergence of these fields. For example, in the following 
chapter I explore the considerable overlap between the 
objects of psychoanalysis and social anthropology. Some of 
the customs, rituals and symbolism described and explained 
by anthropologists are also described and, differently, 
explained by psychoanalysis. A convenient way of avoiding 
the conflict arising from this overlap has been to 
designate the anthropological field as the study of the 
social, and the psychological as the study of the 
individual, but this is both inaccurate and misleading. 
The conflicts arising from the descriptions of the "incest 
taboo" and "Oedipus complex" as human universals are 
particularly significant. Or, to take a slightly different 
example, some of the processes described in the Freudian 
metapsychology as 'instinctual impulses', 'drives' or 
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'instincts' rna 1 b Y a so e described within the concepts of 
language of neuro-biology in terms of certain biochemical 
processes, although neither of these objects completely 
describes the other. 
So, although it is important to maintain a sense of the 
differences between the concepts and language of 
psychoanalysis, anthropology, linguistics, and Marxism, we 
nevertheless have to give up the idea of them as completely 
autonomous disciplines, with each producing completely 
distinct theories about distinct objects. Certainly there 
is nothing to be gained by erasing the differences between 
these fields, nor from overlooking the differences of their 
terminologies and their histories. But the object of our 
investigation, sexual difference, requires an 
interdisciplinary method which means that we have to think 
about bridging the gaps between them and about recognising 
overlaps between them. 
Discussing the philosophy of biology, Francois Jacob 
notes that: 
There exists today a series of sciences that differ 
not only by the nature of the objects that are studied, 
but also by the concepts and language that are used. 
These sciences can be arranged in a certain order that 
corresponds to the hierarchy of the complexity found in 
the objects of these sciences ... In order to obtain a 
unified world view through science the question has 
repeatedly been raised as to the possibility of making 
bridges between adjacent disciplines ... Important 
advances in the history of sciences often come from 
bridging the gaps between them. (4) 
Jacob stresses that although "every proposition that is 
true for physics is also true for chemistry, biology or 
sociology" (5), that it is nevertheless impossible to 
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reduce the axioms on the sciences of complex objects to 
those underlying them in the hierarchy, which is why the 
psychoanalytic concepts of drives, of sexuality or of 
aggression cannot ultimately be represented in physics or 
chemistry. Complex objects have to be analysed at all 
levels, which means distinguishing effectively between the 
objects of each science. 
The debates from the philosophy of science are 
especially useful for establishing precision in the use of 
terms such as 'science ' . Kuhn (1977) rejects Popper's 
(1959) invocation of falsifiability as the primary 
criterion for any proposition to be considered truly 
scientific. Kuhn's criterion is the shared capacity of a 
community of professionals to solve certain kinds of 
puzzles or questions. This shared problematic he terms a 
paradigm, and characterises the history of science as a 
series of paradigm shifts. But whether we are justified in 
using his concept of a paradigm to describe any of the more 
complex sciences is doubtful. Kuhn himself objects to this 
extended usage of the term (6). Although psychoanalysis is 
not viewed as a scientific paradigm by Kuhn, there are 
theorists of psychoanalysis as science who have found his 
work useful for describing it as such (7). 
Whilst it is possible to make quite clear demarcations 
between the objects, concepts and languages of the physical 
sciences, and to order them hierarchically, this is not 
possible in the same way for the social sciences. In fact 
the general ambiguity and overlapping between the range of 
social and behavioural sciences gives rise to a special 
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kind of anxiety, such as has been described by Edmund Leach 
as arising from ambiguity in classification (8). One 
solution to absence of absolutes I'n 1 
conceptua demarcation 
in the social sciences has been the attempt to reduce the 
differences between discourses to zero, thereby making the 
overlap complete, and 'reducing' one science to another. 
Alternatively, a movement in the opposite direction is 
possible, so that all overlap is unacknowledged, or denied, 
and a discipline is assumed to be autonomous, thereby 
fragmenting the sense of unification or interrelation 
between sciences. These processes raise the old 
philosophical problem of 'reductionism' in science, which 
is discussed earlier. 
It has often been noted that in all scientific study of 
human beings, other than the study of humans as physical 
and chemical systems, in other words in all study of 'human 
nature', we find a further overlap between the object and 
the observer. It may be this complication of the 
observer's objectivity that results in the social and 
behavioural sciences being known as the 'soft' sciences, 
and acknowledgement of the affective responses which 
impinge on the neutrality of the information gathered. 
Devereux (9) notes that this overlap is ineradicable in the 
behavioural sciences and that it generates anxiety which 
should lead us to analyse the division between object and 
observer. Devereux has produced a critique of experimental 
psychology, noting that it seeks to deny the significance 
of the overlap, to eradicate knowledge of the partiality of 
the relation of communication between subject and observer 
50 
by overemphasising the importance of method and of 
quantifiable data. The anxiety produced in the observer 
generates what Devereux terms "counter transference 
resistances" which, he suggests, "tend to masquerade as 
methodology, causing further sui generis distortions": 
..• behavioural science data arouse anxieties which 
are warded off by a counter transference-inspired 
pseudo-methodology; this manoeuvre is responsible for 
nearly all the defects of behavioural science. I do 
not advocate the elimination of filters, I urge only 
the elimination of the illusion that they abolish all 
subjectivity and neutralise anxiety. They only 
displace and postpone these. (10). 
Devereux's method of research entails the more or less 
systematic attempt to compensate for this partiality of the 
communication between subject and observer on a conscious 
level through four stages, and to try and avoid 
overcompensating on an unconscious level. Rather than 
emulating the procedures of the physical sciences, which 
leads to an inappropriate reification of quantifiability, 
Devereux proposes a general scientific method, with 
interdisciplinary validity, using what is specific to the 
situation of the behavioural sciences. Thus, since the 
overlap between subject and observer is ineradicable, and 
since it causes 'disturbances' for the observer, Devereux 
proposes that we use these 'disturbances' as the most 
In his significant and characteristic data of research. 
words, "we must use the subjectivity inherent in all 
observation as the 'royal road' to an authentic rather than 
fictitious objectivity" (11). The four steps outlined by 
Devereux are: 
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1 
2 
3 
"A scrutiny of the matrix of meanings in which relevant 
data are embedded". , 
"A study of the scientist's personal involvement"; 
"A h compre ension of the nature and locus of the 
partition between subject and observer"; 
4 "The provisional acceptance, acknowledgement and 
exploitation of the observer's subjectivity" (12). 
Although it is necessary to devise principles for the 
theory of a general scientific method (as Devereux terms 
it), the application of these principles can only take 
place with reference to a specific object and discourse. 
Devereux's own application of the method is to anthropology 
and psychology, but the potential application of human 
sciences has important implications for all forms of 
cultural analysis. All empirical and observational studies 
would be rendered infinitely more complex, requiring a more 
scrupulous self-reflexivity on the part of the observer. 
The constraints imposed on the objectivity of empirical 
research would be more than compensated by the increase in 
research on subjectivity. And without reducing all 
research into external objects to the status of solipsism, 
the study of the scientist's "personal involvement" in the 
process of investigation itself would lead to momentous 
changes in the traditional methods of enquiry and forms of 
knowledge. This kind of change has very specific 
significance for the cultural meaning of gender. 
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A self-reflexive science f 1 o anguage? 
One example of the critique of the disembodied 
"objective" observer of scientific discourse can be found 
in Kristeva's studies of linguistics . 
. In its development in the work of Julia Kristeva 
semIology is conceived as a critical science a ' 
~ractice perpetually displacing its object a~d itself 
In a theoretical activity that operates a ceaseless 
destruction of the whole ideology of representation. 
Heath, 1973, (13). 
Although the influence of Kristeva's work has probably 
been widest in the study of literature and literary theory, 
it has much to offer as a critique of disembodied 
metalanguage. Recently her theories have been widely 
disseminated and discussed (Heath, 1973, 1979, Moi, 1985, 
Belsey, 1979, Jardine, 1981, Rose, 1982, Duchen, 1985, 
Cameron 1981, Berg and Berry, 1979) and criticised (Adams 
and Brown 1978, Hall, 1978, White 1980). Her work is 
sometimes grouped with that of Jakobson, Benveniste, 
Ducrot, Barthes, and Greimas as a "linguistics of parole" 
(Pecheux, 1975), differentiated from the "historical" 
linguistics of Labov, Bernstein and Cohen, and also from 
the "formal" linguistics of Chomsky, Lakoff and the 
theories of transformational grammar. 
Certainly Kristeva's work is concerned with the 
language of style, poetics, rhetoric, dialogue, image and 
their context in rule-bound or transgressive processes; but 
her work is also difficult to classify because of its 
changes over the past twenty years. Her first work on the 
history of language and linguistics (Joyaux, 1969) led to a 
compendious study of the semiology of literature (Kristeva, 
1974) and the role of "poetic function". Later work 
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focusses on a broad f . 
range 0 text analyses of lIterature, 
painting, film and music , on the critique of the 
epistemological 'apparatus' of scientific discourse, and on 
integrating psychoanalysis with semiology (Kristeva, 1979, 
1985). 
The early critique of formal linguistics, such as we 
find in 'Du sujet en linguistique' (1971), aimed at 
replacing the concept of the unitary field of scientific 
discourse with a concept of "un ensemble d'articulations". 
The starting point is the idea that in all formal 
linguistics the conceptualisation of an object language, 
such as 'langue' for Saussure or the 'deep structures' of 
syntax for Chomsky, logically precedes the formulation of 
the theory itself. Kristeva notes that the 'projection' of 
such an object contains within it an implicit definition of 
the speaking subject, both the ideal speaker/hearer as 
described by the theory, and a subjectivity implicit in 
what Devereux calls the position of the 'observer'. 
Kristeva argues that the coherence and the degree of 
closure of a theory (closure in the mathematical sense) is 
the product of a contradiction within the observing subject 
which is involved in a double process of theorising and of 
reproducing itself as self. In other words, Kristeva is 
describing on an institutional level what Devereux, in the 
second of his four steps towards scientific method, 
recommends on a personal level, the analysis of the 
scientist's involvement. Kristeva describes the 
contradiction of the linguist as a 'denial' or 
'foreclosure' of subjectivity, depending on where the 
partition between subject and object is conceived as being 
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located. 
the 'bar' 
Saussure's division of signifier and signified by 
which separates them in his schema is classified 
as implying a suspended or 'denied' subject, whereas the 
Chomskyan concept of 'intuition', which plays an important 
part in providing closure for the theory of syntax, is 
classified as implying a foreclosure of subjectivity. In 
other words, it is because linguistics studies language 
apart from the speakers that use it, (or are used by it), 
because it studies language as, for example, a mechanism 
for the production of sentences, that Kristeva analyses it 
as a language itself. There have been critiques of the 
transformational grammar that have arrived at similar 
conclusions through pursuing different routes, exploring, 
for example, why the theory cannot account for the poetic 
or metaphoric use of language (Jackson, 1975), or why the 
rules governing the use of negation are so difficult to 
systematize. comparing Saussure's concept of parole, 
Chomsky's concept of the part played by 'intuition' in 
performance, and Sapir's concept of the "consciousness of 
the speaking subject", Kristeva notes that although they 
each refer to different parts of language, they have in 
common the fact that they each serve to produce an 'object' 
language from the lacuna that takes the place of the 
subject of metalanguage. Giving a schematic account of the 
kinds of subjectivity implied by the various languages of 
linguistics, Kristeva proposes: 
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LANGUAGE 
1 Metalanguage 
2 System or object 
(langue) 
3 An inexplicable signifying 
economy, not integrated into 
the theory (poetry, metaphor, 
Saussure's anagrams) 
4 A reference to subjectivity, 
(parole) which remains un-
integrated in theory and thus 
produces a lacuna in theory. 
SUBJECT 
Foreclosed subject 
Suspended or denied 
subject 
Divided subject, 
acknowledged as divided 
by the signifier 
An unknown subject X 
in the place of the 
Cartesian subject. 
For Kristeva the language capable of describing these 
subjectivities is that of psychoanalysis, particularly 
Lacanian theory, and she suggests points at which the 
latter could be used to inform Chomsky's theory. For 
example, whilst the problem of the psychological 
'realisation' of grammars has been left to one side 
(Brennan, 1979), the grammatical characterisation of syntax 
has shown that the mechanism for generating sentences has a 
series of universal rules, including recursivity, 
embedding, repetition and the cyclical application of 
certain rules. The acquisition of these rules takes place 
between the ages of two years and about thirteen years, 
"from the mirror stage to puberty" as Kristeva puts it. 
Language acquisition studies (Lenneberg, 1967) have shown 
that shortly after the age of two there is a halt in 
learning which is often followed by a period of unlearning, 
and this stage is often thought to mark the point at which 
the lateralisation of the brain is irreversibly effected 
and "at which the subject is already actualised through the 
splitting, alienation and duplication through the image or 
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specular other. The acquisition of syntax and the 
possibility of innovatory use of language presupposes the 
position of such a Spll't "I". S yntax consolidates this 
subject, split in the signifier" (14). Whilst being 
careful to point out the limitations of applying Lacanian 
theory to Chomsky's linguistics, Kristeva suggests that the 
mechanism governing the use of syntax and closure should be 
thought in relation to the formation of the specular ego, 
and its particular subject topography (its drives, objects 
and Other). A more developmental approach is outlined by 
Edgcumbe (1979). 
Kristeva suggests that if linguistics is to be an 
explanatory science rather than a descriptive one it must 
now open up the space of the Cartesian subject which it has 
unquestioningly maintained and must begin to define the 
topologies that produce subjectivity in language: 
The articulation of these productive topologies 
would constitute the explanatory basis for the 
description that is at present covered by the term 
'intuition'. The theory proposed is one which is 
attuned to the Saussurian aims of describing the 
economy of the signifier, as well as the Chomskyan 
discovery of syntactic mechanisms but is above all 
informed by psychoanalysis and its Lacanian 
developments. (15). 
So the linguistics thus constructed would be both 
descriptive and explanatory, representing rather than 
denying the heterogeneous contradiction at the centre of 
theoretical metalanguage. Providing unity without 
artificial closure it would fulfil the demands of a 
materialist analysis of signifying systems. Kristeva 
suggests that the deep structures to be described would 
therefore need to be not only the mechanisms of syntax 
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already proposed by generative grammar but also the 
following topologies: 
an M mechanism - describing modal processes already 
characterised by linguistics; 
an S mechanism - tracing the primary processes in the 
condensations and displacements of the 
signifier; 
and a mechanism - tracing the topos of the speaking 
subject. 
It is not evident from Kristeva's study what kinds of data 
would be admissible for such a theory, nor what sorts of 
verification would be appropriate. No doubt the empirical 
study of language acquisition in infants and children, if 
it were to be correlated with the psychic development such 
as the mirror stage and the formation of the imaginary ego, 
would necessitate a project on a scale similar to John 
Bowlby's study of the effects of separation and loss 
(1960). Kristeva's own application of the theory has been 
mostly to textual analysis, analysing texts in terms of the 
unconscious primary processes, infantile fantasy, and the 
containment of these within symbolic codes. 
More recently Kristeva's method has led her to analyse 
texts on a number of levels, seeing a text as the 
articulation of a number of separate but interconnecting 
instances of production. On a first level, texts are 
signifying systems, and can be studied synchronically, in 
terms of their deep structures, the semiotic langue or 
their syntax. Analyses of painting, music and film discuss 
the extent to which these forms can be considered to be 
language or language-like structures. 
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Secondly, every signifying system is a product of a 
particular historical moment with a specific mode of 
production, in Marxist terms, which will be manifest in the 
text, legible either directly (through the effects, for 
instance, of an author's patronage), or indirectly through 
the influences of the religion, morality, the aesthetic and 
social codes of a rising or dominant class, in short, 
through its ideology. 
At a third level, a text is determined by subjectivity, 
as described above in the discussion of linguistics. 
Again, psychoanalytic theory is used to account for the 
unconscious determinants of a text, examining the relation 
of language to the speaking subject and to the contents of 
the unconscious. The concept of the 'semiotic choral was 
introduced in La Revolution du Langage Poetigue (1974) to 
account for the effect of unconscious processes in texts by 
differentiating between two aspects of the signifying 
system. Contrasted to the Symbolic aspect of the system, 
which contains those aspects of language readily encoded 
within the terms of formal semiology and linguistics, the 
syntactic, thetic, aspects of language, the 'semiotic 
choral contains the levels at which meaning is derived from 
connotative processes such as prosody, rhyming, punning and 
rhythm, the 'transgressive' aspects of language. The 
separation of the Symbolic and Semiotic levels of language 
is purely abstract for the two are thoroughly intertwined 
in practice, and separable only for the purposes of 
analysis. Coding is necessarily selective, and there woulj 
be no excess or transgression if not for the existence of 
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the rule. (This particular use of the term semiotic is 
also to be differentiated from the use of the term 
semiotics to describe the t 
s ructural analysis of signifying 
systems as founded by C S Pierce. The first is used as an 
adjective, the second as a noun; as an adjective it 
qualifies the text , describing a quality of the text). 
If subjectivity is to be included in the problematic of 
the text this automatically changes the status of the text 
from being a static object, a signifying 'system' or 
'economy' to being a practice, a process (designated by 
Kristeva as signifiance). The concept of practice implies 
an additional historical dimension to the conceptualisation 
of the object. 
The interconnection of the three levels of textual 
analysis noted above can clearly be seen in Kristeva's idea 
of the 'triple register' of the sign (Kristeva, 1972). 
Discussing the signifying systems of pictorial 
representation, Kristeva proposes that a sign is always 
produced simultaneously on three axes, analogous to the 
three levels of textual analysis. The axis of the symbolic 
implicates the sign within a signifying system whose codes 
and internal rules can be described by semiotic or 
linguistic analysis. The historical axis is to be explored 
through historical materialism, and the subjective through 
psychoanalysis. 
[It describes] a fundamental problem, namely the 
inclusion of a signifying economy within a social 
context. By its very nature, artistic practice is 
doubly articulated: through the inclusion of a 
signifying economy within an objective ideological 
functioning; and through the production of meaning 
through its subject, in terms of (and liable to the 
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constraints of) concrete social contradictions. In 
oth~r ~ord~, ~ (~ubjective) signifying economy becomes an 
artIstIc sIgnIfYIng practice only to the extent that it is 
articulated through the social struggles of a given age. 
Along such lines, I might suggest that the sociopolitical 
and ideological position of the artist within the 
contradictions of his time ultimately determines a concrete 
signifying economy, turning it into an artistic practice 
that will playa given social and historical role. A 
signifying economy within an artistic practice, therefore, 
not only operates through the individual (biographical 
subject) who carries it out, but it also recasts him as 
historical subject - causing the signifying process that 
the subject undergoes to match the ideological and 
political expectations of his age's rising classes ... One 
cannot understand such practice without taking its socio-
economic foundations into account; nor can one understand 
it if one chooses to reduce it solely to these foundations, 
thereby bypassing the signifying economy of the subject 
involved. (16). 
The problematic described here remains Kristeva's basic 
framework, although questions of historical materialism 
have been increasingly replaced by those of subjectivity, 
so that transference rather than class struggle becomes 
seen as the central contradiction of history (Kristeva, 
1985). As suggested earlier, Kristeva's work is not 
limited to literary theory, as it has importance for the 
question of the method of general science. In particular 
the problem of relating the discoveries on the nature of 
syntax to the explanatory theory of psychoanalysis remains 
fertile territory. In chapter 3 the Freudian concept of 
superego is discussed in relation to syntax 
and the auditory sphere. This kind of integrated approach 
°d ways of conceptualising history and the provl es new 
transmission of culture. 
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History, self-reflexivity and the science of sexual 
difference 
It has been argued that the new problematic of 
subjectivity requires a redefinition of science as a 
practice, where the latter emphasises the active 
involvement of the scientist within a paradigm and within a 
subjective matrix of meaning. Kristeva's work, and 
Devereux's critique of psychology, indicate that self-
reflexivity in the human sciences leads away from emulation 
of the methods of the physical or exact sciences, and 
towards a method which is akin to that of psychoanalysis. 
The need for maintaining the specificity of each object, 
concept and language of each of the component discourses in 
an interdisciplinary study has to be borne in mind 
alongside the need for an integrated and internally 
coherent method. As Winnicott has put it, "To plan our 
lives we need science. But science boggles at the problem 
of human nature and tends to lose sight of the whole human 
being." (1965). 
This question of contextual ising scientific enquiry 
within a broader context, which began with Kuhn's 
contestation of popper, has most effectively been 
elaborated in terms of the sociology of knowledge. 
Increasingly, the philosophy of science has become the 
sociology or history of science, and this is one crucial 
dimension to the redefinition of science as practice. 
l
't l'S the axis of subjectivity which can contribute However 
most to clarifying the way in which scientific knowledge is 
implicated in a matrix of gendered meanings. 
To approach the problem defined earlier, of the 
62 
relative autonomy of adjacent disciplines within the social 
sciences, from a historical perspective is one way of 
'triangulating' the rivalrous structure of " '" narcIssIstIc 
quarrels about jurisdictional spheres" (Devereux, 1957). 
The anxiety arising from the ambiguity of demarcation 
between the boundaries of these disciplines, such as is 
visible in the interface between psychology and 
anthropology could be said to have some root in the 
"narcissism of minor differences", and the narcissistic 
battle, usually with an Imaginary other, for primacy and 
dominance can be most easily resolved when the third term 
of 'history' stabilises the conceptual structure. In this 
case the history is the history of culture, the history of 
the Oedipus complex, which is generally thought of as 
cultural 'pre-history'. 
Similarly, if we explore the Lacanian project of 
"emancipating" Freudianism from its interdependence on 
biology we find another contradiction. Mitchell states: 
Jacques Lacan dedicated himself to the task of re-
finding and reformulating the work of Sigmund Freud. 
psychoanalytic theory today is a variegated discipline. 
There are contradictions within Freud's writings and 
subsequent analysts have developed one aspect and 
rejected another, thereby using one theme as a 
jumping-off point for a new theory. Lacan conceived 
his own project differently: despite the contradictions 
and impasses, there is a coherent theorist in Freud 
whose ideas do not need to be diverged from: rather 
they should be set within a cohesive framework that 
they anticipated but which, for historical reasons, 
Freud himself could not formulate. The development of 
linguistic science provides this framework. (Mitchell, 
1982) (17). 
NOW, as we have seen, linguistics is no less a 
variegated discipline than psychoanalysis, and it is hard 
to see how it can be called upon to provide the scientific 
framework for the latter. The Lacanian model, for example, 
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does not use the discoveries of generative grammar, and, 
moreover, its integration of structural linguistics with 
the metapsychology is carried out very much at the expense 
of the economic, libidinal, standpoint of psychoanalysis. 
The new "improved" psychoanalysis proposed by Mitchell is a 
metapsychology reduced to a topographical theory alone. By 
erasing the question of instincts, the "emancipation" from 
biology is felt to be successful, and psychoanalysis is 
thereby given an illusory autonomy. This makes it possible 
for Mitchell to combine the theory more easily with 
historical materialism, which has traditionally constituted 
the feminist theory of the oppression of women (De 
Beauvoir, 1949). 
Moreover, biology too is a variegated discipline and 
not all of the psychoanalytic references to biology tout 
court are aimed at the kind of functional biology which 
Mitchell is afraid will haunt psychoanalysis in the form of 
'biologism'. There is, according to Mayr, another side to 
biological theory which is its historical, evolutionary 
aspect; and this ultimately provides the scientific 
framework for psychoanalysis. Before exploring the 
possible contributions that evolutionary biology can make 
to our understanding of the social organisation of sexual 
difference we shall return to the question of historical 
materialism and its longstanding relationship with feminist 
analysis. 
Starting from the premise that women, under capitalism, 
are exploited not only as wage labourers but also through 
the unique position they occupy in the family as unpaid 
labourers, feminist analysis has drawn the focus of Marxist 
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analysis towards the problem of conceptualising the family 
and its role in political economy. Early texts like 
Engels' The origins of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, based on faulty anthropological speculation (18), 
soon discredited the evolutionary approach to the question, 
and contemporary analyses have focussed on redefining the 
sphere of reproduction and the contradictory role of the 
family via-a-vis the sphere of production. A small number 
of feminist analyses have returned to Engels' analysis as 
providing the basis of a feminist materialism (Sacks 1974, 
1975, Rubin 1975, Leacock 1972, Reed 1972, 1975). More 
commonly feminist theory has focused on trying to locate 
the political economy of women in relation to capitalist 
labour relations and history (Rowbotham 1972, 1979, 
Mitchell 1971, 1974, Barrat 1979, wolpe and Kuhn 1979 are a 
few representative texts of the Marxist feminism in 
Britain), and a number have tried to locate women's unpaid 
domestic labour as a central contributory factor to surplus 
value (Seccombe 1974, Dalla costa and James 1972, Gardiner 
1975, coulson, Magas and Wainwright 1975, Molyneux 1979, 
Delphy 1977, smith 1979) thus locating the contradictions 
of gender as central to those of class. But more recently 
the emphasis has shifted from the analysis of the economic 
level of capitalism to the level of determinate social 
formations and their reproduction and particularly to the 
level of ideology as a material, although not necessarily 
economic, part of the social formation. Classical Marxism 
, I' m as "that view of history defines historical materIa IS 
which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power 
of all important historic events in the economic 
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development of society, in the changes in the mode of 
production and exchange, in the consequent division of 
society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of 
those classes against one another." (Engels, 1892) (19), or 
with modifications: 
ACC?rding to the materialist conception of history, 
the ultImately determining element in history is the 
production and reproduction of real life. More than 
this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if 
somebody twists this into saying that the economic 
element is the only determining one he transforms that 
proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless 
phrase. The economic situation is the basis but the 
various elements of the superstructure - political 
forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: 
constitutions established by the victorious class after 
a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even 
the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the 
brains of the participants, political, juristic, 
philosophical theories, religious views and their 
further development into systems of dogmas - also 
exercise their influence upon the course of historical 
struggles and in may cases preponderate in determining 
their form. There is an interaction of all these 
elements in which, amidst all the endless host of 
accidents ... the economic moment finally asserts 
itself as necessary. (Engels, 1890) (20). 
The question of the extent to which superstructural 
forms may influence or determine economic development has 
been taken up by several contemporary Marxist theorists, 
and it is to these that feminism has turned to find ways of 
theorising the specificity of women's struggles, and the 
history of the family. 
Although historical materialism has been successfully 
socI'al and physical anthropology (Godelier 19 7 3, applied to 
1979, Sa hlins 1960a, 1972, 1977) it is difficult Meillasoux 
to ascertain whether or not it is compatible with 
structural anthropology of the Levi-straussian school. 
( 21 ) . Marx is cited as an intellectual antecedent of 
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structural analysis but the concept of history as myth, 
paradigm or code is contradictory to historical materialism 
(22). Badcock (1975) maintains that the theory of the 
primacy of exchange relations, which is central in Levi-
Strauss' conceptualisation of the social totality, 
precludes its compatibility with a theory of the primacy of 
production. Meillasoux (1979) describes the contradiction 
between kinship and mode of production as distinct levels 
of analysis: "Thus to reproduce itself the capitalist mode 
of production depends on an institution which is alien to 
it, but which it has until now maintained as that most 
adapted to this function, and also the most economical, on 
account of its using unpaid - particularly female - labour, 
and by exploiting the emotional attachment which still 
dominates parent and child relations." (23). It has been 
in order to understand more precisely the nature of the 
relation between institutional form of the family, its 
subjective reality as powerful emotional attachment, and 
its objective relation to the economic base, that feminism 
has turned to Althusser's theory of ideology. 
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Ideology in general and the idea of an omni historical 
reality 
Althusser has provided a theory which is useful for 
rethinking the role of reproduction. At its most basic 
level, this theory could be said to define the specificity 
of Marxist philosophy - that is, of both dialectical and 
historical materialism - in terms of a structuralist 
problematic which he draw from Marx's Capital and the works 
of Lenin and Mao-Tse Tung. The description 'structuralist' 
must be used with some qualification since Althusser has 
defined it as "an ideology peculiar to the human sciences, 
one of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois philosophies of 
ethical idealism (humanism) which threaten Marxist theory" 
( 24 ) • 
Althusser's aims are partly polemical, and he speaks to 
a specific historical moment in the history of the French 
Communist party: the effect of the end of Stalinism in the 
Soviet Union on the ideology of socialism amongst party 
members and intellectuals in France. The critique of 
Stalinism, in the late 1950s and early 1960s was used by 
many European Communist parties as a 'liberation', which 
led to a re-emergence of humanism. Intellectual humanism 
then seemed to have political support, and the scientific 
analysis of social formations was being impeded. So it was 
in such an intellectual climate that Althusser, returning 
to Marx, identified three distinct periods in the latter's 
work. The first two: the writing up to, and including, the 
Ideology, 1845, and the work from 1845 to 1857, ~T2h~e~G~e~r~m~a~n~~~ __ ~-
seemed to Althusser to exist in sharp differentiation from 
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the work after 1858 - largely consisting of Capital. 
Drawing on Bachelard's work on th ° 
e epIstemology of science, 
Althusser identifies an 'eplOstemologlOcal break' between the 
first two periods and the third; that is, up until 1858 
Marx's work is a pre-scientific humanism, and from Capital 
onwards it focuses prIomarlOly on th 1 e ana ysis of social 
relations. Briefly, Althusser's use of Marx's theory is 
the application of the scientific method which is 
identified in Capital to the problem of the ideological 
level of the social formation. 
The four main themes of his work are: 
1) practice as the basic unit of analysis 
2) the idea of a structure in dominance 
3) the concepts of contradiction and overdetermination, and 
4) the problem of reproduction. 
We shall examine these in turn. 'Practice' is used to 
describe "all significant action", it is "a process of 
transformation of a determinate given raw material into a 
determinate product, a transformation effected by a 
determinate human labour, using determinate means (of 
production)" (25). All practice has a tripartite form 
(object, means, product) and Althusser's emphasis is on the 
fact of the ongoing transformation, the process, rather 
than on the specificity of the raw material, the means, or 
the product. Four different types of practice are 
distinguished, one, the economic/material practice, in 
which nature is transformed into use values and exchange 
pollOtical practice in which social relations values; two, 
are transformed into state power {which is used either to 
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maintain the unity of the status guo or to create 
revolutionary forms}, three, ideological practice, in which 
one form of lived relation is transformed into another 
through ideological struggle, and four, theoretical 
practice, in which knowledge is transformed into science. 
Controversy exists over the question of whether theoretical 
practice should be considered to be inside or outside of 
the social formation, and part of ideological practice; 
however Althusser has stressed the relative autonomy of 
each practice in relation to the others and there is good 
cause for retaining a sense of the specificity of each. 
Rather than existing as a separate theme, reproduction 
is central to the theory of ideology in all its aspects. 
What was described by Engels as the motor force of history, 
the need to produce and reproduce the conditions of 
existence, is here used to locate the main task of 
ideological practice: to maintain the reproduction of the 
conditions required for production to continue. 
Althusser's conceptualisations of ideology changed in the 
course of his work; in the earlier phase, as in 'Marxism 
and Humanism', ideology is analysed as an objective level 
of social reality, as consisting of representations 
(intelligible through their structure). Rather than 
reading ideology from discrete representations and images, 
"it is their system, their mode of combination and 
disposition which give them sense and function". In the 
second phase, a distinction is drawn between science and 
ideology; in some places an opposition is made between 
ideological and theoretical practice. Althusser also 
70 
distinguishes between the theory of particular ideologies 
and the theory of ideology in general, stressing the need 
for a materialist analysis of ideology as an omni-
historical reality. The later formulations, drawn from his 
essays in self-criticism, include ideology as "the 
representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their real conditions of existence" and the idea that 
ideology "interpellates" individuals as subjects. The 
shift is from the objective to the subjective existence of 
ideology, with the analysis of representational structures 
appearing as a midway point. 
As an objective level of the social formation, ideology 
is seen as existing in relative autonomy from the other two 
component spheres, although the economic is determinate in 
the last instance. A further attempt at correlating state 
and political power with the ideological forms can be found 
in the well-known concepts of Repressive State Apparatuses 
and the Ideological States Apparatuses. Whereas the former 
use overt forms of power, military and police forces or 
juridical enforcements to maintain social relations statu 
~, the latter, working much less visibly, cannot be so 
easily defined. These institutions are dependent on the 
voluntary participation of individuals who feel themselves 
addressed by their discourse, and who are thus 
interpellated as subjects of such institutional identity. 
These discourses each offer us a different representation 
of our relation to our real conditions of existence, and we 
voluntarily misrecognise ourselves in such representations, 
feeling ourselves addressed by them. These then are the 
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three main theses on ideology - that it is a representation 
(system of representation) of imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence, - that 
it interpellates individuals as subjects, and that it has a 
material existence, independent of economy. 
Althusserians have developed the first of these theses 
by using theories of misrepresentation, linguistics and 
semiotics, such as in Barthes' Mythologies (26) or as seen 
in Kristeva's work above. Further research into the nature 
of the 'imaginary' has led to the integration of Lacanian 
theory, particularly the mirror phase theory, (27). The 
second thesis has realised the question of the nature of 
interpellation and has again used the Lacanian concept of 
the 'entry into the Symbolic' as the condition for full 
sUbjectivity. It also raises questions pertaining to the 
philosophical definitions of subjectivity and human agency 
and structuralist theory. 
It is the third thesis that most directly concerns our 
exploration of the place of history in relation to sexual 
difference. Not only does Althusser differentiate his 
theory from Marx's concept of ideology as 'false 
consciousness', by stressing that there can be no practice 
except in and through ideological practice, since the 
latter is an inextricable component of representation, but 
he also maintains that ideology will, therefore, never 
disappear, go away, or be replaced by the 'real' 
representation. Insofar as ideology is analogous to 
language and is coterminous with it, it has an 'extra'-
historical or omni-historical reality. This seems to be an 
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important step in conceiving of the history of human 
society without reproducing the inaccuracies of humanism. 
In what way is such a history conceived by Althusser? 
On the one hand, I think it is possible to hold 
that ideologies have a history of their own (although 
it is determined in the last instance by the class 
struggle); and on the other, I think it is possible to 
hold that ideology in general has no history, not in 
the negative sense (that its history is external to 
it), but in an absolutely positive sense. 
The sense is a positive one if it is true that the 
peculiarity of ideology is that it is endowed with a 
structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-
historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in 
the sense in which the structure and functioning are 
immutable, present in the same form throughout what we 
call history ... i.e. the history of class societies . 
... our proposition that ideology has no history 
can and must be directly related to Freud's proposition 
that the unconscious is eternal, i.e. that it has no 
history. 
Ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconscious. 
And I add that I find this comparison theoretically 
justified by the fact that the eternity of the 
unconscious is not unrelated to the eternity of 
ideology in general. That is why I believe I am 
justified, hypothetically at least, in proposing a 
theory of ideology in general. (28). 
Althusser's problematic, and his suggestion that 
psychoanalysis and historical materialism should be linked 
in some form has been taken up by several theorists over 
the past fifteen years. Not only the work of Tel Quel, 
Kristeva, Barthes, the French Marxist feminists, Psych et 
Po, but also, in Britain, work of Theoretical Practice, 
Screen, the New Left Review, Ideology and Consciousness, 
m/f, Feminist Review and writing by Brewster, MacCabe, 
Heath, Rose, Mitchell, Anderson, Wollen, Mulvey, Coward and 
Ellis, and Hirst and Woolley, has responded to Althusser's 
theory. For the most part these responses have been 
directed to the first and second of the theses on ideology, 
the synchronic issues concerning the status of 
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subjectivity, or the definition of systems of 
representation. Where the third thesis, on the history of 
ideology has been broached, there has been a tendency to 
assume that psychoanalysis has little to contribute to the 
conceptualisation of such a history; which has resulted in 
some unsatisfactory links being made between the concept of 
the unconscious and that of ideology. For example, MacCabe 
suggests that: 
Psychoanalysis is a necessary component of 
historical materialism in the knowledge it produces of 
the construction of the subject, the latter being 
understood as that unity of consciousness which 
classical philosophy takes as the founding disposition 
of the world ... the virulence with which 
psychoanalysis rejects such a primacy has ensured it 
both the undying enmity of those who long for a final 
moment of communion when consciousness will become one, 
and the living gratitude of those who see it as marking 
an irreversible break with all idealism and religion. 
( 29 ) . 
Certainly psychoanalysis does mark an irreversible 
break with idealism and religion, and can provide a 
critique of the Cartesian ego, as cogito, but rather than 
trying to build it into the theory of ideology as a 
component of historical materialism I suggest that we have 
to uncover the concept of history on which psychoanalysis 
bases itself, and to see what interdependence is possible 
between the theories of ideology and the unconscious. 
Where sacrifices have had to be made, in order to create 
links between the two theories, it seems that it has 
usually been the psychoanalytic theory that has been 
compromised. For example in 1929 one psychoanalyst-teacher 
commented on the fate of Freudian theory in the 
universities: 
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There is, among the teaching body, a certain 
limited demand for practical knowledge of 
psychoanalysis. On the other hand, in respect to 
theory, a certain disadvantageous development has shown 
itself in many quarters: namely the acceptance of 
certain small portions shorn of real significance and 
applied alongside entirely opposing ideas. Again we 
see here the traditional English attitude of 
compromising with a new truth too profound, and 
possibly too painful, to be accepted wholly (by means 
of pouring new wine into old bottles, with a result 
which is often barren or disastrous). There are many 
taking part in education today deluding themselves and 
other that they understand and accept the theory of the 
unconscious: in reality all they do is to choose what 
may be termed the tit bits which gratify their wish for 
modernism, failing wholly to appreciate the 
significance of either the part or the whole, and 
taking great care to repudiate one of the fundamental 
findings of psychoanalysis - the theory of infantile 
sex u a lit y. (L ow) (30). 
The way that academic and education institutions make 
this compromise has had important consequences for the 
ensuing conceptualisation of the place of sexual difference 
in culture and ideology. It has tended to marginalise the 
significance of gender issues in determining the social 
formation. For example, the Althusserian concept of 
reproduction gives a minor significance to the part played 
by physical reproduction, procreation, in this process, and 
thus tends to marginalise the importance of the family, 
seeing it primarily as an ISA, reproducing ideas and 
ideology more crucially than reproducing people. The 
dimension of female reality which is based on the caring 
for and nurturing of children and the family is excluded 
from the Althusserian concept of reproduction. 
However a theory of ideology is crucial to a history of 
the social organisation of sexual difference, as it can 
account for the mechanisms of ideological reproduction. 
But, if it is to be useful in this regard, Althusser's 
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theory must be correlated with Freudian metapsychology. To 
do this, it must be acknowledged that, according to Freud, 
the unconscious has a history, akin to the history of the 
Oedipus complex. Following this acknowledgement, a new 
alignment of the theory of ideology and the history of 
sexual difference will be possible. One of the 
problematics opened up by Althusser's theory of ideology 
has been the relationship of history to narrative 
structure. A classical structuralist view, such as Levi-
Strauss' (1960), is not concerned with the temporal 
dimension of history so much as its repetitive and 
recurring structures. The Marxist focus on social 
transformation precludes the synchronism of classical 
structuralism and requires some dialectical relation 
between stasis and transformation and some explanation of 
historical progress. However the structuralist discovery 
of the elementary structures of discourse has been used to 
illuminate the material of ideology so that many cultural 
processes can be analysed as "texts". 
A major question then arises as to how to interrelate 
the history of the subject, of the text and the history of 
class contradiction as separate but related histories. One 
of the most useful levels of textual analysis provided by 
structuralism is that of narrative structure. Narrative 
structure as defined by Propp consists of a number of 
motifs with endless permutations of connection between 
syntagmatic elements and of substitution of characters or 
paradigmatic functions. All structural analyses of 
narrative attribute the characteristic "sense of an ending" 
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of narrative closure to the resolution of structure within 
the text. It is useful to compare the structural analyses 
with the psychoanalyses of narrative. 
Propp's early formalist analysis of plot structures of 
Russian fairy tales became the basis of an extended use of 
the concept of narrative as an 'abstract substratum
' 
or 
grammar or language of textual meaning. Propp divided the 
existing analytical unit of 'motif' into a set of paradigms 
combining roles and functions or character and actions. 
Certain actions proved common to all plots, such as a 
predicament of loss followed by acts of restitution. These 
basic elements might have infinite variation of form such 
as loss by theft, misplacement, interruption, invasion, 
banishment, etc. and restitution by conquest, love and 
marriage, receipt of gifts, vindication, rightful 
succession to power, or just 'living happily ever after'. 
Propp's formulation was of obvious interest and value to 
subsequent structuralism and both Jakobson and Levi-Strauss 
followed Propp's initiative in their respective fields. 
For Levi-Strauss, narrative was a form of mythic thought, 
the logical operation through which non-scientific thought 
tries to encode the three-dimensional contradictions of 
reality into the binary logic of symbolic classification 
and language. Beneath the convoluted storylines and 
intricate patterns of each myth, Levi-Strauss identified 
the central contradictions of mythic thought, revealing the 
significance of particular natural and social environments 
within the societies studied. He mostly worked with non-
literate societies, whose dependence on an oral tradition 
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would give myth the status of history: and often in non-
literate culture genealogical information is interwoven 
with more general origin myths. All myths are to some 
extent origin myths, as they seek to explain the fact of a 
difference between natural and social orders of life, which 
is the birth of humanity itself. Levi-Strauss also 
suggested that, in literate societies such as our own, 
politics serves a similar mythic function to that served by 
story-telling in non-literate societies. 
As a set of paradigmatic elements potentially combined 
into syntagmatic sequences of infinite variety, narrative 
structure would seem to confirm that autonomy of symbolic 
determinism. Levi-Strauss analysed the Oedipus Rex legend 
and found it to contain an attempted solution to the 
question of personal origins: 
The myth has to do with the inability for a culture 
which holds the belief that mankind is autochthonous, 
to find a satisfactory transition between this theory 
and the knowledge that human beings are actually born 
from the union of man and woman. Although the problem 
obviously cannot be solved, the Oedipus myth provides a 
kind of logical tool which relates the original problem 
- born from one or born from two? - to the derivative 
problem: born from different or born from the same? By 
a correlation of this type, the overrating of blood 
relations is to the underrating of blood relations, as 
the attempt to escape autochthony is to the 
impossibility to succeed in it. Although experience 
contradicts theory, social life validates cosmology by 
its similarity of structure. Hence cosmology is true. 
( 31 ) . 
By reducing a story about the passage of time to an 
atemporal and static contradiction, the 'natural' flow of 
time is seen as secondary to the meaning it is given by 
cosmology, society, or the theory. But the central enigma 
of the Oedipus story, the sphinx's riddle, is of how humans 
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grow up and age. What is the strange relationship of 
infancy, maturity and old age in human beings, that the 
sphinx likens to the natural course of the movement of the 
sun, a natural arc? The riddle of the human animal is the 
fact that the course of human aging is 'monstrously' 
unnatural when compared to other animals. With sexuality 
in immaturity and infantilism in adulthood, human sexuality 
is not the mark of maturity as in other animals, but 
carries with it the meanings of infantile experience. 
The temporal axis is rarely seen as significant when 
binary logic is in operation since it is the logic of the 
imaginary, which does not recognise the reality of time. 
Leach has documented a number of rituals concerned with 
aging and initiation and argues that the social 
representation of time has a strong determining effect on 
the real experience of time; if a ritual symbolically 
reverses time, it may be experienced as time 'going 
backwards'. Like Levi-Strauss' analysis, this is a strong 
form of symbolic determinism. 
Subsequent narrative analysis has mainly been developed 
in literary theory and film theory. Todorov replaced the 
notion of narrative as an infinite repetition of static 
paradigms with the concept of a textual progression, in 
which a state of equilibrium (a predicament for characters 
and for the reader) is disturbed, and mechanisms of delay, 
obstruction and partial restitution or help are set in 
motion creating suspense, until a second version of the 
initial state is created. Barthes' analysis brought the 
theoretical focus onto the relation of reading subject and 
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textual structure, the relation of identification between 
reader and text. The movement in the text from 
equilibrium-loss-new equilibrium is mirrored in the subject 
by the experience of plenitude-loss-satisfaction. The 
pleasure of reading is characterised as the safety of re-
experiencing, at a distance, the painful or traumatic 
experiences of the real. The degree of control that a 
reader has, literally at his or her fingertips, is an 
inversion of the helplessness and lack of control 
experienced in reality endured passively or 'suffered'. An 
interesting difference was drawn between 'pleasure' and 
'jouissance' as forms of textual pleasure, the safety or 
satisfaction of recognition and the more dangerous 
experience of loss, "beyond" control of vertiginous 
displacement, and these pleasures were ascribed to the 
conventions of classic realism and modernism respectively 
(Barthes, 1976). The Tel Quel group of of critics, 
particularly Kristeva, extended narrative analysis into 
social criticism. Narrativity was aligned with the 
dominance of the Law, monotheistic and monological 
ideology. The belief in God was seen as a structural 
equivalent to the faith in univocal meaning in language, 
the Logos, and the binding of the reader in realist 
narrative texts, history too, as a univocal narrative (as 
'histoire' rather than 'discours') was as illusory as other 
aspects of the Symbolic cultural axis. 
We have seen that Levi-Strauss classifies the Oedipus 
story as one of a number of myths, rather than as 
paradigmatic in itself; Barthes, however, concludes his 
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'Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative' on a 
more speculative note: 
Although we know scarcely more about the origins of 
narrative than we do about the origins of language, it 
can be reasonably suggested that narrative is 
contemporaneous with monologue, a creation seemingly 
posterior to that of dialogue. At all events, without 
wanting to strain the phylogenetic hypothesis, it may 
be significant that it is at the same moment (around 
the age of three) that the little human 'invents' at 
once sentence, narrative and the Oedipus. (32). 
Barthes went on to combine psychoanalytic and 
structuralist concepts in his narrative analysis of 
literature and cultural artefacts. The deconstructionist 
school of textual analysis also applies analytic concepts 
to literary texts in a variety of ways, locating linguistic 
structures in the subject and psychic structures in the 
text. A more substantial challenge to the view of 
narrative as textual structure can be found in Bettelheim's 
The Uses of Enchantment. (33). Bettelheim interprets a 
number of European fairy tales as they have been modified 
over several centuries, comparing original with popularised 
versions. The tales are grouped into thematic sets 
according to the types of relations they describe: such as 
brother-sister, the group of brothers, mother-daughter 
rivalry, father-son loss: and each tale is discussed in 
terms of the unconscious fantasies and fears it articulates 
and contains. Bettelheim suggests that meaning in 
narrative is derived from the connections it draws between 
two psychic predicaments. (propp and Todorov demonstrated 
that every narrative includes a transition from from a 
first state of equilibrium to a second one which 
recapitulates the first and its loss). Bettelheim suggests 
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that this pattern is itself a representation of the 
particular structure of human psychic maturation. The 
early efflorescence of sexuality is expressed in the 
Oedipus complex, and the everyday tragedy of childhood is 
the realisation of the impossibility of the satisfaction of 
these desires, the "tragic and beneficial situation of 
castration" (Althusser, 1971, p.214). This is the start of 
the acceptance and symbolisation of the difference between 
the generations and of the difference between the sexes. 
This is followed by latency and puberty, where the Oedipal 
desires are repressed, along with the sharp disappointment 
and a sense of personal failure (trauma) in the impossible 
predicament. At puberty, physical sexual maturation 
reactivates the repressed, unconscious, infantile 
predicament which is always, to some extent, present in 
adult sexual, social and cultural relationships, in the 
form of unconscious phantasy. 
For Bettelheim these two phases of the human mental and 
physical growth are the psychic correlates of the IOnce 
upon a time
' 
and the 'happily ever after
' 
of fairy tale 
narrative. The feelings of the castration complex are 
expressed as loss, injury, lack, theft, violent separation, 
interruption, etc. and the impossible tasks facing the 
protagonists in almost all fairy tales represent what it 
feels like, to the child, to have to wait until maturity to 
be able to satisfy his or her desires. Feelings of 
catastrophic loss, or despair, futility and hopelessness 
are common to all children and the narrative of the fairy 
tale gives expression to the unspeakable distress of the 
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loss of infantile omnipotence, and gives hope that desires 
will eventually find fulfilment. Often the monsters, such 
as ogres, giants, witches and their human counterparts in 
neglectful kings, impoverished parents, wicked stepmothers, 
jealous sisters, etc. represent the aggressive impulses of 
the child as projected onto the people of his or her 
environment or onto internal objects of fantasy. 
Aggressive fantasies may be autonomous or may be stimulated 
by the frustration of Oedipal desires; and the physical 
powerlessness of the child transforms rage into despair. 
According to Bettelheim, when told or read to children, 
fairy tales console and reassure the child, so the child is 
not alone with its imagination, and suggest that impossible 
tasks can be accomplished with help, so that the future is 
worth hoping for. Adults find meaning and enjoyment in 
these stories for the same reason, with the difference that 
for the adult it is the pleasure of the recognition of an 
inner world. For children the stories are a necessity not 
recreation, and they are often told or recounted before 
children go to sleep when the transition between waking 
consciousness and sleep or dreamlike duplicates the loss of 
identity or control inherent in the trauma of the 
castration complex. 
As we have noted, children do not distinguish between 
Imaginary and Real so that whereas for adults narrative is 
pleasurable, as it gives recognition to unconscious fantasy 
within a structure of safety through distance (is 
pleasurable as fiction), for children the narrative is a 
fact, a predicament that is actual and not just symbolic. 
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Adult narrative, in biography, autobiography, history, 
religion, theory, literature, film, news or gossip, 
activates the Imaginary within the subject whilst 
containing it within the overall symbolic structure of the 
narrative form. 
symbolic object. 
It repeats the imaginary loss of a 
Structural analysis has recognised narrative as a 
fundamental human need, as part of the need for meaning or 
order. Levi-Strauss includes many social structures as 
examples of myth, or narrative, which would extend its 
influence from being, in Marxist terms, a 
superstructural form to effecting the economic base. 
So a conceptual contradiction exists here; narrative 
structure can be understood as an autonomous material 
structure, akin to language and analogous to the sentence, 
or it can be seen as a surface structure. If it is part of 
the codes of langue, then the Oedipus story is but one 
example among an infinite number of stories, and socio-
textual systems must form the basic object of study of 
cultural analysis. psychoanalysis would be, as a method, a 
biographical adjunct of social science. But what if 
narrative structure is one of the many cultural expressions 
of a 'universal' Oedipus complex? 
(In the following chapter more evidence is given in 
support of a psychoanalytic interpretation of narrative 
structure. The concept of superego is understood as 
directly connected with the 'sense of an ending' 
characteristic of narrative closure according to Isakower.) 
84 
Here, the central concern is with the integration of 
the theories of the cultural meaning of gender to provide a 
framework for an adequate recognition of the structural 
place of sexual difference in society. 
Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974) pioneered 
the integration of structural, Marxist and psychoanalytic 
theories to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social 
position of women. Mitchell's pathway through the 
Althusserian problematic created a new conception of the 
relationship between patriarchy and capitalism; one which 
placed the contradictions of the Oedipus complex more 
centrally in the dialectics of historical change. Mitchell 
makes extensive use of Levi-Strauss and Lacan to argue that 
sociological or economic theories of the political 
oppression of women do not fully analyse the primary 
contradiction between capitalism and patriarchy. A 
psychoanalytically informed analysis of the ideology of 
patriarchy demonstrates that the "overthrow" of 
exploitative relationships within the family and in the 
workplace is possible, given "revolutionary optimism". The 
longevity of patriarchal ideology, a vestigial remain from 
a pre-industrial economy, is seen as being the result of 
unconscious phantasies. Women are represented as not-men, 
or inferior, as debased, or in terms of a range of negative 
stereotypes within patriarchal ideology, because of the 
unconscious phantasy of the mother as a castrated or 
castrating "other". On the level of the social structure, 
patriarchy is identified with kinship systems and what 
Levi-strauss describes as the "exchange" of women. 
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Mitchell follows Levi-Strauss fairly closely as she 
maintains that the Oedipus complex is a subjective 
correlative of the more primary social structure of the 
incest taboo. Using Levi-Strauss' insight that the 
biological triad of procreation is less socially important 
than the four-part elementary structure of kinship, and 
that this remains true on an ideological level in 
capitalist society, Mitchell argues that the biology of 
sexual difference is not a primarily determining factor in 
the psychological and political status of men and women: 
In no human society do these (the reproductive 
roles of men and women) take precedence in an 
untransformed way. The establishment of human society 
relegates them to a secondary place; though their 
ideological importation may make them appear dominant 
... it is thus not on account of their 'natural' 
procreative possibilities but on account of their 
cultural utilisation as exchange objects (which 
involves an exploitation of their role as propagators) 
that women acquire their feminine definition and 
status. (34). 
Neither Levi-Strauss nor Mitchell can account for why 
it is men that "exchange" women rather than women who 
"exchange" men. An economic or rationalist argument, like 
Engels' explanation in The Origins of the Family, Private 
Property and the state, stresses the significance of 
accumulated wealth, inheritance and the subsequent need for 
the control over legitimate inheritance through certain 
paternity. There may be something in this explanation, but 
a more far-reaching explanation can be found in the 
psychological ambiguity of men's need for women. The 
oedipal wishes, remaining in unconscious fantasy, in adults 
are reactivated especially during mating, pairing or 
marriage, which creates anxiety about the exact nature of 
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the purpose of the pairing bond. If men "need" women to 
provide them with offspring, this logical and biological 
need is compounded with a vaguer and less specific need 
which might be called "love". The ambiguity of need, of 
whether the need for women has a specific object, obviously 
refers back to the helpless dependence of infancy and 
childhood, and to the fact that many of the emotions and 
ideas reactivated in adults are not conscious. 
This would explain why ideologies of male dominance and 
figures of masculine authority exist in societies where 
inheritance is not patrilineal, and in communities where 
the inheritance of property is not a factor of economic 
significance. In other words, the need to institutionalise 
the control of women, such as in prescriptive kinship 
systems, is a manifestation of unconscious (irrational and 
powerfully felt emotions), psychic reality, particularly 
the Oedipus complex and the pre-Oedipal relation to the 
mother. 
This explanation pushes the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of culture further than Mitchell's analysis 
would allow. Mitchell takes on psychoanalysis only if it 
can be "freed" from its integral historical paradigm: 
It seems to me that, 'Why did it happen', and 
'historically when' are both false questions. The 
questions that should be asked in the place of these 
are: 'how does it happen and when does it take place in 
our society?' 
Most feminisms have tried to show the extent to which 
feminine identity and the female psyche is determined by 
social structure and external reality. Mitchell's, more 
dialectical, analysis nevertheless suggests that an 
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overthrow of patriarchy is possible through revolutionary 
optimism. Mitchell's opposition of 'social' and 
'biological' categories is part of the intellectual legacy 
of structural anthropology with its emphasis on binary 
oppositions. Psychoanalytic theory, in its uncompromised 
form, precludes any such absolute differentiation between 
social and biological forms, as it analyses the interaction 
of body and mind. 
Freud's challenge to the intellectualist doctrines of 
the nineteenth century psychologists had an interesting 
parallel, in the materialism of Marx and Engels. Engels 
extended the Marxist materialist analysis of society to the 
question of origins, in the aforementioned paper, On the 
part played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man 
(1876). The evolutionary paradigm of the late nineteenth 
century invited his speculation on evolutionary process, 
and Engels reasoned from this theoretical principle that 
the human brain evolved because of a specific interaction 
of historical and environmental factors. Engels argues 
that the historical sequence of walking upright, tool-using 
labour, language and brain size, as it was being asserted 
by the idealist doctrine of cerebral primacy was a false 
one. 
All merit for the swift advance of civilisation was 
ascribed to the mind, to the development and activity 
of the brain. Men became accustomed to explain their 
actions from their thoughts, instead of from their 
needs. And so there arose in the course of time that 
idealistic outlook which ... has dominated men's minds. 
It still rules them to such an extent that even the 
most materialistic natural scientists of the Darwinian 
school are still unable to form any clear idea of the 
origin of man, because under that ideological influence 
they do not recognise the part that has been played 
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therein by labour. (39). 
The idealist doctrine of cerebral primacy re-emerges in 
Cartesian linguistics and in many aspects of structural 
anthropology, as will be demonstrated in the following 
chapter. The Marxist critique of idealism focuses on 
labour, the Freudian critique is from the perspective of 
psychological and emotional needs. 
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The meaning of woman in the unconscious 
What are the human needs that determine the social 
meaning of woman, and of sexual difference? Certainly, as 
socialist feminism has demonstrated, the institutional and 
economic systems deriving from the division of labour along 
gender lines and class lines constitute an important factor 
in shaping those needs. Similarly, the symbolic and sexual 
needs identified by Levi-Strauss in kinship systems and all 
ideologies prescribing sexual or marital relations are 
another determining factor. But unless the reality of 
human infancy is fully understood, the significance of 
unconscious factors in human needs will continue to pass 
unrecognised. 
Of the many accounts of unconscious processes, the 
feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis has focused 
primarily on the debates around the Freudian and Lacanian 
theories of "phallic monism". Mitchell (1974) Mulvey 
(1975), Brown and Adams (1979), Cixous (1976), Irigaray 
(1977) and Gallop (1982) have taken to the Freudian and 
Lacanian theories of the castration complex to analyse the 
ideological misrepresentations of women. A careful account 
of Freud's theory of the development of male and female 
sexualities is given in Mitchell (1974) and only the debate 
specific to the conflict indicated in the opening quotes of 
this chapter will be discussed here. 
Briefly stated, the conflict between differing theories 
of the status of sexual difference, can be exemplified in 
the accounts given by Lacan and Winnicott. Lacan 
understands femininity and masculinity to be defined by the 
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relation of the subject to the signifier, and the primary 
unconscious signifier of the phallus. Winnicott has 
suggested that women and men are defined, as gendered 
subjects, by their relation to "Woman", the unconscious 
meaning of the mother. 
In order that the significance of the difference 
between these views be fully grasped, some initial 
elaboration of the underlying concepts is necessary. A 
full account of Freudian theory on this theme is given in 
Mitchell (1974) and will not be repeated here. But the 
Freudian theory, briefly put, is that the psychic 
development of men and women follows an identical path 
until the emergence of the Oedipus complex. Until that 
time, neither boys nor girls have any realistic idea of the 
difference between the sexes. In the phallic phase all 
children assume that everybody has a penis, boys because 
their narcissism protects them from acknowledging 
difference, and girls assuming that their own genital 
organs are an as yet undeveloped form of the adult male 
version. Freud's own research was largely based on 
observations of early male sexuality, and he was extremely 
modest about the success of this as a means of 
understanding female sexuality. Nevertheless many of the 
technical and metapsychological concepts in Freud's work 
were based on knowledge of male subjectivity. The first 
introduction of the concept of Oedipus complex in 1910 in 
'On a certain Type of Object Choice Made by Men' and the 
first use of the concept of the castration complex in 'On 
the Sexual Theories of Children' in 1908, are both in 
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papers that are centrally about male sexuality. Often 
Freud's papers do contain a conceptual slippage between 
'boy' and 'child'. Not until the late 1920s and early 
1930s did Freud focus specifically on the construction of 
femininity and female sexuality, eventually suggesting that 
the whole area of research should be handed over to women 
themselves, and concluding somewhat pessimistically that 
psychoanalysis had "contributed nothing" to understanding 
women. 
The early papers on sexuality and identity assumed a 
natural heterosexuality in girls and women, in order to 
comply with the Oedipus concept and not until 1925 in Some 
Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Difference Between 
the Sexes was there a complete reassessment of the theory 
of female sexuality which stressed the girl's primary 
emotional attachment to the mother. In 1924 in The 
Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex Freud posited the 
complex as the central dynamic of infantile sexuality, 
seeing it as the dominant fantasy until its inherent 
impossibility, or some external event such as the birth of 
a sibling, shatters the Oedipus complex and inaugurates the 
castration complex. In the boy the castration complex 
results in the child giving up the father as a rival and 
identifying with him instead. The violence of the passion 
in the relation to the father is repressed and is replaced 
by 'affectionate ties'. During latency, sublimation works 
on the sexual drives, replacing the initial objects with 
aim-inhibited objects. For example, Klein has suggested 
that sexual curiosity in looking, scopophilia, is 
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transformed into epistemophilia, the desire to know. (This 
would certainly account for the ubiquity of cultural 
references to knowledge expressed in visual metaphors, such 
as: the 'enlightenment', 'perspective', 'aspect', to 'see' 
sense, to 'see' the point, to 'see' reason, to 'look into' 
a problem, to 'cast light' on, etc.) During latency, 
school learning takes the place of the more physical and 
imaginative play of early childhood. According to Freud 
the 'heir to the castration complex' is the superego. The 
child's aggression, either conceived as an innate and 
constitutional disposition or as a response to the 
frustration of powerlessness, is projected onto the father, 
who is seen as the source of frustration, and is then 
reintrojected in the form of an 'internal' paternal 
prohibition. Identification with the father who is envied 
as the mother's partner and with the father's own superego 
or sense of judgement are important aspects of the 
superego. But the instinctual energy of this psychic 
agency comes directly from the id, and is influenced by the 
ego only insofar as it is is used defensively, as a 
protection against loss of self-esteem. Grunberger has 
suggested that prohibition is 'invented' by the child 
rather than internalised from taboo or law embodied in the 
father, thus 'I cannot do such and such' becomes 'I must 
not do such and such', which is a much more satisfactory 
arrangement from the child's point of view. 
Freud assumed that infantile sexuality, at the time of 
the Oedipus and castration complexes was primarily phallic, 
and that because of this the child's "sexual theories", or 
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search for knowledge, are abandoned inconclusively at a 
time when the meaning of sex and knowledge is experienced 
as predominantly phallic. Through latency until puberty 
there is no knowledge of the reality of the female genitals 
as complementary to phallic sexuality, nor of female 
sexuality. Thus in the unconscious in the phantasies that 
are the repressed 'sexual theories' of children there 
exists only the concept of the male genital. The encounter 
with reality is simultaneously an encounter with the 
difference between 'internal' and 'external' reality, and a 
sexual encounter with 'woman' as representing the truth of 
the other. Whilst Freud analysed mechanisms of fetishism 
and splitting as forms of disavowal of visual knowledge of 
sexual difference, which would indicate some 
acknowledgement of that difference, he considered that this 
did not constitute a knowledge of the female genital. It 
was simply, for the child, a perception of an absence of 
the male genital, and hence a confirmation of the 
possibility of castration. 
As we have noted, before 1925 Freud thought that the 
little girl developed according to the same pattern as the 
boy and that she too assumed that all adults have the male 
genital. Because girls were seen to lack any potential 
organ for castration it was thought that their castration 
complex was less resolved than that of the boy and their 
superego less developed. Girls were thought to simply take 
the mother's place through identification without 
introjecting a prohibitive paternal object. Later this 
idea was amended and it was suggested that whereas boys 
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move from the Oedipal to the castration complexes, for the 
girl the transition was the other way around, with the 
castration complex being initiated by the realisation that 
she is lacking and result in a turning towards the father 
in the hope that he will supply with something to make good 
the lack, the female Oedipus complex. So the motivating 
force of change in the girl is 'penis envy' with the girl 
wanting the penis in any number of forms of displacement. 
Freud considered that the girl too had no knowledge of her 
vagina and internal sexual organs as complements of the 
penis until the discovery of sexuality at puberty. This is 
the theory of phallic monism, briefly put, the hypothesis, 
confirmed by certain clinical data, that there is no 
unconscious representation or knowledge of a female 
equivalent to the phallus, because there is no infantile 
experience or knowledge of the vagina. Lacan's version of 
the theory of phallic monism combines the Freudian theory 
with a Levi-Straussian understanding of the centrality of 
the signifier, the symbolic and language in the 
construction of the subject. Following Saussure's concept 
of the signifier as conveying meaning only through 
arbitrary and conventional relation to the signified, and 
through the encoding of patterns of difference from other 
signifiers, Lacan proposes that the phallus is a signifier. 
That is, the phallus is to be considered as neither 
anatomical organ, nor fantasy of a part-object, but as a 
representation that is simultaneously psychic and social. 
For Lacan the phallus is the signifier of desire, as it is 
the place of the Symbolic that intervenes with the paternal 
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prohibition on Oedipal demands. Sexual difference is 
inscribed in language, and the Symbolic, only in relation 
to the phallus, the other sex is other because it does not 
have the phallus. 
Woman is thus a minus and not a whole, the woman 
does not make the unified One: she is the 'not-one' 
(pas une) of the phallic structure of language. (36) 
Since language mediates the real, the symbolic 
negativity of woman influences the perception of reality, 
and Lacan proposes that this be signified, in his theory, 
by the barring of the definite article, femme 
indicating that woman exists only in negation. 
"woman" , 
Unlike 
Freud's, Lacan's theory is not a developmental psychology, 
and gives only descriptions of different topologies of the 
subject. Insofar as childhood is significant for the 
Lacanian subject, it is as the site of a series of psychic 
separations marked by the signifier of difference. 
Initially visual, in the Imaginary realm of the mirror 
phase, the signifier marks the loss of a fantasised unity 
of infant with mother. As speech is learned, the verbal 
signifier of word, sound or phoneme, comes to mediate 
needs, and to phrase demands, but it is above all at the 
castration complex that the signifier with its realm of the 
Symbolic order comes to play its full role in the 
construction of the subject. With the Imaginary, and the 
Real, the Symbolic is one 'axis' of subjectivity. The 
Symbolic, as a concept, is partly taken from the Freudian 
concept of the superego and partly from Levi-Strauss' 
theory of culture as determined by exchange relations 
(Levi-Strauss: "Any culture can be looked upon as an 
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ensemble of symbolic systems, in the front of which are to 
be found language, marriage laws, economic relations, art, 
science and religion. "). The phallus, then, is the 
signifier of a system of exchange and intersubjective 
recriprocity. The subject has to renounce one function of 
his organ ("castration is the symbolic lack of an imaginary 
object"), thereby confirming the precedence of culture over 
nature. 
As well as being based on an assumption about the 
primacy of symbolic systems in the construction of the 
subject, Lacan's theory is based on the idea that the 
visual sense is primary after birth. Freud's view differs 
from this because of the centrality given to the drives 
rather than to language: for Freud all five senses are 
contributing to the ego (the ego is a body ego) but sight 
carries the psychological significance of control and 
domination, because of phylogenetic transformations in 
posture. Sight is not necessarily the dominant sense, for 
Freud, but only the sense of domination. This Lacanian 
assumption of the dominance of the visual is the 
cornerstone of his theory of why it is the phallus that 
functions as signifier of difference. 
In relation to the boy, the Oedipal girl indeed has 
'nothing' to offset against her lack vis-a-vis her mother 
and father's bodies. It is the difference between the 
generations, as much as that between the sexes, that is the 
foundation of reality and the castration complex. The 
little boy's overvaluation of his external organ in 
comparison to a sister's 'lack' is a defensive reaction to 
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the sense of inadequacy in relation to the parents, adult 
sexuality and generativity. But for Lacan the adult 
subject remain, in large part, a 'boy' so that woman's 
phallic negativity, her lack of being, her unspokenness and 
negative relation to language results in an impossibility 
of knowing female desire. Whilst lacking in desire, woman 
is claimed to have a supplementary relation to enjoyment _ 
the unspoken aspect of desire. 
If she is excluded from the nature of things, which 
is the nature of words, it is just because she is not-
all (pas toute), she has, in relation to what the 
phallic function designates as enjoyment, a 
supplementary enjoyment. (37). 
Lacan has linked this to the symbolic nature of female 
orgasm, which represents sexuality unbound from its 
'natural' function of procreation, and which is purely 
gratuitous. But since the mark of the feminine remains 
unspeakable, in excess of language, culture, exchange, 
control, the pleasure principle and thus outside of the 
ego, woman, as a being, has no representation. This is 
thought to be true for women as well as true for the male 
subject's view of woman. 'Woman' is other to herself 
insofar as she is a sexed being. 
Lacanian feminists have seen this as an explanation of 
the way in which certain cultural forms of denigration of 
women seem to be universal. By representing a threat to 
male narcissism, as the representation of castration, women 
are subjected to symbolic forms of control, punishment and 
humiliation. They are hated because they are feared, and 
they are feared because an encounter with the real entails 
a loss of imaginary omnipotence. The patriarchal 
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unconscious is like the mood of the post-Oedipal boy, 
wanting control, absence of pain, frustration, wanting to 
rid himself of suffering in order to return to the illusion 
of omnipotence; the boy wants revenge. Mulvey describes 
the Lacanian theory of phallic monism as "a theory that 
brilliantly describes the power relationships of 
patriarchy" (Mulvey, 1975). 
On the other hand, Irigaray sees the theory of phallic 
monism as the epitome of misogyny, as an assertion that the 
boy child's omnipotence must be maintained by cultural and 
psychological systems, and she sets up an alternative 
gynocentric theory of language based on the morphology of 
the vulva and the female capacity for reception and 
procreation. Which is correct? Is the Lacanian theory an 
explanation of phallocentrism or is it a phallocentric 
theory? 
During the 1930s a number of women analysts took Freud 
at his word and set out to build a theory of female 
sexuality. Of particular interest are those of Horney, 
Klein and Jones, who amended and replaced the theory of 
phallic monism with theories of innate knowledge of primary 
femininity. Horney's theories are known as 'culturalist', 
in that she allocates a determining role to the cultural 
environment in establishing the reality of psychic life. 
She also hypothesised, following years of clinical 
practice, the existence of an early knowledge of the 
existence of the vagina in girls. She considered that the 
strength of aggressive impulses in childhood gave rise to 
fantasies of the danger of the vagina, or the fear of being 
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penetrated, and that the girl's phallic phase and penis 
envy was a secondary, reactive formation, a defence. The 
knowledge of the vagina, from internal sensations and 
unconscious fantasy, is specific to female subjectivity and 
forms the basis of the specifically female castration 
complex, the fear of penetration, or being invaded, or the 
fear of deprivation of sexuality as a woman. 
Similarly Klein and some of her co-workers posited an 
intuitive or innate knowledge of the vagina and uterus as 
components of a fantasised 'inside' of the mother's body, 
connected by children of both sexes to some idea of where 
babies come from. Klein posits the existence of a very 
early and complicated psychic life, with the Oedipus 
complex operating as early as the first months of life. 
The Freudian concept of developmental stages is 
underwritten, in Kleinianism, by a theory of a potential 
oscillation between two psychic 'positions', the paranoid-
schizoid and the depressive. Earliest defenses, before the 
psyche is capable of repression, are those of projection 
and splitting, and these mechanisms remain active in the 
adult as a 'paranoid-schizoid' core reactivated in dreams, 
under duress and in mental illness. post-Oedipal infancy 
brings with it the capacity for integration, reparation, 
and some awareness of aggression and thus some 
responsibility for it, which is the depressive position. 
Klein posited many psychic contents as innate, with a 
primitive ego operating from birth and innate or 
constitution envy. However, Riviere notes that the 
structure of envy is not symmetrical in the sexes. 
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Men's envy of women is not less common than women's 
of men, nor less profound. But it is much less 
recognised and understood; and I think this is due, not 
simply to the prejudice of men on this delicate point 
but to the nature of things. As far as a little boy's 
envy of his mother's breasts and milk is concerned, he 
has himself a special organ to set off against them, a 
penis. Now his little sisters have not got either 
penis or breasts; so that his satisfaction and 
superiority about having a penis can be used to conceal 
and counterbalance his wish for a body that could make 
and feed babies. All their lives men continue to make 
use of this compensation against their envy of women, 
and one important element in the enormous psychological 
significance of the penis is to be found in this 
compensation. The chief reason why men's envy of women 
remains so hidden is because it relates precisely to 
the inside of women's bodies, to the mysterious 
functions and processes that go on, magically, as it 
seems, inside women (their mothers) making babies and 
milk. It appears too that, just as women envy men's 
initiative, conversely men envy women's capacity for 
passive experience, especially the capacity to bear and 
to suffer. Suffering relieves guilt; especially is the 
pain that brings life into the world doubly enviable, 
unconsciously, to men. Men cannot easily become 
conscious of what they envy, because they do not really 
altogether know what it is . ... Their speculations and 
imaginings about the experiences of women are of course 
part of their phantasy life, which they keep very much 
apart from their conscious everyday life, there they 
naturally prefer only to show their masculine side, 
since that they both know about and can use. (It would 
seem that, prejudice apart, we have to employ a special 
technique for exploring the unconscious mind before we 
can obtain access to the sources and understanding of 
that strong envy in men and women, which lies hidden in 
the life of imagination and phantasy. (38). 
If this theory is correct, it would also account for 
some of the reasons why it is that the visual senses is 
overvalued in many cultural forms, including art and 
science. We have noted that vision in used as a metaphor 
for knowledge throughout philosophy and theory, and as a 
metaphor it carries the unconscious meaning of the 
infantile desire to see inside, to possess and control the 
'inside' of the mother's body. Riviere notes that men's 
envy of women remain hidden because its object is also 
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hidden and unknown: and the more it is hidden from 
consciousness, repressed, the more it emerges in a 
projected metaphorical form in the 'outside' world of 
culture. 
The Kleinian view also influenced Ernest Jones' theory 
of female sexual development, and like Mrs Klein he 
supposed a feminine development that is different from the 
boy's, based on bodily differences reflected in psychic 
structures and based on the importance of the mother as the 
first love object of both sexes. His theory of innate 
knowledge of femininity in the pre-Oedipal girl children 
led Jones to posit a specifically female form of castration 
anxiety, 'aphanisis', or the dread of the loss of sexuality 
per se, as a female equivalent of the boy's castration 
anxiety. (39). 
Each of these three post-Freudian accounts of female 
sexuality argue that the concept of phallic monism is 
insufficient to account for the structure of femininity and 
the meaning of femininity for both sexes. 
Lacanian feminism argues that, since subjectivity and 
gender are effects of symbolic structure and language, both 
gender identities are potentially available to either sex. 
There is no biological or psychological reason why a female 
body necessitates a female identity nor a male body a 
masculine one; the relation of body to psyche is as 
arbitrary and conventional as that of signified to 
signifier. 
A more far-reaching account of the influence and 
meaning of sexual difference is developed in the object 
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relations school of post-Freudian psychoanalysis. This 
focuses on the two-person relationship between infant and 
mother that precedes the triangulation of Oedipal 
structure. Klein's theory is one part of the object 
relations school, and was of influence on Winnicott, whose 
account of the psychological significance of the primacy of 
maternal care, on men and women alike, is of obvious value 
to feminist attempts at understanding the assymetrical 
relation between the sexes. Instead of comparing the 
parallel development of masculine and feminine 
psychological and sexual development, as does classical 
Freudian theory, or of comparing the male and female 
relation to the signifier and the symbolic, as does 
Lacanian theory, Winnicott emphasises the fact of 'absolute 
dependence' on maternal care and the fear that this 
produces. 
There is no getting round the fact that each man 
and woman came out of a woman. The more this is 
examined the more it becomes necessary to have a term 
WOMAN that makes possible a comparison of men and 
women. 
We find that the trouble is not so much that 
everyone was inside and then born, but that at the very 
beginning everyone was dependent on a woman. It is 
necessary to say that at first everyone was absolutely 
dependent on a woman, and then relatively dependent. 
Now it is very difficult indeed for a man or woman 
to reach to a true acceptance of this fact of absolute 
and then relative dependence insofar as it applies to 
the actual man or woman. For this reason there is a 
separated out phenomenon that we call WOMAN which 
dominates the whole scene and affects all our 
arguments. WOMAN is the unacknowledged mother of the 
first stages of the life of every man and woman. (40). 
Winnicott's clear and straightforward prose made his 
work widely accessible to the women he addressed as 'the 
ordinary devoted mother' in radio broadcasts and in 
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published lectures. The relation between theory and 
practice was carefully considered and Winnicott was careful 
not to undermine the confidence of the ordinary mother's 
trust in her intuition. Whilst turning his scientific and 
medical knowledge to understand the psychological and 
social significance of the extended dependence of infancy, 
he never allowed the authority of science to dominate or 
'take over' from the ordinary mother. It was used to 
support, to recognise, and, where necessary, to help the 
mother, infant and family and their interdependence. This 
recognition of the mother is of great importance, but is 
very difficult to achieve: 
The mother at the beginning, by an almost 100% 
perfect adaptation, affords the infant the opportunity 
for the illusion that her breast is part of the infant. 
It is, as it were, under magical control. The same can 
be said of infant care in general, in the quiet times 
between excitements. omnipotence is nearly a fact of 
experience. The mother's eventual task is gradually to 
disillusion the infant, but she has no hope of success 
unless at first she has been able to give sufficient 
opportunity for illusion. Indeed a recognition of 
absolute dependence on the mother and her capacity for 
primary material preoccupation, or whatever it is 
called, is something which belongs to extreme 
sophistication, and to a stage not always reached by 
adults. The general failure of recognition of absolute 
dependence at the start contributes to the fear of 
WOMAN that is the lot of both men and women. (41) 
The theme of recognition of the mother was also a 
central concern in the work of Irigaray and Kristeva in 
French feminism, and in the work of Dinnerstein, Chodorow 
and Friday in the united States. The British tradition has 
tended to remain on the level of empirical and sociological 
documentation. critical of logic, Irigarayan poetry 
frequently attacks the metalanguage of theory and science 
as patriarchal theft of the truth of experience. The 
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recognition that psychological science and practice has 
often attempted to rival 'the mother' t as nur urer, creator, 
and in the function of understanding, may have led to the 
defensive cult of the idealisation of motherhood. Some 
elements of this exist in Kleinian theory and practice, 
where the mother is sometimes seen from the point of view 
of the infant, as magical and omnipotent, rather than from 
a real perspective. The difficulty of a real recognition 
of the significance of the mother is due, as Winnicott has 
noted, to the fact that this level of experience is deeply 
repressed, and our feelings about it are very strong and 
very irrational. Mystification of the mother, whether by 
men or women, is another defence against recognition. 
Winnicott suggests some more consequences of lack of 
recognition: 
is not the contribution of the devoted mother 
unrecognised precisely because it is immense? If this 
contribution is accepted, it follows that every man and 
woman who is sane, every man or woman who has the 
feeling of being a person in the world, and for whom 
the world means something, every happy person, is in 
infinite debt to a woman. 
Once again, let me emphasize, the result of such 
recognition when it comes will not be gratitude or even 
praise. The result will be a lessening in ourselves of 
a fear. If our society delays making full 
acknowledgement of this dependence, which is a 
historical fact in the initial stage of development of 
every individual, there must remain a block both to 
progress and to regression, a block that is based on 
fear. If there is no true recognition of the mother's 
part then there must remain a vague fear of dependence. 
This fear will sometimes take the form of a fear of 
WOMAN, or a fear of a woman, and at other times will 
take less easily recognised forms, always including the 
fear of domination. (42). 
Fear of domination leads to being dominated, 
paradoxically, and this dynamic is obviously present in the 
popular appeal of a prime minister like Mrs Thatcher. Mrs 
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Thatcher, despite being a woman successfully competing in a 
male world, is not a feminist phenomenon, because far from 
working towards a recognition of the social debt to WOMAN, 
her power is based on the exploitation of the fear produced 
by the denial of dependence. The fear of domination leads 
to the desire for domination, which is expressed in an 
ideological form in the popularity of Thatcher's public 
image. The Iron Lady, like the phallic mother, has an 
appeal which is counter to the true recognition of 
dependence on WOMAN. It offers the illusory safety of a 
return to the omnipotence of fusion. Recognition of 
dependence by society is a necessary precondition of 
democracy, 'freedom and creativity for both sexes, and only 
this recognition can produce the possibility of an equal 
and mutual collaboration between men and women as adults. 
In psychoanalytic theory, the transition from a 
primarily Oedipal analysis to object relations theory over 
the past fifty years has provided us with the means of 
reconceptualising the role of sexual difference in society 
and culture. Rather than this being understood in terms of 
the relation between 'male' and 'female' as psychological, 
symbolic or cultural categories, of complementarity, it is 
clear that the meaning of sexual difference is 
fundamentally determined by fear of "the unacknowledged 
mother of the first stages of life of every man and woman". 
The Lacanian theory has been very successful, particularly 
in academic and philosophical contexts, but a theory which 
sees sexual difference as the product of symbolic systems, 
and which sees language as a determining instance of the 
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meaning of sexual difference is taking on only the most 
superficial aspects of the problem. The effectiveness of a 
politics of cultural change based on this theory will be 
limited, transforming conventions of representation and 
pioneering a form of ecriture feminine, can only be part of 
the larger project to recognise that before language there 
is the raged-at mother. The rage and fear that is pre-
linguistic and pre-Oedipal is responsible for "the immense 
amount of cruelty to women which can be found in customs 
that are accepted by almost all civilisations." (43). 
The significance of this for feminism is that the 
social recognition of the debt to WOMAN is a necessary 
precondition of any long-standing change in the social, 
legal and economic position of women. Whether social 
institutions are conceptualised as the phenomenal forms of 
underlying economic or political systems, or as autonomous 
as determining forces in themselves, the changes that 
legislation and resourcing can bring about are ineffectual 
without the acknowledgement (on a subjective and social 
level) of the fact of this dependence on WOMAN. This may 
then facilitate a realistic conceptualisation of women, 
unimpeded by fantasy, so that women's needs may be 
realistically taken into account in social and political 
planning and organisation. 
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Social reality and psychic reality 
This chapter takes Freud's short book, Totem and Taboo 
and examines, in detail, its hypotheses on the dialectic of 
psychic reality and social structure. I also discuss the 
derivation of the hypotheses from the earlier clinical and 
cultural studies that Freud conducted. The influences on 
Totem and Taboo are described to contextualise its usage of 
biological and anthropological concepts. 
The exposition of the central points of Freud's theory 
is followed by a review of the book's reception by 
anthropologists. The particularly negative responses of the 
functionalists and the structuralists are discussed, and 
the psychoanalytic theory is compared with the 
anthropological theory of totemism. 
The concept of the avunculate is also discussed, 
particularly as it arose in the debate between Malinowski 
and Jones over the interpretation of Oedipal structures in 
pre-literate papuan-Melanesian society. The question of 
whether the Oedipal complex is universal, or whether it is 
a product only of western Europe's nuclear family 
structure, is asked in relation to historical, cultural and 
social difference. 
Finally, the phylogenetic or evolutional dimension of 
Freud's work is explored in relation to contemporary 
evolution theory. Freud's neo-Lamarckianism is considered 
as a precursor to the development of the concepts of 
superego and identification, which account for the 
inheritance of "acquired characteristics" of culture. 
III 
Totemism is thought by anthropologists to be one of the 
most primitive forms of social organisation and 
classification. It has two aspects, a social side which 
assigns clan membership to individuals and a religious side 
which concerned the relation of the individual or group to 
its totem species. In totemic societies, the tribe is 
divided into sub-groups (phratries, sub-phratries, clans) 
and each group identifies itself with a species, usually an 
animal, sometimes a plant. The clan calls itself after its 
totem and individuals have a set of devotional obligations 
towards the totem animal, particularly centred on 
prohibitions on killing, except in certain rituals where 
the totem animal is killed and sacrificially eaten. (1) 
Totemism is also connected with exogamy, as clan 
membership is usually transmitted matrilinealy, and each 
clan is exogamous. Some speculation exists as to whether 
exogamy is intrinsic to totemism or whether the two systems 
are separate social forms. 
Australia is thought to have the most complete and 
original form of totemism, but totemic societies also exist 
among tribes in Melanesia, polynesia, India, Africa and 
North America. 
Totemism can be firstly conceived as a form of ritual 
and socio-religious structure, as it is studied by 
sociology and anthropology. Secondly, it has been 
conceived as a psychic structure. A structure which 
comprises the interconnecting themes of incest prohibition, 
kinship systems, and the symbolic representation of the 
"father" in the psyche. Speculation on totemism as a 
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psychic structure was initiated by Frazer, Totemism and 
Exogamy (1910) but not theorised until 1913 by Freud in 
Totem and Taboo. This was also Freud's first major essay 
in psychoanalysis applied to cultural analysis and the 
earliest statement of his hypothesis that the Oedipus 
complex is the basis of the relation between human and 
social structure. The problem of totemism provided a 
specific form for Freud to work through his theory of 
psychic determinism and to demonstrate the fact of 
ambivalence in all human relationships. Totemism also 
required formulations on the meaning of origin and 
fantasies of origin for human relationships, and the 
speculations on the relation between documentation of 
history and awareness of death. After Freud, Geza-Roheim, 
Theodor Reik and other psychoanalytic theorists have 
presented variations on the interpretations of Totem and 
Taboo and the significance of these variations will be 
discussed in more detail. 
The two sides of totemism are discussed by 
anthropological and psychoanalytical theories. A number of 
questions arise from their juxtaposition, "Is paternity a 
social structure or a biological structure?", "Is the 
father the prototype of social authority or its replica?", 
"Is ritual a collective enactment of psychic conflict or is 
psychic conflict an internal reflection of social 
discord?", "How are we to differentiate between psychic 
reality and "external" reality?" 
The publication of Totem and Taboo marked Freud's 
definitive assertion of the primacy of psychic reality. 
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The earlier work on hysteria entailed the discovery of the 
unconscious and the self analysis and dream interpretation 
described more specifically how the unconscious works. The 
clinical cases of 'Little Hans', the 'Rat Man' and Schreber 
expanded and consolidated Freud's sense of the autonomy of 
psychic reality and the unconscious. Totem and Taboo was 
the result of this sense of an autonomous Oedipus complex. 
The following chapter explores the conflict between the 
anthropological and psychoanalytic theories of totemism, 
through a study of the critical reception of Freud's Totem 
and Taboo and the ideas associated with totemism. 
The third area of questioning opened up by Totem and 
Taboo is that of the historical dimensions, the question of 
the co-evolution of human mind with culture and language. 
Totemism itself recognises an implicit relation between 
human species and other animal species but, lacking a 
historical comprehension of this relation, substitutes a 
metaphoric relation. Of course totemism is a way of using 
relations between species to symbolise a set of intra-
social human relationships, as Levi-strauss has 
demonstrated, but in its prehistoric formulation of the 
question, "What is our father?", it intuits the Darwinian 
answer, not God but other species. 
The claims made by cultural relativists, that totemism 
is as valid a system of classification as any system, are 
clearly exaggerated to the point of idealising primitive 
classification. Without idealising totemism's "solution" 
to the problem of finding a comprehension of and notation 
of origins and descent, it is clear that their thinking is 
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very much along the same lines as Western science. 
The psychoanalytic interpretation of totemism and the 
associated prohibition and taboos that create laws and 
social codes provides a comprehensive and substantial 
account of why this similarity should exist between a pre-
literate and a scientific account of origins and 
classification. But the explanation provided in Totem and 
Taboo has many shortcomings. Why is it a Lamarckian 
theory? What is meant by the "phylogenetic inheritance" of 
certain "memory traces"? Does this theory correspond to 
any post-Mendelian account of genetic inheritance? 
What is the significance of the "real event" in Freud's 
account of both history and psychic reality? What is the 
significance of the hypothesis of 'primal parricide' and is 
it to be sustained? What is provided by a re-reading of 
Totem and Taboo informed by contemporary evolutionary 
theory? 
Totem and Taboo: Freud's hypothesis 
Totem and Taboo was written in four parts: the first 
three being preliminary to the hypothesis advanced in the 
fourth. The first essay, 'The Horror of Incest', discusses 
the ethnographic research into Australian Aboriginal 
totemic exogamy. Totemism is characteristic of peoples in 
parts of Polynesia and Melanesia, India, Africa and North 
America, but totemism has generally been regarded as 
occurring in Australia in its most complete and original 
form. Under totemic societies, the tribe is divided into 
two phratries, four subphratries and twelve totem clans, 
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represented by a totem (usually an animal). All divisions 
are exogamous so that an individual is prohibited from 
having sexual relations with anyone from the same clan. 
Australian totemism has an equally important economic and 
social dimension. Among the tribes of central Australia 
all those important happenings such as the origin of man 
and his customs, and the recurrence of birth and death are 
explained in totemic terms, as originally in "olden days" 
there were only totemic beings: emu, grub, etc. - half 
animal and half human in form. 
The major ethnographic source of information for Totem 
and Taboo was Sir J.G. Frazer's four volume study, Totem 
and Exogamy (1910), which provided a mass of data on 
totemism organised geographically; Freud started reading 
this in 1910 (Jones, 1955, p. 351) and also read Bachofen's 
Mutterecht (1861), McLennan's Primitive Marriage (1865), 
Tylor's Researches into the Early History of Mankind (1865) 
and Primitive culture (1871), Lubbock's Origin of 
Civilisation (1870) and Morgan's Systems of Consanguinity 
(1871) and Ancient Society (1877). Two of Durkheim's 
studies were also central references: 'La Prohibi tion de 
l'Inceste et ses origines' (1898) and the more extensive 
study of totemism in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
(1908). 
Freud differentiated between nominalist, sociological 
and psychological theories of the origins of totemism. 
sociological and historical explanations like those of 
Durkheim, Tylor and Morgan assumed that the power of the 
social group formed the individual. Psychological 
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explanations such as those of Frazer and Wundt (1911) 
focussed on the religious dimensions of totemism. For 
example, Frazer: 
The key to totemism might be found in the theory of 
the external soul, that is, in the belief that living 
people may deposit their souls for safe keeping outside 
of themselves in some secure place (totem) where the 
precious deposit will be less exposed to the 
vicissitudes of life than while it remained in the body 
of its owner (1910, Vol. 4, p. 52). (2) 
Freud synthesises the ethnological material and 
identifies the essential characteristics of Australian 
totemism: the fact that all original totems were animals, 
that these were regarded as the ancestors of the different 
clans; that totems were inherited only through the female 
line; that there was a prohibition against killing the 
totem, and lastly that there was a prohibition against 
marriage and sexual relations between members of the totem 
clan. 
A central problem for explanations of totemism was to 
account for the link between totemism and exogamy. Some 
held the two systems to be inextricable, others claimed 
separate origins and history. Where clan membership is 
matrilineal, the exogamous prohibition served to regulate 
mother-son, brother-sister, relations. Where patrilineal 
lineage predominates (Africa), the father-daughter, 
brother-sister, relations are most strongly tabooed. 
Freud assumes that exogamy is a central characteristic 
of totemism, and speculates on the interaction of the 
social and psychological aspects of taboo. Starting from 
the psychoanalytic premise that what is strongly tabooed 
represents a repressed wish, Freud suggests that the 
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'horror of incest', socially expressed as a phobia or 
taboo, is a protection against desires to gratify wishes. 
In exogamous taboos, the wishes in question are the 
childhood incestuous wishes that have been repressed and 
have become subconscious and are felt as immediate dangers 
which require very severe forms of defensive restraint. 
The second essay, 'Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence', 
discusses the taboos in preliterate societies that surround 
death and enemies. Wundt's definition of taboo as the 
'oldest human unwritten code of law' is discussed. 
According to Wundt, original taboos described both the 
sacred and the denigrated, and prohibition was originally 
on touching an object designated as taboo. 
Psychologically, taboo is seen as locating fears and thus 
danger within an object, so that the danger of touching 
would signify fears of contamination and revenge. 
According to Wundt, in later social systems, taboo has the 
function of separating the 'unclean' from the 'sacred', but 
it was originally a combination of both aspects. 
Freud notes the close resemblance between these social 
taboos and the obsessional prohibitions of some neurotic 
types of thinking. Neurotic solutions to the 
gratifications of instinctual needs involve complicated 
sets of rituals in which forbidden acts are followed by 
expiatory, cleansing acts. Obsessional thinking tends to 
involve prohibitions on touching and these prohibitions are 
particularly liable to displacement onto other actions and 
objects. Just as obsessional neurosis shows an ambivalence 
towards unconscious wishes, Freud claims, so taboos express 
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an ambivalent attitude towards the wishes that are socially 
prohibited. The sacred and the denigrated are both taboo, 
we desire what we pretend to abhor. This is because all 
human relations are ambivalent. 
Freud discusses the ambivalence of love and hate and 
how this is expressed in pre-literate societies in the 
taboos around death and mourning. That there are 
appeasement rituals for ghosts of the dead, and social 
restrictions imposed on killers (of animals and humans) 
with ceremonials and acts of expiation and pacification, he 
suggests, demonstrates the emotional ambivalence towards 
enemies, with loss, grief and mourning co-existing with 
aggression and jubilant satisfaction. 
Whereas aggression might be expected to exist towards 
enemies and strangers, Freud also finds it expressed in 
rituals surrounding the loss and death of kin or loved 
ones. Discussing taboos around admired rulers such as 
chiefs, kings and priests, he also finds ambivalence "for a 
ruler must not only be guarded but guarded against". The 
taboos and ceremonials imposed on leaders in many pre-
literate societies not only "revere and exalt the man 
concerned but also make his life an intolerable burden, 
reducing him to the bondage of slavery". Ambivalence in 
relationships to close relations and friends is 
demonstrated in African, polynesian and Melanesian 
totemistic societies in the belief that a dearly loved 
relative will turn into a demon at the moment of his death 
and that his survivors can expect nothing but hostility 
from him. Freud notes that the psychic mechanism in 
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operation in these rituals is the same as in our forms of 
mourning. In mourning there is a strong aspect of self-
reproach combined with the grief of loss, which Freud 
identifies as the response to an unconscious wish for the 
death of the loved person. Similar mechanisms operate in 
depression, where grief at a severe psychic loss is bound 
up with rage and unconscious aggression. 
In a more obscure way Freud notes that ambivalence is 
also the basis of conscience, the capacity for judgement, 
where the aggressive emotion is kept unconscious and is 
maintained in repression by the compulsive domination of 
the "good" behaviour. (The severity of what he later 
termed the superego is an index of the strength of the 
repressed aggression). 
Freud compares neurotic symptoms in the individual to 
the rituals of social institutions through analogy, and had 
formulated the comparison in 1907: 
One might venture to regard obsessional neurotics 
as a pathological counterpart to the formation of a 
religion, and to describe that neurosis as an 
individual religiosity and religion as a universal 
obsessional neurosis (3). 
In Totem and Taboo the interaction between 'individual' 
and 'universal' is further elaborated as the concept of 
projection is developed and as the historical dimension IS 
introduced. The concept of projection is developed in the 
third essay, "Animism, Magic and the Omnipotence of 
Thoughts". Animism, an anthropological term, is described 
as the tendency to project subjective wishes and fears into 
objects. As a mental mechanism is characteristic of most 
rituals and magic of pre-literate societies, much 
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contemporary religion, the neurotic disorder of obsessional 
neurosis, and a particular stage of children's thinking and 
play, particularly in the pre-linguistic, infantile, stage. 
Here Freud suggests a connection between the mental 
structure of infantile thought, neurotic disorder and 
aspects of contemporary religion of literate and pre-
literate societies. This connection was based on the 
"doctrine of survivals" which influenced most nineteenth 
century anthropology, and hence pervaded most of Freud's 
ethnographic sources for Totem and Taboo. But far from 
being a crude and racist assumption of the infantilism of 
pre-literate people, the connection drawn is one which 
could, eventually, explain the mechanisms of socially 
destructive forms of projection. 
The historical dimension is introduced: 
projection is not specially created for the purpose 
of defence, it also comes into being where there are no 
conflicts. The projection of inner perceptions onto 
the outside ... also influences our sense perceptions, 
so that it normally has the greatest share in shaping 
our outer world. Under conditions that have not yet 
been sufficiently determined even inner perceptions of 
ideational and emotional processes are projected 
outwardly, like sense perceptions, and are used to 
shape the outer world, whereas they ought to remain in 
the inner world. This is perhaps genetically connected 
with the fact that the function of attention was 
originally directed not towards the inner world, but to 
the stimuli streaming in from the outer world ... only 
with the development of the language of abstract 
thought through the association of sensory remnants of 
word representations with inner processes did the 
lat ter gradually become capabl e of percept ion. (4 ) . 
The "language of abstract thought" here is identified 
as the structure which mediates the projection of internal 
perceptions and the introjection of external perceptions, 
and which initiates the capacity of recognition of internal 
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processes as such. 
The socially shared forms of speech and writing are, 
similarly, mechanisms for differentiating between 
subjective and objective reality and for documenting the 
'real events' of history. What is real for the group as 
opposed to what is real for the individual. In the fourth 
essay, "The Return of Totemism in Childhood", Freud 
presents his synthesis of the sociological, psychological 
and historical aspects of totemism and advances his theory 
of the Oedipus complex as the basis of both totemism and 
exogamy. The essay opens with a review of the 
anthropological literature. Anthropologists maintain a 
differentiation between the identification of a clan with a 
totem animal and the identification that any individual may 
make with an animal; the first regulates group identity and 
the second regulates individual identity. Freud's theory 
traces the paths of association and displacement which link 
the content of totemic prohibitions and the content of 
phobias. 
psychoanalysis notes that at a certain age, children 
readily identify themselves with animals. Ferenczi's 
treatment of a child, Aspad, who identified both himself 
and his father with poultry, is clinical material cited as 
illustration of the way that the emotional relationship to 
animals can become phobic if the affect is displaced onto 
the animal. Freud's own case of Little Hans, a boy with 
phobic reactions to horses, who was treated from 1906 to 
1908, is also used as clinical documentation of this type 
of identification. The Oedipal wishes of the boy are to 
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get rid of father and to marry mother. These are directly 
expressed in the games, stories and fantasies of children , 
and indirectly reappear in adults as the core of a 
neurosis, after repression. 
Freud puts forward the hypothesis that the content of 
totemic prohibitions (not to kill the totem and not to 
marry a woman of the same totem) are an inverted form of 
the two crimes of Oedipus and of the infantile wishes 
represented in animal phobias. The Oedipus complex, he 
suggests, is the structure which underlies both neurotic 
disorder and totemic religion. The totem animal signifies 
an abstract father, the ancestor of the social group, the 
originator of identity. 
Having recognised the importance of the emotional 
ambivalence toward the paternal function in obsessional 
neurosis, religion and children's phobic reactions, Freud 
turns towards investigating the significance of the 
maternal function. 
A feature of totemism is the sacrificial meal, the 
killing and communal eating of the totem animal, strictly 
forbidden on other occasions.(S) The sacrificial meal of 
totemism, the Judaic rituals of Passover, and the Christian 
sacraments of communion with the body and blood of Christ, 
are all based on rituals of incorporation in which the 
substance represents a symbolic nourishment and the 
symbolic nourishment represents bodily nourishment. 
Signifiers of food are incorporated as the nourishing 
function is introjected, and the mechanism of introjection 
has the unconscious meaning of physical incorporation. 
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The limitations of Freud's analyses are evident here as 
Totem and Taboo does not elaborate the pre-Oedipal 
significance of the totem meal and rituals of 
incorporation, which are left as metaphors of 
identification. In the place of a psychodynamic 
explanation of the pre-Oedipal relation to Oedipus 
complex, Freud puts forward a historical explanation of 
the origins of totemism and exogamy. The explanation 
preferred is the well-known 'primal horde' hypothesis 
so firmly refuted by anthropologists as "an almost 
wholly untenable fabrication" (6). 
If we now bring together the psychoanalytic 
translation of the totem with the fact of the totem 
meal and with Darwin's theories of the earliest state 
of human society ... a hypothesis ... which may seem 
fantastic emerges ... one day the brothers (of the 
primal horde) who had been driven out together, killed 
and devoured their father and so made an end of the 
patriarchal horde ... in the fact of devouring him they 
accomplished their identification with him, and each 
one of them acquired a portion of his strength ... 
After they had got rid of him, had satisfied their 
hatred and had put into effect their wish to identify 
themselves with him, the affection (for him) which all 
this time had been pushed under was bound to make 
itself felt. It did so in the form of remorse ... the 
dead father became stronger than the living one had 
been - for events took the course we have often seen 
them follow in human affairs to this day. What had up 
to then been prevented by his actual existence was 
thenceforth prohibited by the sons themselves, in 
accordance with the psychological procedure so familiar 
to us in psychoanalyses under the name of 'deferred 
obedience'. They revoked the deed by forbidding the 
killing of the totem, the substitute for their father; 
and they renounced its fruits by resigning their claim 
to the women who had now been set free. They thus 
created out of their filial sense of guilt the two 
taboos of totemism, which for that very reason, 
inevitably corresponded to the two repressed wishes of 
the Oedipus complex. (7) 
The real event of primal parricide and its result of 
the first purely psychological experience, of guilt, 
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according to Freud, left memory traces which constitute the 
'phylogenetic inheritance' of the human psyche, the Oedipus 
complex. So the Oedipus complex is given a universal 
explanatory power and a historically specific explanation. 
Influences on Totem and Taboo 
Darwin's Impact and the cultural Evolutionists 
Jones notes that Freud began to read for Totem and 
Taboo in 1910 and read comprehensively in the sociology and 
anthropology of totemism. Frazer's four volumes were 
undoubtedly his main source of ethnographic material, and 
Frazer's own explanations of totemism in terms of animism 
and primitive magic Freud categorised as psychological 
explanations like his own. The main influence on the 
overall theory and direction of conceptualisation of Totem 
and Taboo was Darwin, where influence is to be felt both 
directly in the primal horde hypothesis, and indirectly 
through the evolutionary perspectives of the cultural 
anthropologists Maine, MacLennan, Tylor, Morgan, Lubbock 
and Spencer. 
The conceptual frameworks of the early anthropologists 
has been documented by Rosalind Coward (1982) who also 
traces their influence on Freud's clinical practice. 
Wallace (1983) has characterised the four fundamental 
tenets of the nineteenth century's cultural evolutionists 
as comprising: first, a transposition of Darwin's concept 
of biological evolution onto culture with the idea of a 
"unilinear and invariable sequence of cultural development 
from simple to complex". Second, a loose equation was made 
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between contemporary preliterate cultures and the culture 
of pre-human ancestors. Third, the belief in the psychic 
unity of the human species, which justified the use of the 
comparative method equating contemporary with past culture. 
Lastly, a transposition of Haeckel's biogenetic law onto 
psychic life resulted in a doctrine of "survivals", the 
belief that contemporary individuals have memory traces of 
behaviours which belonged to the ancestral pre-human 
population (8). The indefensibly direct transposition of 
biological principles onto cultural processes was 
rigorously criticised by twentieth century anthropologists, 
and historical explanations of cultural difference were 
soon replaced by functionalist descriptions. However, 
Freud's aim in Totem and Taboo was to give a historical 
account of psychic evolution, an aim which is not 
fundamentally affected by the anthropological critique of 
cultural evolutionism. Sulloway (1979) has also shown the 
extent to which Freud conceived his work as part of the 
biological sciences, and as part of the Darwinian project. 
Ritvo (1974) has traced the long-standing influence of 
Darwinism and materialism on Freud's education and 
training. Ritvo and Scher (1970, 1970b) have applied 
contemporary principles of evolutionary biology to Freud's 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Freud made direct use of Darwin's Sexual Selection and 
the Descent of Man (1871) for his primal horde hypothesis. 
In Sexual Selection Darwin used reported observations of 
primates, particularly African apes in order to speculate 
on human ancestry. Using the comparative method (of 
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comparing other species with protohuman ancestors) Darwin 
put forward some very tentative speculations: 
The most probable view is that primeval man 
aboriginally lived in small communities, each with as 
many wives as he could support and obtain, whom he 
would have jealously guarded against all other men. Or 
he may have lived with several wives by himself, like 
the gorilla ... where but one adult male is seen with 
the band: when the young male grows up a contest takes 
place for mastery, and the strongest, by killing and 
driving out the others, establishes himself as the head 
of the community. The younger males, being thus 
expelled, would ... prevent too close interbreeding 
within the limits of the same family. (9) 
which Freud seems to have translated into a factual 
account. As it happens, the gorillas are not an accurate 
model of human ancestors and this invalidates some aspects 
of the primal horde hypothesis. (10) 
Freud was particularly influenced by Darwin's 
Lamarckianism, which allowed for the biological 
transmission of historically acquired characteristics: 
Our intention is to base Lamarck's ideas completely 
on our own theories and to show that his concept of 
'need', which creates and modifies organs, is nothing 
else than the power unconscious ideas have over the 
body, of which we see the remains in hysteria - in 
short, the 'omnipotence of thoughts'. Fitness would 
then be really explained psychoanalytically; it would 
be the completion of psychoanalysis. Two great 
principles of change (of progress) would emerge: one 
through adaptation of one's own body, the later one 
through alteration of the outer world (autoplastic and 
heteroplastic). (11) 
Ritvo (1964) has shown that Freud's Lamarckianism was 
not in contradiction with Darwinism of the time although it 
now appears anachronistic and biologically incorrect. 
Following Darwin, Weissman developed a concept of 
'soma' and 'germ plasm' which Freud used, especially in 
formulating a dualism between two sets of instincts and 
drives, and provided a useful metaphor for conceptualising 
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the mechanisms now attributed to 'genotype' and 'phenotype' 
in post-Mendelian genetics. 
Contemporary psychoanalysis has continued to make use 
of ethnological studies as a basis of understanding human 
behaviour. John Bowlby's studies of attachment rest on a 
theoretical base of evolutionary principles. Therefore, 
Bowlby has presented one of the most useful critiques of 
Freud's Lamarckianism and why it is an obstacle to current 
comprehension of human nature. (12) 
It has often been assumed that the biological dimension 
of Freudian psychoanalysis is incompatible with feminist 
thought and many have identified Freud's evolutionism as 
the main target for critique. Sayers (1982), Mitchell 
(1979), Rose and Mitchell (1982) and Adams and Brown (1981) 
are indicative of this critique. To base the structures of 
the mind in the human body is feared as a repetition of the 
symbolic equation between 'woman' and 'body', which has 
universally resulted in a destructive misrecognition of 
women's needs. The perspective of Totem and Taboo does 
offer an insight into why there is a universal tendency to 
equate masculinity with humanity and femininity with 
animality, in cultural representations of sexual 
difference. It also offers an explanation for why the 
'opposition' of sexual difference is used, universally, as 
a metaphor for other binary oppositions. 
Evolutionary theory today, which includes the history 
of women and the history of infancy, provides some points 
of contact with the principles of Totem and Taboo. (These 
are discussed in chapter three). Nevertheless it is 
128 
significant that, in the text of Totem and Taboo, the point 
of transformation from analytical to historical explanation 
occurred when Freud reached a threshold in his thinking. 
Having advanced the Oedipal analysis of totemism and 
exogamy, it is as if a barrier then prevented him from 
thinking through the significance of pre-Oedipal processes 
in psychic and social structure. The ability to think more 
deeply about the psychological and cultural meaning of what 
Winnicott terms WOMAN, and the emotional incursion that 
this requires, is replaced, in Freud's work, by a narrative 
excursion into prehistory. 
In a study of the Dora case history, Toril Moi has 
proposed that narrativisation in Freud's work could be seen 
as an attempt to impose order onto an inherently disordered 
experience, which she equates with masculine and feminine 
forms of knowledge. This kind of 'secondary revision' in 
Totem and Taboo may indeed have indicated an inability to 
broach his own femininity. 
Freud recognised this limitation in his theory in 1938; 
returning to the primal horde hypothesis, he noted: 
No date can be assigned to this, nor has it been 
synchronised with the geological epochs known to us: it 
is probable that these creatures had not advanced far 
in the development of speech. An essential part of the 
construction is the hypothesis that the events 
happened to all primitive man ... the story is told in 
an enormously condensed form, as though it had happened 
on a single occasion, while in fact it covered 
thousands of years and was repeated countless times 
during that long period. (13) 
The narrativisation of 'the events' seemed inadequate 
to Freud himself. But he maintained the essential aspect 
of the hypothesis: that events took place, and in this 
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maintained the historical dimension of psychoanalytic 
theory. 
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Cultural analysis and psychic reality 
Totem and Taboo, the first of Freud's attempts at 
constructing a psychoanalytic theory of social structure, 
articulates the clinical and cultural aspects of the 
metapsychology. The two aspects are about evenly 
represented in Freud's writings, with at least half of the 
work concerned with the application of psychoanalysis to 
problems of history, sociology, religion, art, literature, 
mythOlogy, etc. 
The interaction of the insights gained from clinical 
work with the concepts developed in cultural analysis 
created a constantly developing theory which linked both. 
Four of the five clinical cases, published as case 
histories with major contributions to the development of 
theoretical concepts, preceded Totem and Taboo and each can 
be seen to have contributed to it. Dora, the case of 
hysteria (1905), the cases of 'Little Hans' and the 'Rat 
Man' (1909), and Schreber (1911) all provide parallels to 
the social processes described in Totem and Taboo, and 
Freud noted there that: 
Neuroses exhibit on the one hand striking and far-
reaching points of agreement with those great social 
institutions, art, religion and philosophy. But on the 
other hand they seem like distortions of them. It 
might be maintained that a case of hysteria is a 
caricature of a work of art, that an obsessional 
neurosis is a caricature of a religion, and that a 
paranoic delusion is a caricature of a philosophical 
system. (14) 
If the term caricature implies not only a distortion or 
exaggeration of negative traits, but also a copy, it 
remained to be shown whether the neuroses were copies of 
cultural structure or vice versa. That is, exact 
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mechanisms of the interaction of cultural and subjective 
structures remained to be discovered. It would require the 
concept of superego to formulate this interaction, a 
concept which was not fully formulated until 1923 in The 
Ego and the Id. Immediately before this in 1920 and 1921, 
the two major works on sociological and historical issues, 
Group Psychology and Beyond the pleasure Principle use the 
concept in all but name. Group psychology uses the idea of 
an ego-ideal, of projection used in defence against 
aggression and splitting, Beyond the Pleasure principle is 
a full exploration of the vicissitudes of aggression in the 
psychic apparatus. Likewise, Totem and Taboo can be 
understood as a theory in search of the concept of 
superego. certainly the later works, such as Civilisation 
and its Discontents (1930), The Future of an Illusion 
(1927) and Moses and Monotheism (1937) all retrace the 
themes originally set out in Totem and Taboo, aided by the 
conceptual framework of the second topography of 1923. 
The first topography differentiated between unconscious 
psychical systems and conscious experience, a 
differentiation which Freud discovered and conceptualised 
in the studies on hysteria. The recognition of the Oedipus 
complex, the central concept of Totem and Taboo, was 
gradual and was still being tentatively formulated in 1913. 
At this time Freud was unambiguous about the applicability 
of concepts developed in or or other aspects of cultural or 
social theory: 
What characterises psychoanalysis as a science is 
less the material with which it works than the method 
it applies. without forcing its nature one can apply 
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it . 
. Just as well to the history of civilisation, to the 
SCIence of religions and to mythology as well as to the 
theor~ of.the.neuroses. Its only aim and its only 
contrIbutIon IS to discover the unconscious in 
psychical life. 
Freud's earliest works include research into the non-
clinical aspects of psychology, particularly into 
symbolisation. This became a key concept for The 
Interpretation of Dreams which linked the neurotic and 
'normal' psychic processes. similarly the unconscious 
aspects of ordinary life were explored in Jokes and their 
Relation to the Unconscious (1906) in The Psychopathology 
of Everyday Life (1901). 
In 1907 Freud published three papers which dealt 
exclusively with this sphere; two on literature: creative 
Writers and Daydreaming and Delusions and Dreams in 
Jensen's Gradiva, and the third was his earliest direct 
precursor of Totem and Taboo, Obsessive Actions and 
Religious Practices. This introductory incursion into the 
psychology of religion set out Freud's analysis of 
obsessional neurosis as being a symptomatic defence against 
feelings of guilt. Obsessionals, whether on the level of 
thought or of actions (ceremonials), systematically 
elaborate ordinary daily processes into highly formal sets 
of rules, prohibitions or repeated actions. Freud was 
struck by the similarity of the patterns of obsessional 
systems of behaviour and religious practices, and he 
suggested that they might have in common a latent content 
and a particular form of defence against unconscious 
wishes. 
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At this point Freud was using the model of intrapsychic 
structures to understand the social structure of religion, 
and although his use of the comparative method extends 
itself to 1913, his conclusions in Totem and Taboo are 
considerably different. 
In the following year Freud published "Civilised" 
Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, in which he 
further explored some of his ideas from the Studies in 
Hysteria where he had thought social restrictions of the 
expression of sexual drives to be an important aetiological 
factor in the formation of neurotic symptoms. This theme 
of the dependence of intrapsychic processes on 'external' 
conditions is one which runs throughout Freud's work, of 
course, although the solutions he finds for formulating 
this relationship between inner and outer reality vary 
considerably in the evolution of his thought. 
At this point (1908) Freud accords great importance to 
the social conventions which facilitate or impede the 
expression of instinctual impulses. It is the first of 
Freud's many discussions of the antagonism between 
civilisation and instinctual life which culminated in 
Civilisation and its Discontents (1930). In this early 
paper 'civilised' sexual mores are seen as being harmful to 
mental health by imposing too severe a demand for 
restriction and sacrifice upon instinctual life. Although, 
Freud notices, such restrictions are held to be necessary 
for the welfare of all within the protective institutions 
of society, there is a point at which the severity of the 
demands become too much for individuals. These individuals 
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then fall ill (with symptoms that are either somatic or 
mental), and cannot function as members of the society, 
thus endangering civilisation itself. Freud further 
classified these nervous disorders into two groups: the 
neuroses and the psycho-neuroses, the former being more 
directly the result of an external prohibition on sexual 
fulfilment and the latter involving a more deep 
intrapsychic conflict which Freud attributed to 'heredity'. 
At this point Freud's libido theory maintained the division 
he set out in 1895 in his paper 'On the grounds for 
Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the 
Description 'Anxiety Neurosis" (SE 3, p. 85-116). In this 
early essay Freud states that civilisation is built upon 
the suppression of instincts and identifies three stages to 
the historical evolution of such suppression. Firstly a 
stage of 'polymorphous perversity', secondly a stage in 
which the sexual instincts are expressed only within the 
limitations of reproductive sexual activity, and thirdly 
the 'civilised' state which allows only unhampered outlets 
to monogamous, heterosexual reproductive sexuality. As in 
the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud 
notes that the human sexual instinct does not originally 
serve the purposes of reproduction at all but that 
infantile sexuality simply aims to secure for itself 
particular forms of satisfaction and pleasure. Freud ends 
his essay by asking whether our civilised sexual morality 
is worth the sacrifice it imposes on us in the form of 
neuroses. 
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Although it was as early as 1897 that Freud, writing to 
Fliess, had remarked that "something organic plays a part 
in repression", it was not until the formulation of the 
metapsychology that he conceptualised repression as an 
autonomous psychic function. Intrapsychic conflict, 
between the UC, PCs and Cs systems, and later between the 
id, ego and superego, was eventually seen as the most 
important determinant of repression, both repression proper 
and the Nachdrangen or 'after-pressure'. The 
straightforward conflict between external and instinctual 
demands then, as it is expressed in the 1908 essay, was a 
short-lived idea in the work of Freud, although it lived on 
much longer in the minds of those who claimed to be his 
followers. 
The route to the metapsychology passed through two 
important case histories: the 'Psychoanalytic Notes on an 
Autobiographical Account of a Case of paranoia', the 
Schreber case, and the 'History of an Infantile Neurosis', 
although this was not published until 1918. The former 
enabled Freud to develop his intrapsychic theory of 
repression whilst showing how instinctual life is 
articulated with certain kinds of symbolic structures, 
notably syntax. Also important from the Schreber case was 
the concept of the 'return of the repressed', which became 
central to Freud's thinking on social institutions such as 
totemism, as well as its manifestation in the guise of 
symptoms, dreams and parapraxes which are discussed below, 
in relation to clinical practice. 
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Anotl~r, more minor, precursor to Totem and Taboo was 
Freud's review of Gance's 'The Antithetical Meaning of 
Primal Words' (1911) in which his interest in symbolism, 
philology, ancient mythology and symptom formation were 
united. Here we can see the emphasis on the mechanism of 
inversion that Freud found in the structures of totemism 
when viewed in relation to the symptom formation of 
obsessional neurosis. Totem and Taboo, when viewed in the 
light of these precursors, was the first of Freud's works 
to embark upon a fully psychoanalytic theory of social 
institutions, that is, one which places the Oedipus complex 
at the heart of both social and psychic realities. 
However, whereas his previous works had interpreted 
social institutions on the basis of individual behaviour 
(1908) or had, paradoxically, seen social institutions as 
primary determinants of individual illness; Totem and Taboo 
gives a historical account of the co-emergence of psyche 
and 'society'. The interdependent relation between the 
internal symbolic structures of psychic differentiation and 
the social symbolic structures of such cultural forms as 
totemism and other kinship systems (any system which 
overlays a symbolic relation on a biological reason, in 
fact) was clearly formulated. The complexity of 
conceptualising the history of this relation made it 
impossible for Freud to pursue this aspect of his theory, 
and he focussed instead on enlarging its psychological 
significance. 
For example, in 'The Claims of psychoanalysis to 
scientific Interest' (1913) he made a strong case for 
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seeing psychoanalysis as not only complementary to 
sociology and anthropology but as integral to them: 
A similar application of its points of view, its 
hypotheses and its findings has enabled psychoanalysis 
to throw light on the origins of our great cultural 
institutions - on religion, morality, justice and 
philosophy. By examining the primitive psychological 
situations which were able to provide the motive for 
creations of this kind, it has been in a position to 
reject certain attempts at an explanation that were 
based on too superficial a psychology and to replace 
them by a more penetrating insight. 
Psychoanalysis has established an intimate 
connection between the psychical achievements of 
individuals on the one hand and societies on the other 
by postulating one and the same dynamic source for both 
of them ... Our knowledge of the neurotic illnesses of 
individuals has been of much assistance to our 
understanding of the great social institutions. For 
the neuroses themselves have turned out to be attempts 
to find individual solutions for the problems of 
compensating for unsatisfied wishes, while the 
institutions seek to provide social solutions for these 
same problems. (15) 
Later he made a bolder claim: 
Sociology too, dealing as it does with the 
behaviour of people in society, cannot be anything but 
applied psychology. Strictly speaking, there are only 
two sciences: psychology pure and applied, and natural 
science. (16) 
The clearest example of subsequent developments in 
Freud's use of the ideas in Totem and Taboo can be seen in 
Group psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921). In 
1913 Freud gave an account of how the incorporation of the 
father's body in the totem meal gave rise to a form of 
identification and thus co-operation between the sons, what 
he called the 'anthropophagic complex'. In 1921 Freud's 
theory is of how the introjection of the ideal ego in the 
form of a group leader is the mechanism of identification 
that secures the cohesion of groups. using the artificial 
groups of the army and the church as examples, he argues 
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that they share a structure of illusion on which their 
internal cOhesion is maintained; the illusion is shared by 
all members that there is a benevolent and just leader who 
loves all the members with an equal love. Through sharing 
this illusion the individual members can develop ties of 
identification in which the (displaced) libidinal ties 
dominate over the aggressive ones. A 'group', as opposed 
to a collection of people, is defined as a number of 
individuals who have put the same object in the place of 
the ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves 
with one another in their ego. 
Freud discusses the mechanism of identification and 
compares the ego's relation to its ego ideal as it is 
formed in the bonds of hypnosis and of 'being-in-love'. 
Each situation provides a different permutation of 
identification, but, most importantly, each example shows 
how both individual and social structures share a common 
basis. Once again Freud suggests that contemporary 
psychological structures can be understood as 'survivals' 
of their origins in the primal 'horde', which is seen as 
the origin of the Oedipus complex. 
From incorporation, to introjection, to identification 
Freud uses the groundwork of the metapsychology to build an 
increasingly complex theory of the relation between 
'internal' and 'external' realities. By 1923, when he 
advances the second topology, the 'structural' theory of 
psychic differentiation in The Ego and the Id, Freud 
further increases the number of factors that he brings to 
bear on his concept of the origin of the Oedipus complex: 
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If we consider once more the origin of the superego 
as we have described it, we shall recognise that it is 
the outcome of two highly important biological factors: 
namely the lengthy duration in man of his childhood 
helplessness and dependence and the fact of his 
Oedipus complex (which we h~ve traced back to the 
int~rruption of libidinal development by the latency 
perIod and so to the diphasic onset of man's sexual 
life). (17) 
In the same essay Freud attributes the cause of the 
neuroses to three factors, firstly the prematurity of human 
infants, their extended dependence on their mothers, which 
leads to internal psychic differentiation; secondly the 
phylogenetic factor of diphasic sexuality so that infantile 
sexuality is felt by adults as an internal danger; and 
thirdly the fact of the dynamic interaction between the 
different psychic agencies (which is actually a part of the 
first, biological factor). He called these three factors 
the biological, the historical and the psychological 
factors. We can now see that they are all in some way 
dependent on an evolutionary explanation of specific 
prematurity and diphasic sexuality. 
Eventually Freud described the Oedipus complex as a 
psychological structure which depends closely on the 
immaturity of the child's infantile body: to an ever-
increasing extent the Oedipus complex reveals its 
•.• importance as the central phenomenon of the 
sexual period of early childhood. After that, its 
dissolution takes place; it succumbs to repression, as 
we say, and is followed by the latency period. It has 
not yet become clear, however, what it is that brin~s 
about its destruction. Analyses seem to show that It 
is the experience of painful disappointments. The 
little girl likes to regard herself as what her father 
loves above all else; but the time comes when she has 
to endure a harsh punishment from him and she is cast 
out of her fool's paradise. The boy regards his mother 
as his own property; but he finds one day that she has 
transferred her love and solicitude to a new arrival. 
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Reflec~ion must deepen our sense of the importance of t~ose In~luences, for it will emphasise that 
dIstressIng experiences of this sort which act in 
. . , ~PPO~ltIon to the content of the complex, are 
InevItable. Even when no special events occur, like 
those we have mentioned as examples, the absence of 
satisfaction hoped for, the continued denial of the 
desired baby, must in the end lead the small lover to 
turn away from his hopeless longing. In this way the 
Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its 
lack of success, from the effects of its internal 
imposs ibil i ty. (18) 
Here the emphasis is on the internal impossibility of 
satisfying the Oedipal child's wishful longings. Whereas 
the emphasis in the earlier works was on the role of social 
prohibition ('civilised' morality in adults, the paternal 
prohibition and incest taboo in the case of children), 
Freud's fully psychoanalytic theory emphasises the 
significance of the discrepancy between a child's wishes 
and its physical immaturity which makes the satisfaction of 
those wishes impossible. This he develops into a 
psychological theory of the importance of the ego ideal and 
the superego in guiding the child's impulses into symbolic 
and substitutive activities (the latency child enters 
educational institutions in our society). 
Whilst no explanation is given of the history of the 
increasing prematurity of the human neonate, nor of 
diphasic sexuality to which it is probably connected, Freud 
correctly identifies these as problems belonging to the 
biological sciences. The evolutionary hypotheses of Totem 
and Taboo. although no longer in their anthropological 
form, re-emerge as necessary elements of the psychological 
explanation of the origins of the Oedipus complex, as a 
necessary part of the description of its historical, 
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ontogenetic development. 
The Freudian critique of religion was continued in The 
Future of an Illusion (1927), where we find an analysis of 
religion as wish-fulfilment, as a projection of Oedipal 
fantasy, as a narcissistic compensation for infantile 
helplessness, as well as being a historical system which 
reproduces power relations. Religion is contrasted to 
science as explanations by the pleasure principle and by 
the reality principle respectively, although science is 
expected, at most, to be able to give us an explanation for 
our ignorance. The limits of human knowledge can be 
explained, scientifically, in terms of the characteristics 
of our psychological construction. 
At the end of his life, in the 'Postscript' to his 
Autobiographical Study, Freud notes that: 
My interest, after making a lifelong detour through 
the natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, 
returned to the cultural problems that had fascinated 
me long before ... At the very climax of my 
psychoanalytic work in 1912, I had already attempted in 
Totem and Taboo to make use of the newly discovered 
findings of analysis to investigate the origins of 
relation and morality. I now carried this work further 
in two later essays, The Future of an Illusion and 
Civilisation and its Discontents (1930). I perceived 
ever more clearly that the events of human history, the 
interactions between human nature, cultural development 
and the precipitates of primeval experiences (the most 
prominent example of which is religion) are no more 
than a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between the 
ego, the id and the superego, which psychoanalysis 
studies in the individual - are the very same processes 
repeated on a wider scale. (19) 
Not only in Civilisation and its Discontents but also in 
Moses and Monotheism (1939) did Freud continue to develop the 
psychoanalysis of social structures. Totem and Taboo marks an 
important turning point in the development of his 
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conceptualisation of the relative autonomy of intrapsychic 
conflict: 
Sometimes one seems to perceive that it is not only 
the pressure of civilisation, but something in the 
nature of the function itself which denies us full 
satisfaction and urges us along other paths; (20) 
Freud noted this inherent psychic frustration in 
Civilisation and its Discontents (p. 105), and it was 
precisely his understanding of the centrality of the 
Oedipus complex, the residue of the infantile experience 
within the adult, that enabled him to recognise the full 
significance of his 'perception'. 
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Clinical concepts and psychic reality 
If the development of concepts from the clinical case 
studies is more obscure, this may be partly because the 
technique of psychoanalysis does not favour rationalisation 
and the case studies were published primarily to discuss 
issues of technique. But there are very clear 
correspondences between the cases of 'Little Hans', the 
'Rat Man' - a case of obsessional neurosis, President 
Schreber, and the cultural analysis in Totem and Taboo. 
The cases each produce a problematic which is fully 
utilised in the more systematic method of Totem and Taboo. 
The animal phobia of five year old Hans provides a basis 
for thinking through the connection between animal 
symbolism and the psychic significance of the father. 
Child analysis itself was suggestive of how the forces of 
infantile subjectivity might remain as psychic 'survivals' 
in adult life. The case of obsessional neurosis provided a 
thorough investigation of the mechanism of displacement of 
affect and meaning in the obsessional's 'ceremonial'. 
Schreber's paranoia revealed a pattern of systematic 
distortion of a core phantasy, using projection as the 
major form of defence. 
These three problematics, the symbolisation of the 
'father', the mechanism of displacement and the mechanism 
of projection, that emerged from Freud's therapeutic 
practice, are synthesised in the cultural analysis of 
totemism and exogamy. The study of the interaction of 
clinical concepts and cultural analysis provides certain 
clues about the conceptualisation of the 'subjective' and 
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'social' spheres. 
In the final section of Totem and Taboo, 'The Return of 
totemism in Childhood', Freud describes the animal phobia 
of 'Little Hans' as "negative totemism". 'Hans' was a 
three year old boy treated for two years by Freud through 
the intermediary of the boy's father. 'Hans', ordinarily a 
cheerful and intelligent child, started suffering from 
nightmares following the birth of a younger sister. 
Freud's case history describes Hans' play and his 
discussions, interpreting these as representing many 
processes that are normal in children of that age. These 
include the intellectual efforts to find out the difference 
between animate and inanimate objects around him, and his 
inquiries into the origins of his baby sister and himself. 
It also shows how the paths of thought necessary for the 
true answers to these questions were blocked for Hans, by 
his own inability to differentiate between the sexes. Hans 
was unable or unwilling to acknowledge the facts of sexual 
difference, and sought to displace sexual difference onto 
the difference between species of animals. 
Following an anxiety dream, Hans produced the 
phantasied image of two giraffes, one crumpled and one with 
a long neck, which frightened him and which he associated 
with mother being 'gone'. Hans was also frightened of 
horses for a number of reasons: "because they had big 
widdlers", "because they might bite him", and because "they 
might fall down". 
Freud interpreted, over the years, the 
overdetermination of the animal symbolism. 
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The giraffe 
image represented a phantasy of the 'primal scene', the 
parents joined in exciting activity, and Hans' fear that 
the mothers' body is damaged (the crumpled giraffe was 
associated with mother). Hans' fear was of the power of 
his aggression, activated by his sister's birth, and the 
phantasy of being excluded from an exciting couple. Hans' 
experience of his anger was that his mother would be 
"gone", because rejected by him. His defense against his 
fears and anxiety was to deflect his aggression onto a 
substitute object, father, and then almost immediately onto 
a symbolic equivalent for father: horses. The fears of 
horses were interpreted as fears of the instinctual 
impulses emanating from the oral stage ("being bitten" as a 
reversal of wanting to bite), the anal stage (falling 
down), and the phallic stage (fear and envy of the horses' 
"big widdlers"). With his phobia Hans was able to solve 
his impossible predicament of hating the parents who loved 
him. He was "free" to maintain a close tie with mother, 
partly through identification with her (by denying that 
she, unlike himself and father had " no widdler"), and 
partly through positive Oedipal triangulation (finding her 
beautiful, wanting to marry her, etc.). partly by 
interpreting to Hans the content of his fears, and partly 
by maintaining a sympathetic support, the treatment enabled 
him to work through his phobia and integrate his aggression 
in a more productive way. Hans' thinking became unblocked, 
he was able to accept the fact of sexual difference as a 
reality, not of his own creation, and to use the relation 
of identification and rivalry with his father to help him 
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grow. 
The case gives detailed descriptions of the boy's 
conversations and games and the interpretations give clear 
examples of how the Oedipus complex structures the child's 
psychic reality. Particularly it shows that a phobia is, 
initially, without an object. Whether in neurotic symptoms 
or in the form of social taboo, a phobic defence is 
originally an instinctual or libidinal phenomenon which 
becomes projected outward, onto objects, people, specific 
actions, etc., as a result of psychic conflict. 
The mechanism of projection, described above in Totem 
and Taboo, was not originally created as a defence but is 
part of ordinary subjectivity, essential to human survival 
and part of the earliest developmental prototype of 
symbol-formation. The equation between a subjectively felt 
sensation such as being overwhelmed by an emotion, and an 
externally perceived object, is one of the first forms of 
ego activity. Freud had remarked on this in The project of 
1895: 
At first the human organism is incapable of 
bringing about a specific action. It takes place by 
extraneous help, when the attention of an experienced 
person is drawn to the child's stae by discharge along 
the path of internal (neurotic) change, for example by 
the child's screaming. In this way this path of 
discharge acquires a secondary function of the highest 
importance, that of communication, and the initial 
helplessness of human babies is the primal source of 
all moral motives. (21) 
The discharge of instinctual energy as an automatic 
reflex becomes an elementary form of signal or 
communication (given a responsive environment or mother), 
the discharge of the aggressive impulse takes place through 
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displacement onto an external object, and in each case a 
symbolic equation is formed. In the Hans' case history the 
place of symbol formation is strongly linked to the place 
of the father in the Oedipal triangle, a place to move from 
the relation of extreme dependence on mother. These themes 
are again in evidence in Totem and Taboo in the concepts of 
emotional ambivalence, and in the study of animal symbolism 
and fathers. 
We have already noted the close relation that Freud 
identified between religion and obsessional neurosis. In 
1909 Freud had published his Notes upon a Case of 
Obsessional Neurosis, the account of a one year treatment 
of a young man who was severely constrained by obsessional 
symptoms involving both actions and thoughts. Following 
his father's death, which he had been unable successfully 
to mourn, the young man was troubled by a complicated 
fantasy that unless he performed certain actions, both his 
father and his fiancee would be anally attacked by rats. 
Unfortunately, this man's family circumstances had provided 
an opportunity for him to project his Oedipal wishes onto 
external reality. He had had, at the age of twelve, a 
conscious fantasy that his father might die and that he 
would inherit his money and then marry. This wish, later 
unacceptable to consciousness, was repressed and returned 
in the displaced form of tormenting guilty self-reproaches 
after his father's death. Furthermore his love life was 
constrained by the guilt, as he repeated the childhood 
predicament in his adult life; he found himself having to 
choose between two women he might marry, one with his 
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father's approval and another - whom he felt he most wanted 
- in defiance of paternal approval. He was thereby 
repeating a childhood situation of dependency on his 
father's approval and the trauma of helplessness. Freud 
comments that the obsessional neurotic, unlike the 
hysteric, does not repress his memory of the traumatic 
event that triggers the neurosis, but represses only the 
affect. The affect is then turned into anxiety and 
displaced, metaphorically and metonymically, onto other 
ideas. The idea of contamination is of particular 
significance to obsessionals, and the process of 
displacement which characterises this neurosis serves to 
allay fears of contamination through contiguity. Similarly 
in taboo Freud notes the fear of contamination in the 
original taboo on touching. Freud felt that this case 
showed even more clearly than the analysis of hysterias how 
infantile sexuality or pre-genital sexuality is the main 
component of neurotic disorders. 
The third case history that directly influenced the 
conceptual framework of Totem and Taboo was the study of 
President Schreber's book, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. 
Schreber's paranoia and delusional ideas are interpreted as 
having a specific latent, homosexual, content and a 
systematic mechanism of projection of this content. The 
infantile nature of the homosexuality is evident in the 
narcissism of the phantasy of being God's lover. 
Schreber's delusions of being in sexual intercourse with 
God, of being impregnated by his 'Divine Rays' and 
repopulating the world with a new race, were accompanied by 
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delusions of persecution by his former doctor. Schreber's 
solution to an intolerable anxiety in the Oedipus complex 
was to identify himself with a pre-Oedipal mother and to 
enact a series of unconscious phantasies about being joined 
to father. As the conscious thought of being homosexual 
was inadmissible to him, it became denied, repressed and 
split off from the ego through a series of grammatical 
inversions. The delusions were the 'return of the 
repressed', whereby internal sensations (both physical and 
psychical) were felt by the ego to be perceptions emanating 
from the outside world. 
This concept of the 'return of the repressed' was of 
much use to Freud in Totem and Taboo, particularly in 
understanding the fear of the dead, primitive magic rituals 
associated with death. It also has a prototype in the 
'animistic' thinking of children and certain primitive 
magic, in which inanimate objects are attributed with 
voluntary action and power. 
The fourth section of Totem and Taboo contains a 
detailed theory of the mechanism of projection in its 
normal and pathological forms and gives an account of its 
historical origin in pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic 
society (if the concept of pre-linguistic 'society' is not 
contradictory). In Freud's hypothesis the gradual creation 
of internal reality is a product of the interpellation of 
instinctual impulses through symbolisation or the capacity 
for abstract thought. Contemporary research into 
instinctual processes in human behaviour confirms this 
hypothesis of Freud's, Kubie for example: 
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It is through the interposition of the symbol that 
t~e ~uman system an~icipates any thrusting impulse from 
wIthIn or any such Impulse from without and corrects 
before the responsive deviation occurs. This is inde~d 
the essential distinction between instinctual processes 
in the human animal and in all other animal forms 
insofar as they have been studied. (22) 
Freud also noted that the "prototype of projective 
systems is the secondary revision of dreams" (1913, p. 65), 
which functions to overlay an apparent unity onto the 
deeply contradictory latent content of unconscious wishes, 
often narrative in form. 
The three case histories quoted all show how clinical 
material, culled from intensive psychoanalytic pratice, 
gave rise to conceptual problematics, subsequently 
synthesised in Totem and Taboo. Of particular significance 
were the concepts of ambivalence, displacement and 
projection of aggression, the Oedipus complex as a struggle 
against the symbolic father, and the mechanism of symbol 
formation itself. The social institutions of totemism, 
religious taboo and exogamy, provided a form for the 
articulation of these concepts and for showing the effect 
of unconscious stuctures on social formations. Totem and 
Taboo can be said to be a book in search of a concept. The 
concept of superego contains and integrates the mechanisms 
of symbolic, syntactic and narrative function, is "heir to 
the Oedipus complex", as a development of the ego-ideal, is 
based on an identification with the father, and serves to 
mediate the aggressive impulses, thereby creating a 
" 1 " conscience or mora sense . 
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The real event: seduction or aggression? 
It is ~raditional,to look upon Freud's dropping of 
the seductIon theory In 1897 as a decisive step in the 
foundation of psychoanalytic theory, and in the bringing 
to th~ fore of,such conceptions as unconscious phantasy, 
psychIcal realIty, spontaneous infantile sexuality and 
so on. (23) 
The seduction theory was conceived and developed by 
Freud from 1893 to 1897 in response to the treatment of 
patients suffering from hysterical symptoms. Before this, 
Freud had discovered that every hysterical symptom would be 
understood as a metaphoric or metonymic or overdetermined 
representation of a traumatic event. But between 1895 and 
1897 he attributed a major determining role, in the 
aetiology of neurotic symptoms, to the traumatic memory of 
real scenes of seduction. The real event of seduction was 
held to account for the subsequent repression of 
sexuality, and its unconscious expression in neurosis. 
without the seduction theory Freud was unable to explain 
the mechanism of repression. Before being a theoretical 
concept it was a clinical discovery, as patients, it 
seemed, invariably recalled childhood memories of sexual 
seduction or passively endured sexual abuse by adults. The 
traumatic factor identified by Freud in seduction was the 
helplessness and passivity of the subject. Also the trauma 
was understood to occur in two stages. First was an event 
in childhood, a sexual scene which the child could not 
respond to, the second an event in adult life which 
associatively reactivates the childhood memory. By 1897 
Freud confided to Fliess his discovery that some of the 
scenes of seduction recounted by his patients were 
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phantasy: 
If hysterical patients trace back their symptoms to 
traumas that are fictitious, then the new fact which 
emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in 
phantasy, and this psychical reality requires to be 
taken i~to account alongside practical reality. This 
reflectIon was soon followed by the discovery that 
these phantasies were intended to cover up the auto-
erotic activity of the first years of childhood to 
embellish it and raise it to a higher plane. A~d now, 
from behind the phantasies, the whole range of a 
child's sexual life came to light. (24) 
although Freud continued to recognise the existence of 
child sexual abuse and the extreme destructiveness of such 
abuse. But beneath the phantasies of seduction Freud also 
recognised the Oedipal love of small children for their 
parents. 
Many feminist critiques of psychoanalysis have seen 
Freud's rejection of the "seduction theory" of the neuroses 
as a betrayal of the sexual reality of women. They claim 
that the abuse of girls by fathers, symbolic or actual, is 
a political reality and that incest is a prevalent and 
undiagnosed event. Masson's critique of Freud's rejection 
of the "seduction theory" allies itself with this feminist 
voice, suggesting that it was Freud's masculinity that led 
him to disbelieve his female patients' memories of 
seduction. Masson's work has been contested by many, 
including Malcolm, In the Freud Archives, and even those 
critical of the Freudian concept of infantile sexuality and 
the stress put by Freud on the centrality of the Oedipus 
complex, nevertheless maintain the necessity of a concept 
The of psychic reality as a relatively autonomous sphere. 
"seduction theory" has seen a number of revivals, in 1932 
Ferenczi described the adult-child relation as the 
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"confusion of tongues" in which adult sexuality "the 
language of passion" forcibly enters the infantile world 
"the language of 
tenderness". Such a formulation reverses the Freudian 
, 
formula. More recently "child sexual abuse" has become a 
target of massive public and media concern, with Henrietta 
Biggs' (the paediatrician from Cleveland) campaign to 
remove from parental care hundreds of children, suspected 
victims of child sexual abuse. The force with which this 
woman and her team carried out her investigations into 
child abuse was abusive in itself and hundreds of families 
suffered violent separation in the hands of local health 
authorities and social services officials who colluded in 
Dr Biggs' destructive campaign. Similarly Esther Rantzen's 
"discovery" of child sexual abuse and the subsequent 
launching of the Childline network is indicative of the 
popular appeal of the "seduction theory" and of the power 
of this universal phantasy. 
The danger of the seduction theory is that it tends to 
overlook other more common forms of emotional abuse and 
neglect in 'ordinary' childrearing practices, and 
sanctioned by economic and social structures. Also the 
unconsciousness of the Oedipus complex makes it extremely 
difficult realistically to manage to understand and to help 
children who have experienced actual sexual seduction by 
adults or other children. 
Freud ultimately placed seduction among the "primal 
, . h h traces backed to human prehistory. phantasies' whlC e 
That is, beyond the psychical reality he sought a 
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historical reality for the primal phantasies of seduction, 
castration, and the primal scene, which would be 
transmitted through mnemic traces, 'memories' of actual 
experiences in the history of the human species. 
What is interesting about Totem and Taboo is that the 
primal event, the event which hypothetically gave rise to 
the perceived and actual existence of psychic reality, is 
an aggressive event. It is the enactment of aggressive 
instinctual impulses in the drama of "parricide" which 
inaugurates the first symbol, the first taboo, the original 
moment of self-consciousness. Far from being a repetition 
of the doctrine of 'Original Sin', as many critics have 
suggested, the primal horde hypothesis suggests that the 
experience of guilt itself must be linked primarily to the 
vicissitudes of aggressive drives. 
Many social scientists and anthropologists find the 
hypotheses of Totem and Taboo are unacceptable because of 
the historical theory of the real event; they suggest that 
the theory would be tenable only if it were an account of 
psychic reality pure and simple: if the "parricide" 
corresponded only to parricidal wishes, for example. 
Similarly, biologists have noted that the hypothesis of the 
transmission of mnemic traces of primal events, in the form 
of a nucleus of unconscious phantasies, or in the form of 
the Oedipus complex, is a purely Lamarckian idea, 
incommensurate with contemporary genetic theory. 
What is the relation between the historical event and 
the psychic event in relation to aggression and to 
sexuality? In what form is the hypothesis of an originally 
155 
historical (non-psychic) event commensurable with 
contemporary biological theory? 
What are the implications of this for contemporary 
cultural analysis, and for understanding the psychic 
determinants of historical reality? In other words, in 
what form does psychic reality impinge on historical 
reality today? 
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Totem and Taboo: the functionalist critique 
It was not until 1918 that Totem and Taboo was 
translated and published in an English language edition. 
The first translation was by Brill. Two of the first 
English language reviews were by anthropologists, Kroeber 
and Lowie, both published in 1920. Kroeber and Lowie had 
both studied with Boas in North America, where the new 
scheme of anthropology was being established as an academic 
discipline. Boas, the "founding father" of the 
functionalist method (Kuper, 1973) had reacted against the 
evolutionist principles of the 19th century 
anthropologists, criticising their methods as naive and 
oversimplistic. The comparative method was criticised for 
grouping together both prehistoric and contemporary pre-
literate societies as if their historical differences could 
be overlooked. The evolutionist tenet of a unilinear 
cultural development, across all societies, was dismissed 
as oversimplistic, and the doctrine of "survivals" 
abandoned as unscientific and Lamarckian (Boas, 1976). 
Further, the basic tenet of the "psychical unity" of human 
species was declared both inaccurate and racist, as it 
seemed to equate pre-literate society with "childhood" and 
even "neurosis". Boas also considered that the 
anthropological antecedents had based much of their 
historical speculation on very limited ethnographic data. 
He stressed the importance of field work, limited to single 
societies, each society to be "fully documented in all 
aspects", and these researches seen as limited but precise 
and exhaustive ethnographies of individual tribes or 
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societies would then provide an empirical basis for later 
theoretical speculation and interpretation. 
However the functionalist debate on ethnographic data, 
with its underlying assumptions about the primacy of 
perception over theorisation, concealed a more radical 
difference of perspective between the psychoanalytic and 
anthropological interpretations of totemism and exogamy. 
Kroeber, commenting on research into Australian totemism by 
Roheim, found that: 
It contains a mass of psychological observations 
most valuable to cultural anthropologists, but so 
organised as to be unusable by them. None have used it 
as far as I know. This is not due to lack of interest 
on the part of anthropologists ... Nor is it due to any 
deficiency of quality in Roheim's data: these are rich, 
vivid, novel and valuable. But the data are so 
presented as to possess organisations only from the 
point of view of psychoanalytic theory. (25) 
If psychoanalytic interpretation appears meaningless, 
'disordered', to classical anthropology, this indicates a 
fundamental incompatibility in their basic principles. 
The responses of the classical, functionalist, 
anthropologists, to Freud's Totem and Taboo and to 
psychoanalytic anthropology in general clarify the 
differences in these basic principles. Kroeber, the first 
reviewer, published Totem and Taboo: An Ethnological 
Analysis in 1920. it was a violent critique of the 
cultural evolutionism, attacking Freud's sources (Darwin, 
Atkinson and Robertson-Smith) and then Freud's method. The 
latter seemed "endowed with unsubstantiated convincingness" 
(p. 55), a contradictory criticism no doubt but one which 
led Kroeber to propose that if psychoanalysts wanted to 
"establish serious connections with historical ethnology, 
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that they should start by acquainting themselves with the 
mass of ethnographic studies already recognised by 
contemporary anthropology". Aside from the unacceptability 
of a phylogenetic perspective to a functionalist, Kroeber's 
main criticism is of the idea that in totemism abstinence 
and exogamy are necessarily the most fundamental totemic 
taboos, and that they underlie all other taboos. Such a 
fact, for Kroeber, could only be substantiated by 
exhaustive empirical research into all totemic tribes. 
Yet, despite the criticisms, Kroeber acknowledged that 
Freud had made significant contributions; that the 
comparison between taboo customs and obsessional neurosis 
was "unquestionable", as was the existence of emotional 
ambivalence, evident in the two aspects of taboo. 
Lowie's Primitive Society (1920) also contained a 
critique of Freud's method from a functionalist 
perspective. Lowie found the universalism of 
psychoanalytic hypotheses incompatible with the 
sociological emphasis on historical and social differences, 
with social specificity. Yet, in a contradictory way, he 
also maintained that psychology could explain individual 
behaviour only, and was inapplicable to social codes. 
Boas too was critical of the doctrine of "psychic 
unity" as used in Totem and Taboo: 
We cannot accept as an advance in ethnological 
method the crude transfer of a novel, one-sided method 
of psychological investigation of the individual to 
social phenomena, the origins of which have been shown 
to be historically determined and to be subject to 
influences that are not at all comparable to those that 
control the psychology of the individual. (26) 
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The insistence on the absolute differentiation of a 
social fact from psychological/individual fact, consistent 
with the Durkheimian concept of the primacy of social 
institutions, inverted the Freudian concept of the 
necessary relation between the two spheres. In 1921 Sapir 
formulated questions raised by the psychoanalysis of 
culture, particularly as this concerned the relation of the 
individual and society. Was it possible to compare myths 
to dreams, social structure to individual unconscious? 
Does a symbol in a myth have the same meaning as the same 
symbol in a dream? From this it was possible to compare 
the two concepts of symbolism, the Freudian concept which 
linked symbols to certain universal meanings, and the 
sociological concept which assigned to symbols the function 
of a social form "ready to receive whatever psychic content 
the individual psychology or the social psychology of a 
given time and place is prepared to put in them." (27) 
In Britain the old school of cultural evolutionists was 
still vocal, although Westermarck and Frazer completely 
rejected psychoanalysis, and the new anthropology was more 
pluralist in method and theory. Rivers and Seligman both 
saw a potentially productive interchange between 
psychoanalysis and anthropology, and how each might inform 
the other. Rivers recognised psychoanalysis as "one of the 
most important movements in the history of science" (1918, 
p.ll) and Seligman encouraged a young Polish 
anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski, to test out Freudian 
tenets in the field. The ensuing thesis, and its 
contestation by Ernest Jones and Roheim, has formed the 
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basis of much contemporary theorisation of the 
interrelation of psychic and social reality. The Jones-
Malinowski debate is discussed by Parsons (1969), Mitchell 
(1974), Chasseguet-Smirgel and Grunberger (1974), Coward 
(1982), Hirst and Woolley (1982) and Wallace (1983). 
Briefly put, the debate took the following form: 
Malinowski, encouraged by Seligman, considered Freud's 
ideas on the universality of the Oedipus complex to be 
testable by ethnographic research. Ultimately he concluded 
that his findings basically contradicted Freud's theory. 
Malinowski studied the matrilineal, patrilocal families of 
the Trobriand Islanders in South West Melanesia. Since the 
mother's brother was the authority figure, the son's 
hostility was directed towards him and not the father. 
Furthermore Malinowski reported that Trobriand culture was 
'ignorant' of paternity and that the natives did not 
connect sex with conception or procreation, thus 
undermining the basis of the Oedipus relation of 
ambivalence to the father. The matrilineal kinship system 
resulted in the sister, rather than the mother, being seen 
as the incestuous object, and childhood sexual behaviour in 
general was less subject to prohibition than in western 
society. Malinowski proposed that matrilineal societies 
produced an "avunculate complex", different from the 
Oedipus complex of the nuclear family: 
To psychoanalysis the Oedipus complex is something 
absolute, the primordial source ... the fons et origo 
of everything. To me, on the other hand, the nuclear 
family complex is a functional formation dependent upon 
the structure and upon the culture of a society. It is 
necessarily determined by the manner in which sexual 
restrictions are moulded in a community and by the 
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manner in which authority is apportioned. (28) 
Since authority was vested in the mother's brother, and 
since sexual behaviour was unrestricted, save for a taboo 
on sister incest, the Trobriand sons had no need to fear or 
hate the father. Malinowski (1916) maintained that the 
Trobrianders were unaware of the biological fact of 
paternity: "My firm conviction is that the ignorance of 
paternity is an original feature of primitive psychology, 
and that in all speculations about the origins of marriage 
and the evolution of sexual customs, we must bear in mind 
this fundamental ignorance." 
When Malinowski published his research and presented it 
to the British psychoanalytic Society, Ernest Jones took up 
the psychoanalytic critique (1924). He contested the idea 
of "sexual ignorance" in primitive culture, maintaining 
that symbolism in myth indicated a clear unconscious 
knowledge of the facts of sexual intercourse and its 
procreative function. A more complicated cultural system 
of acknowledgement and denial was obviously at work in 
kinship reckoning. Denial of knowledge of paternity seemed 
present in a feature noted by Malinowski: "A Trobriander is 
horrified at the idea of physically resembling his mother, 
brother or sister, i.e. those who are thought to be his 
only blood relatives, and is intensely insulted at the mere 
suggestion; he maintains on the contrary that he is the 
physical image of his father." (p.155). Whilst Malinowski 
argued that in matrilineal society there is no social need 
for knowledge of fatherhood, making the Oedipus complex 
unnecessary, Jones maintained that matriliny and the 
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"denial" of paternity were connected as part of a cultural 
expression of the Oedipus complex: "to deflect the 
hostility felt by the growing boy towards his father", "the 
combination of mother-right and sexual ignorance protects 
both father and son from their mutual rivalry and 
hostility." This would seem to be confirmed in another 
feature of Trobriand custom which regards sexual 
intercourse between man and his wife to be indecent, 
whereas other forms of sexuality are almost entirely 
unrestricted. 
The avunculate structure introduces the uncle when the 
son is about eight years old and the uncle is most 
important around adolescence when the son is to be 
initiated into social custom and law. Malinowski describes 
the difference between the status of the two men: 
To the father, therefore, the children look only 
for loving care and tender companionship. Their 
mother's brother represents the principle of 
discipline, authority, and executive power within the 
family ... Later on, when friction with the maternal 
uncle makes its appearance, he turns, as a rule, to his 
father once more and their life friendship then becomes 
settled. 
As Malinowski used this description of any 'avuncular 
complex' to try and modify Freud's theory of the nuclear 
family complex, suggesting that the latter is a patrilineal 
reworking of the more basic 'avuncular complex', Jones 
argues each of Malinowski's points in succession, and 
concludes that: 
It would seem more probable, in my opinion, that 
the matrilineal system with its avunculate complex 
arose ... as a defence against the primordial Oedipus 
tendencies ... The forbidden and unconsciously loved 
sister is only a substitute for the mother, as the 
uncle plainly is for the father. On Malinowski's 
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hypothesis, the Oedipus complex would be a late 
product; for the psychoanalyst, it was the fons et 
origo. (29) 
To split the paternal function into a 'good' loved 
father and a 'powerful' hated father is a defence. Thus 
Jones interprets the matrilineal system as a mode of 
defence against the Oedipus complex, and notes that 
totemistic societies, far older than matrilineal societies, 
are patrilineal. Matriliny then is not necessarily to be 
seen as a historical precursor of patriliny, and Jones 
argues that the full expression and internalisation of 
ambivalence between sons and fathers, as takes place in 
patriarchal cultures, is a stage of social sophistication. 
An additional psychoanalytic interpretation of 
Malinowski's data was published by Roheim (1947, 1950, ch. 
3), who also saw it as indicating an Oedipal complex. The 
anthropological critique was hindered by what Devereux 
(1957) has described as: "pedestrian fieldworkers who 
cannot believe there is an Oedipus complex in their 
favourite tribe until they discover a custom requiring 
cohabitation with the mother and slaying the father." 
The presence of Oedipal structure as an unconscious 
force is based on its significance as an infantile 
predicament, which once repressed, re-emerges in displaced 
and diverse forms of defence and re-emerges in adult social 
institutions in all forms of cultural and social symbolism, 
notably religious and quasi-religious forms. 
Nevertheless the debate between the anthropologists and 
psychoanalysts was vigorous and productive - the issues of 
matriliny and paternal authority particularly continued to 
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be debated by Reich, Marcuse, Delenze and Guattari, and 
recent feminist critics who have contested the idea that 
the father is the symbol of authority in anything but 
socially determined form. 
The nineteen-forties saw an increasing flexibility in 
methodology and a greater acceptance of psychoanalytic 
theses within anthropology. Seligman and Rivers, as noted 
above, were interested in the interchange of ideas between 
the two sciences. In 1939 Kroeber made a reappraisal of 
his 1920 review of Totem and Taboo and acknowledged that 
many Freudian concepts had been accepted by general science 
and could thus be used by ethnologists. These included 
repression, infantile persistences, dream symbolism, 
overdetermination, and guilt feelings. Unacceptable 
concepts included "the primal horde and parricide 
hypothesis, the superego, the castration complex and the 
psychoanalytic interpretation of specifically cultural 
phenomena". 
Similarly, another orthodox anthropologist, Mead, had 
directly criticised Freudian hypotheses (1930) but later 
changed her views significantly by 1963 in 'Totem and Taboo 
Reconsidered with Respect', when she proposed a reworked 
phylogenetic theory which includes the parricide 
hypothesis: 
What if indeed there had been deeds, not in the 
shadowy past of our species, but at a much earlier 
period before man had developed his distinctively human 
growth curve with its early spurt toward apparent 
maturity and then the long slow plateau of latency, 
followed by a second spurt at adolescence ... Might not 
the Oedipus complex go back to a real situation in 
which sons, at puberty - interrupted no longer by 
latency - were as big as their fathers when they, the 
165 
sons, were seven or eight, and the fathers were already 
declining in vigor and unable to withstand them. (30) 
The interruption of latency, making human sexual 
development diphasic, has been recognised as a crucial 
phylogenetic stage in the transition from prehominid to 
human forms. Mead suggests that "primal parricide" 
occurred repeatedly, as a matter of course since the 
"son's" puberty would coincide with the death of the adult 
generation. As the human species evolved, the psyche would 
have developed to manage the same impulses, as a 
phylogenetic residue or 'survival'. 
The functionalist method which inaugurated anthropology 
as a recognised social science was based on a critique of 
the cultural evolutionists of the preceding generation. 
Given the anti-evolutionist tendency of twentieth century 
anthropology, it is not surprising that the most widely 
criticised aspect of Totem and Taboo has been the "primal 
horde" hypothesis. It has been criticised on a number of 
counts, firstly because of the inaccuracy of the particular 
example of gorillas Darwin chose as the basis for his 
comparative method, also because of the hypothetical status 
of the event as a historical rather than psychological 
event. Many anthropologists would agree with Kroeber that 
the psychological explanation does account for fantasies 
and unconscious wishes, and would object to this psychic 
reality being translated into historical terms. Roheim 
also came to part from the Freudian hypothesis on this 
point, forwarding his own "ontogenetic" theory of cultural 
evolution which located the foundation of the Oedipus 
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complex in the peculiar timing of human infancy (Roheim 
1934). 
Further debates exist as to whether sexuality and 
seduction, or parricide and aggression should be understood 
as physically real or historically real. Of those most 
critical of the primal parricide hypothesis, ostow (1978), 
Ellenberger (1970) and Freeman (1967) are indicative. 
Freeman psychoanalyses Freud's text, to find within it the 
latent content of Sigmund's hostile impulses toward Jakob 
Freud, his father. Most of Totem and Taboo, and 
particularly Freud's theory of the parricidal event, 
Freeman claims, can be understood as a secondary 
elaboration of the author's own Oedipus complex. The 
religious aspects of totemism which Freud found so 
compelling was a displacement of the Judaism of his 
father's which Freud the atheist had rejected. Freeman 
suggests that primal parricide is a reworking of the 
biblical doctrine of original sin. Empirical research into 
a number of totemic societies conducted by Freeman provides 
data which he interprets in the direction of Kleinian 
principles, the totem meal representing the incorporation 
of the mother's body. Also Freeman advances a "non-
Lamarckian", more psychological, version of the primal 
parricide theory based on Freud's own speculation the "the 
mere hostile impulse against the father, the mere existence 
of a wishful fantasy of killing and devouring him, would 
have been enough to produce the moral reaction that created 
totem and taboo." (1913, p.19S). 
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Ostow (1978) maintains that the book must be read as an 
allegory about the relation between Freud and his 
disciples. Thus primal parricide becomes a metaphor for 
Freud's masochistic fantasy that his psychoanalytic sons, 
such as the exiled Adler and Stekel, would conspire to 
dismember and incorporate him. Freud would then be the 
totem animal of a future clan, who called themselves 
Freudians, after his name, who would revere him and 
"function in an orderly organisation". (31) 
Equally imaginative is Ellenberger's theory that the 
primal parricide hypothesis was primarily an allegory of 
the political events of Europe at the time of Totem and 
Taboo. Ellenberger notes that at that time Turkey was 
under the autocratic rule of Abdul Hamid II, and that: 
This despot had the power of life and death over 
his subjects, kept hundreds of wives in a harem guarded 
by eunuchs, and from time to time massacred entire 
populations of his empire. In 1908 'The sons banded 
together against the cruel old man', the young Turks 
rebelled and overthrew the sultan, in order to start a 
national community where civilisation and the arts 
could flourish. These events were watched with keenest 
interest in Austria more than anywhere else. (32) 
Whatever the interpretations offered of primal 
parricide as a metaphor for psychic or social realities, 
and each of the three above are equally probable as 
allegories, Freud's theory requires a historical dimension. 
Freud himself was quite aware of this and maintained his 
perspective in the phylogenetic dimension throughout his 
work, and stuck to the underlying soundness of his 
conceptualisation. 
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The Structuralist critigue 
Initially developed by Saussure in linguistics, the 
structural method of analysis was adapted to several 
academic disciplines in the 1950s. Structuralism in 
psychology, philosophy and literary criticism, and in 
mathematics followed the structuralism of linguistics. In 
anthropology the structural method developed by Mauss and 
Levi-Strauss returned to Durkheim's conception of 
sociology, which underlay the functionalist critique of 
evolutionism. Levi-Strauss drew parallels between 
anthropology and history, both studies of societies other 
than our own; history studying a different time, 
anthropology a different region or culture. But the 
structural method is, by definition, a primarily synchronic 
method. 
Levi-Strauss' structuralism derives from a range of 
sources (1969), including archaeology, Marxism and the 
formalist method in linguistics. In an introductory 
article, 'Social Structure', written for Kroeber's text 
book Anthropology Today (1952), Levi-Strauss elaborates his 
concept of social structure as a symbolic "grammar" or 
"langue". The fundamental symbolic process is that of 
exchange, and Levi-Strauss characterises society as 
comprising four levels of exchange. These levels are 
studied by economics, kinship, linguistics and genetics, as 
the exchange of goods/money, of women/kin, meaning, and 
genes. Isomorphism can be identified between the internal 
relations of these levels of the social structure, although 
each is irreducible to the others. The method of 
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linguistics is taken as the basis for studying the 
structures of kinship, as Levi-Strauss explains in 
'structural method in Linguistics and Anthropology': 
Because they are symbolic systems, kinships systems 
offer the anthropologist a rich field, where his 
efforts can almost converge with those of the most 
highly developed of the social sciences, namely 
linguistics. But to achieve this convergence, from 
which it is hoped a better understanding of man will 
result, we must never lose sight of the fact that in 
both anthropological and linguistic research, we are 
dealing strictly with symbolism. (33) 
Despite a somewhat idealised view of linguistics, the 
structural method in the ethnology of kinship yielded some 
productive results. Understood as a symbolic system, 
kinship could be seen to secure social unity and co-
operation, in units larger than the nuclear family, by 
creating series of linked identities for members of the 
system. 
Exogamy is seen as a system which facilitates the 
exchange of women, by men, who thereby become related to 
one another in unambiguous relationship. Levi-Strauss uses 
the metaphor of "pumping" women from their consanguinous 
families to redistribute them in affinal groups, the result 
of this being to create new consanguinous groups." (1952, 
p.546). 
All consanguinal and affinal relations as well as 
relations of descent can be charted as a system of values, 
just as phonemic difference creates signification in 
language. Levi-Strauss uses the same system of identifying 
bundles of oppositions in cultural elements (kinship, myths 
and social customs), following the logic of binary 
oppositions which he understands to be based in the 
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neurological and even genetic functioning of the body. 
Although binary opposition is seen to create emotional 
capacities, through the anxiety generated by the logical 
im-possibility of imposing binary thought onto a non-binary 
reality, the mechanism of binary opposition is not seen by 
structural anthropologists, as the outcome of emotional 
capa-city. Thus Leach gives a structuralist analysis of 
the language of insult and obscenity, and the isomorphism 
of kinship classi-fication and animal classification in our 
culture, in which he argues that anxiety is a product of 
the classificatory system. 
Leach explores the way in which our own classificatory 
systems work in similar ways to those of 'primitive' 
societies. He describes his essay, 'Anthropological 
Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse' 
(1964), as working on the "frontiers" of anthropology, 
psychology and linguistics. His central theme, taboo, 
centres on the way in which we construct logical categories 
of binary opposition through the suppression of a third 
term. The idea is that we construct semantically distinct 
verbal concepts through language, such as in naming, only 
by 'repressing' the boundary concepts that lie between 
them. What is repressed in the interests of classificatory 
order, becomes the vehicle for anxiety and is thus 'taboo'. 
A pun, for example, is funny because "it breaks the taboo 
on recognising the arbitrariness of sound patterns". Leach 
describes how taxonomy satisfies the logic of binary 
discrimination by separating 'thing' from 'environment', 
just as we separate 'self' from 'not-self'. Whatever is a 
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mediating category, belonging to both, is "especially 
interesting" and as we noted, "Quite apart from the fact 
that all scientific enquiry is devoted to 'discovering' 
those parts of the environment that lie on the borders of 
what is 'already known', what is taboo is not only 
interesting but also especially anxiety provoking." Taboo 
objects, substances or categories will become either 
'sacred', 'valuable', 'important', 'powerful', 'dangerous', 
'untouchable', 'filthy', or 'unmentionable'. The former 
categories are idealisation (in the positive sense) found 
in religions, the latter are negative idealisation found 
mostly in taboos pertaining to body functions and 
substances. The fact that we use latinate terms for 
'faeces', 'urine', 'semen', 'menstruation', etc. testifies 
to the special strength of their 'unmentionable' status. 
Leach speculates that this may be because that it is in 
relation to our bodies, and the body of the mother, that we 
have first to learn to make the difference between 'self' 
and 'not-self'. 
Leach notes that in our classification of kin, non-
family and strangers, there is a spatial-logical set of 
relational statements that can also be found in our 
classification of animal species, as these are organised in 
terms of edibility. Just as family members are too 'close' 
for us to marry, so 'pets' are too 'close for us to eat'. 
Strangers have a similar position to wild or zoo animals, 
and 'edibility' of animals occupies a relational zone 
corresponding to 'eligibility' of humans. The mediating 
categories of animals such as rabbits, for example, both 
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domestic pets and wild animals become loaded with affective 
and symbolic meaning. These are then 'vermin', or they 
assume sexual connotat ions, 'bunny', 'cunny', etc. 
Similarly categories function as terms of abuse, dogs, for 
example, and 'son of a bitch'. 
Leach concludes: 
In the English language, classification of familiar 
animals is by no means a simple matter; it is not just 
a list of names, but a complex pattern of 
identifications subtly discriminated not only in kind 
but in psychological tone. Our linguistic treatment of 
these categories reflects taboo or ritual value, but 
these are simply portmanteau terms which cover a 
complex of feeling or attitude, a sense perhaps that 
aggression, as manifested in either sex or killing, is 
somehow a disturbance of the natural order of things, a 
kind of necessary impiety. 
Similarly Levi-Strauss analyses totemism as a social 
structure, determined only by social facts, and the most 
fundamental social fact which separates 'culture' from 
'nature', in incest taboo. He agrees with Durkheim, the 
cultural evolutionists and Freud, that totemism is a form 
of social classification and a religious structure 
combined. He proposes that what is being worshipped in 
totemism is the fact of sociality itself. The different 
species of the totem clans are used as signifiers, 
signifying the internal subdivision of the tribe into 
cultural and social groups. Like the incest taboo, on 
which exogamy is based, the ability to symbolise, name and 
classify is a fundamental 'social' fact which separates the 
human species from other animals. 
There can be no explanation of the 'origin' of the 
incest taboo or of language in Levi-Strauss' system, these 
are taken as the fundamental facts of human existence which 
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differentiate between 'nature' and 'culture', thereby 
differentiating between ethology and ethnology, biology and 
anthropology. Levi-Strauss is critical of Freud's 
hypotheses in Totem and Taboo as he sees no need for 
psychological explanation: 
Anxiety is not a cause, impulses and emotions 
explain nothing, they are always results, either of the 
power of the body or of the impotence of the mind. In 
both cases they are consequences, never causes. (34) 
For Levi-Strauss social anthropology has no need of 
psychology but, linked to linguistics and the structuralist 
method, borders directly onto the study of the body. 
Although the capacity for logical classification, through 
binary oppo-sition, is seen as being "unconscious", like 
the deep structures of language, this sense of 
unconsciousness is very different from Freud's. Rossi 
(1974) and Badcock (1972) trace the conceptual antecedents 
of Levi-Strauss' notion of the uncon-scious as "the 
architectonic of the human mind", "l'esprit humain", to 
Descartes' cogito. Yet Levi-Strauss' metaphor of an organ, 
"the human mind uses myth like the stomach digests food", 
is not exactly Cartesian and Levi-Strauss has often used 
organic metaphors as metaphysical metaphors for the mind. 
More explicitly, Levi-strauss states that the mental 
process of binary discrimination is wired into the 
"circuitry of the brain, through the mechanism of neuronic 
firing across synapses", since neurones can operate only in 
an on/off, firing/not firing, process. 
One consequence of this neo-innatist view of the 
origins of exogamy and classification is that a new 
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doctrine of the "psychic unit'" of mankind is forwarded. 
However it is based on the concept of the unconscious as a 
structure "empty of all content which is not in the first 
place the outcome of form." (Badcock, 1981, p.46). 
Curiously the diagrammatic representation, given by 
Levi-Strauss, of the totemic classification and its mental 
basis is almost identical with that made by Freud of the 
relation of the group to the ego ideal. 
For Levi-Strauss the totem species signifies the 
membership of the individual to the social corpus by the 
subdivision of the tribe into exogamous groups named and 
identified as such. (35) For Freud the group with a leader 
"is a number of individuals who have put one and the same 
object in the place of their ego ideal and have 
consequently identified themselves with one another in 
their ego." (36) 
For Levi-Strauss the body and its parts are, equally, 
metaphors for the internal divisions of the social corpus; 
they operate as a code or symbolic system quite 
independently of their biological function. For Freud the 
body is the source of the id, and organic forms will be 
experienced in the unconscious and will make their presence 
felt, as metaphors, in cultural forms and language. 
For psychoanalysis the "incest taboo" exists not 
primarily as a social fact so much as a consequence of the 
Oedipus complex; the father is an external projected form 
of the psychic structure. In totemism the concept of 
species is a signifier which takes the place of the group 
leader or "external object" in Freud's diagrammatic 
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representation of group psychology. The totem animal 
represents the image of the father, an internal image which 
is also introjected from external reality, the environment. 
This is the process which is characteristic of the 
superego, simultaneously a product of the id and an 
internalisation of parental authority, and its displacement 
in the form of cultural authority, such as taboos and laws. 
The totemic prohibitions on sex and slaying/devouring are 
social forms of superego controls of aggression towards the 
other members of the group, so that ambivalence is 
transformed into co-operation. The superego is not simply 
an inner representation of social authority, as the 
structural or sociological view would have it, but 
comprises a substantial element of unconscious aggression 
which is redirected against the self within the psychic 
organism. 
As has been noted, Freud lacked the concept of superego 
in 1913 when he formulated the basis of a psychoanalytic 
theory of culture, but the concept is a necessary 
consequence of his hypothesis of the determining influence 
of the Oedipus complex. Levi-Strauss uses the concept of 
unconscious in a pre-Freudian context, and assimilates the 
concept of superego to his notion of the symbolic. The 
symbolic, schematised as the ensemble of social codes 
formulated as law, is conceptualised as a language. Thus 
Jakobson's linguistic 'axes' of metaphor and metonymy are 
assimilated to the Freudian unconscious, primary processes 
of condensation and displacement. This assimilation 
negates the recognition of the powerful emotional contents 
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of condensation and displacement. 
In an illuminating discussion between Levi-strauss and 
Green, the differences between the psychoanalytic and 
anthropo-logical concepts of the unit of kinship are 
classified. Whereas Levi-Strauss, as we have noted, treats 
the avunculate as a necessary term of kinship structure for 
matrilineal societies, Green interprets the avunculate as a 
representation of the unconscious image of the phallic 
woman, "a masculine mother." (1979, pp.99-107). 
Further possibilities for the interaction of 
psychoanalysis and anthropology are evident in Lacan's 
work. The Lacanian theory of symbolism, based on Saussure 
and Jakobson, is very much closer to Levi-Strauss' 
formalism than to Freud's theory of interpsychic conflict. 
Whereas Levi-Strauss and Lacan take prohibition (taboo), 
the nom-du-pere, or the symbolic order as a primary 
principle of the social fact of human nature, Freud takes 
the Oedipus complex, or Darwin's concept of instincts and 
needs, as the primary principle of social reality. The 
dialectic between sociohistorical structure and unconscious 
phantasy is further explored in the following chapters on 
the origins of language and the origins of writing. 
A more absolute reinterpretation of the structuralist 
critique of Freud has been made by Badcock (19Bl), who 
maintains that Levi-Strauss' debt to Freud is larger than 
his debt to Rousseau, Marx, Mauss or Saussure. 
Structuralism in social anthropology, suggests Badcock, is 
a cartesian psychoanalysis with a desexualised unconscious. 
Therefore: 
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structuralism may survive as a permanent addition 
to human understanding, particularly in the fields of 
anthropology and sociology. It may again, on 
reflection, come to be seen as little more than a 
Cartesian heresy in the history of psychoanalysis. 
Badcock offers arguments that Levi-Strauss' work can be 
seen as falling into two categories. The first includes 
The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949), Totemism 
(1962) and The Savage Mind (1962b). The second includes 
Structural Anthropology (1958), Tristes Tropigues (1955) 
and the several volumes of Mythologigues. These two 
categories of Levi-Strauss' work, Badcock suggests, are 
structural equivalents and reworkings of Freud's Totem and 
Taboo and his Interpretation of Dreams respectively. This 
vindication of Freud's belief that sociology and 
anthropology might, one day, become extensions of applied 
psychoanalysis may seem an exaggerated claim. However it 
also supports the more dialectical thesis forwarded by 
Devereux in The Anthropological Roots of psychoanalysis 
(1957): 
No-one is trying to reduce anthropology to 
psychology, the two types of explanations are 
complementary even though both are practically 
compendious ..• leaving aside naively narcissistic 
quarrels about jurisdictional spheres, we are obliged, 
by history and genetics, to postulate that culture and 
the human mind did not simply come into being "at the 
same time", but are, in the strictest sense, co-
emergents" and, "Whatever modification of basic 
psychoanalytic theory that biology or - for all I know 
- astronomy may make necessary, anthropological data do 
not call for any basic modification of the 
psychoanalytic system, though they may necessitate 
further refinements of the scheme. 
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The Neo-Evolutionists 
A number of neo-evolutionists researching into human 
origins have re-opened the discussion on Totem and Taboo in 
order to "salute Freud" (Becker, 1961), to revise the 
primal parricide hypothesis (FOX, 1980) or even to 
"reinstate the Freudian phylogenetic theory in its 
undiluted form" (Badcock, 1983). Others such as Sahlins 
(1960) and Tanner (1981) propose theories of human origins 
which can be used to assess the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' 
of the Freudian hypothesis. A brief review of the salient 
points made by these theorists is followed by an account of 
how the concept of superego can be used to integrate 
Freudian theory with anthropological and biological 
science. 
The neo-evolutionists focus on a number of interrelated 
features of human 'nature', the capacity of symbolisation 
(language or abstract thought), the demands of social co-
operation (identification) and the modification of 
aggressive and sexual responses. 
Sahlins' Origins of Society advances an economic 
hypothesis which identifies the capacity for the repression 
of sexuality as the major factor in human adaptation. Like 
New World primates, (and unlike Darwin's mountain gorilla), 
proto-human hordes would have been divided into two groups, 
males and females with their young offspring. This 
division made "marriage" into the decisive economic 
institution of society, whilst sexuality came increasingly 
under cortical control rather than hormonal control, and 
kinships systems were established as early symbolic 
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organisation. Sahlins suggests "it [marriage] was what the 
manor was to feudal Europe, or the corporate factory system 
is to capitalism", so that a major division of labour 
between the sexes required an alliance between two elements 
of social production. Fox builds on this thesis noting that 
a crucial social transition takes place when young males 
necessarily move from one social group (females with young) 
to the other (all male), corresponding to the rites de 
passage of puberty rites and initiation, in contemporary 
societies. 
From the perspective of a phylogenetic theory of human 
adaptation, Fox advances a modified form of the primal 
parricide hypothesis: 
In the beginning the sons were kept from the women 
of the horde by the fathers, and much as they would 
have liked to, the sons did not kill their fathers but 
simply withdrew from sexual competition with them. The 
frustration of their sexual drives was so intense it 
was frightening to them, so that when the fathers died 
(or were driven out), the sons couldn't face sexuality 
with the women. Their sexual interest in them was so 
intense however that while they took other people's 
sisters to bed with them, they acted out the fantasy of 
having children by their own sisters. They claimed the 
sisters' children as their own and denied the genitor 
any part in the process. Thus at one stroke they 
eliminated the fathers as authorities and as sexual 
rivals. 
This historical theory of the origins of matriliny and 
the avunculate complex is based, like Sahlins' theory, on 
the idea of the human horde as divided between two social 
groups, the conflict between 'generations' of males 
occurring whenever a young male made the necessary 
transition between the first group and the second. The 
crucial adaptation to 'frustration' would be possibly only 
by the transfer of sexual and aggressive behaviour to 
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voluntary control, presumably through abstract thought and 
by symbolisation. The neocortex evolved from the amygdala, 
part of the limbic system. The limbic system, the most 
primitive part of the brain, responds primarily to the 
sense of smell. In early vertebrates the cerebral 
hemispheres were mainly concerned with sense of smell but 
in mammals, particularly humans, general co-ordinating 
functions became predominant. 
One hypothesis on the evolution of the cortex from the 
more hormonally-regulated limbic system has been proposed 
by Spuhler (1979), and cited by Fox. Given evidence from 
neuroendocrinology of the probable sequence of physical 
changes in the ancestral human population, Spuhler suggests 
that bipedal gait was the first of the evolutionary 
developments to affect sexuality. He assumes bipedalism 
was developed for hunting and that this change of posture 
affected the hormonal system which in turn affected the 
oestrus cycle and sexuality. Pre-human sexuality was 
undoubtedly governed by the oestrus cycle, through hormonal 
and thus olfactory signals, but with growing cortical 
control of functions of the 'small' brain, oestrus cycle 
was replaced by continuous female receptivity. 
Spuhler's hypothesis becomes the basis of FOx's 
speculations on language origins, as tool-making must have 
originated alongside bipedalism and have created the 
lateralisation of the brain hemispheres. Fox considers the 
neural communication between the lobes may have been the 
basis of language proper, with the lobes becoming 
specialised for thought and the limbic system for emotions 
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and bodily sensations. Spuhler's hypothesis is called into 
question by Tanner's theory of evolution, which challenges 
the popular, but apparently incorrect, view of early man as 
a hunter. However Fox does provide an integrated theory of 
what Devereux termed "the coemergence of culture and the 
human mind". Fox presents a biological thesis: 
In the evolution of conceptual thought via 
language, pressures towards social classification may 
have been supremely important and these would have 
become true 'selection pressures' demanding mental 
equipment that could cope with them. But these 
conceptual processes concerned with the ordering of 
social relations were being programmed into the hominid 
individuals by Natural Selection over time, not being 
induced by socialisation in each succeeding generation. 
(37 ) 
So the symbolic function, claims Fox, is to be 
accounted for in terms of Natural Selection and does not 
require Freud's neo-Lamarckian stance towards phylogenesis 
and ontogenesis. Tanner (1981) proposes a new theory of 
the evolution of humans from our ape-like ancestors, its 
novelty lying in the fact that it accounts for the role of 
women in the transitional population and development. 
Tanner analyses a number of androcentric myths about human 
origins, one of which is the image of man as the "big game 
hunter", cited by Spuhler and Fox as the basis of tool-
making, cortical development and the sexual division of 
labour: 
What if early hunting consisted largely of 
australopithecine females with tools sitting for long 
periods collecting insects, rather than of those long-
imagined ferocious groups of half-human males racing 
after big animals? (38) 
Tanner's account, using chimpanzees as a model of the 
ancestral population: 
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The closer a primate is to humans, the slower 
infants grow during the first year after birth. 
Therefore for the special extended mother-child 
interresponsiveness so important to human learning 
it is chimpanzees that are the most likely to be 
similar to the ancestral population. (39) 
the 
. . . 
The social bonding, co-operativeness and bonding which 
all anthropologists agree to be the human innovation, 
Tanner suggests, was initially developed between mothers 
and infants. This sharing relation was facilitated by 
natural selection as increased maternal investment in 
offspring became a part of human 'cultural' adaptation 
through learning, the result of the extended dependency of 
immature offspring on parental protection. What sharply 
differentiates Tanner's theory from Fox's is her emphasis 
on the interaction of sexual selection and natural 
selection. In sexual selection, the partner investing most 
in offspring appears also to be the one who exercises 
sexual selectivity: 
Females would have reason to choose friendly males 
who, like themselves, only rarely (and selectively) 
engaged in displays against other, transitional, 
hominids, but who were nonetheless skilled in defense 
and protection against predator species by intimidation 
displays and by throwing objects. This could have 
interesting implications for understanding conflict and 
aggression and how they relate to our human nature. 
Sexual selection also increased the contribution of 
males who exhibited frequent bipedalism (necessary for 
keeping up with female gatherers). Further obvious 
visual clues such as a bipedal male's erect penis could 
have attracted female attention and action. As the 
female hormonal cycle and ovulation came to contribute 
less to the timing of her arousal, it is not illogical 
that visual clues became increasingly significant. If 
so, sexual selection for bipedalism would be yet 
another instance of natural and sexual selection 
together advancing the species' adaptation farther 
along the same path for both females and males. (40) 
Instead of changes in morphology, such as genital 
swellings and olfactory signals, females developed other 
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forms of communication, "physical spacing, gesture, facial 
expression, eye contact, posture, vocalisation", to signal 
to males that they were willing or unwilling to engage in 
sexual intercourse. As hormonal control of oestrus 
diminished, females took on the role of initiating sex, 
overtly soliciting or choosing not to respond to hormonal 
readiness. The whole range of communicatory behaviour 
associated with sexuality thus became to some extent 
referential, not just expressive, and contributed to the 
evolution of language and speech. 
Tanner notes that attempts to construct an account of 
language origins have been hampered by the dualistic 
concepts characteristic of Western languages, polarising 
differences between emotional and rational, verbal and 
non-verbal, relational and referential, gestural and vocal 
communication, etc. Noting also that all mammalian 
communication systems use most of the senses: visual, 
olfactory, auditory and tactile, one or two of these senses 
usually dominates, followed by the auditory-vocal channel, 
whilst humans use primarily language and speech, and use 
visual and tactile senses for non-verbal communication. 
Again drawing from chimpanzee studies: 
Chimpanzees and other primates have the 
intellectual capacity to abstract and exchange 
information between different sensory modalities, 
specifically vision and touch. Cross-modal perception 
was thought to be an exclusively human trait. (41) 
Tanner, like Fox et al., considers cross-modal 
perceptions as a precondition for language and 
symbolisation. As the chimpanzee studies show that 
communication is learned within the mother-infant dyad, it 
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is social, affective and intellectual. The consequences of 
these studies for constructing an account of language 
origins are considered. 
Humans have three times the neo-cortex size to be 
expected of a primate of our body size, with more 
"association cortex" than would similarly be expected. It 
receives input from all cortical sensory areas connecting 
tactile and auditory, tactile and visual, visual and 
auditory, etc. and is the anatomical base for cross-modal 
perception. Like Fox, Tanner emphasises asymmetry as a 
main feature of brain function: 
The important feature of human brain size is not 
size but assymetry ... Asymmetry may relate to 
functional specialisation necessary for symbolising and 
therefore may well be a prerequisite for language. (42) 
Tanner notes that language, as a system "whereby 
through the recombination of a limited number of arbitrary 
elements (phonemes) it is possible to produce vocal signs 
for a potentially endless variety of meanings", is to be 
understood as one element of an integrated communicatory 
system, also including a wide range of non-verbal 
communication, that evolved as the peculiarly human 
adaptation. She suggests that the question is "How did the 
somatic, expressive communication already present in the 
ancestral population mediate the development of the more 
arbitrary symbolic and referential aspects of the fully 
human communication system?" (p.128). 
This development was simultaneous with an increase in 
the mediation of the interaction between organism and 
environment by social organisation and symbolic components. 
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Tool-using and social communication were the earliest forms 
of such mediation. 
Large canine teeth disappeared with female sexual 
selection, oestrus swellings in females were no longer 
selected for, due to reduced visibility of these body areas 
due to bipedalism. The large multi female and multimale 
groups were flexible to various forms of social 
organisation, "flexibility in social organisation is as 
characteristic of the hominid adaptation as tool-making or 
bipedalism" (p.2l8), and the social "system" consisted of 
various forms of dispersion and aggregation. 
Finally this was possible because "culture is part of 
our biological heritage; the capacity for it evolved along 
with other characteristically human qualities", and culture 
is transmitted, through various symbolic forms, through the 
adaptation to learning which takes place in the mother-
infant interaction over a number of years early in 
ontogenesis: 
The biological capacity for symbolisation formed 
the foundation for the development of many human 
lifeways ..• The ability to symbol, [sic] that is the 
capacity for conceptual thought, made possible the 
development of the variety of human cultures ... 
cultures are the accumulated and systematised 
resultants of the ability to symbol. The symbolic 
products, whether tools, language, kinship 
organisation, art, are the outcome of historical 
processes; and it is these that we commonly call 
'culture'. 
Badcock (1980, 1983) has also advanced a neo-
evolutionist theory which integrates Freud's hypothesis 
into a more complete account of the history of the species. 
He suggests, thus, that the Oedipus complex was the first 
psychic structure to exist in a historical perspective, its 
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point of origin is seen as being the point at which 
cultural transmission (ritual, custom, socio-symbolic 
structures) emerged as a mechanism of equal adaptive value 
to the species as genetic inheritance. As this coemerged 
with language it provides a historical context for the 
concept of superego, the psychic mechanism genetically 
given in certain anatomical and morphological structures, 
which is the internal condition for the acquisition of 
culture and learning: 
In modern individuals, and almost certainly also in 
the past, internalised verbal commands and prohibitions 
are of the first significance in the acquisition of the 
superego and manifest this aspect of themselves in the 
auditory hallucinations of accusing and scorning voices 
so often found in paranoia. (43) 
Elsewhere, Badcock (1986) has sought to assimilate the 
Freudian metapsychology, especially the second topography 
(id, ego and superego), into contemporary sociobiology. 
Badcock then suggests that the problematic concept of 
'altruism' in biology and behavioural genetics is an exact 
correlate of the Freudian concept of unconscious 
identification. To transliterate classic Freudian concepts 
into the language of sociobiology may secure for them a 
usage which is guaranteed by general science, thus allaying 
the fears of the anthropologists. But if the cost of this 
is the loss of the integrity and autonomy of the 
psychoanalytic perspective, the price may be too high. 
Moreover, Ritvo's inquiry into the history of biological 
science: Darwin as the source of Freud's neo-Lamarckianism 
argues that the concepts of superego and identification 
fully provide the mechanism of transmission of "acquired 
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characteristiscs". 
Freud himself seems to have provided the mechanism 
for the inheritance of acquired characteristics in 
humans, a species singularly free from natural 
selection, and that is the mechanism of identification 
in general and superego identification in particular. 
Freud saw the superego as derived both from 
identification and from the id, which is the 
biologically inherited portion of the personality and 
therefore, according to modern theories of biology, no 
longer subject to change through use and disuse. (44) 
This formulation has been found acceptable to many 
psychoanalysts, who found Freud's neo-Lamarckianism deeply 
unacceptable, such as Hartmann (1958), Kris (1956), Jones 
(1957) and Erikson (1950, 1959). 
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What is the superego? 
The superego has been compared to an omniscient eye, 
the glaring searchlight of conscience, or the eye of moral 
surveillance. However its primary form of existence is 
almost certainly connected with auditory perception. A 
classic contemporary view of the superego is Hartmann's: 
To the superego, substructure of the personality, 
we attribute the functions of self-criticism, 
conscience, and the formation of ideals. The 
acceptance of moral standards is considered a natural 
step in ontogenesis. The superego has a biological 
root in the comparatively long dependency and 
helplessness of the child of the human species, which 
also means increased importance of the parents for its 
development. The superego develops out of 
identification with them, to which, in subsequent 
layers of development, identifications with others are 
added. Also obvious in its genesis is a socio-cultural 
factor which accounts for an important segment of 
tradition formation. (45) 
The visual aspect of some superego processes may derive 
from its roots in the id, where unconscious images or 
"primal phantasies" are the main forms of libidinal and 
aggressive content. The superego's relation to the ego is 
always critical, partly, as Hartmann suggests, through 
identification with parental demands and prohibitions. But 
part of the critical aspect of the superego derives from 
its function as the mechanism for the redeployment of 
intense, unconscious, anger and aggression. Although a 
considerable disagreement of theories exists, within 
psychoanalysis, as to the origins of aggression, whether it 
is innate or primarily a reaction to frustration, it is in 
a very basic sense innate in that it is indissolubly linked 
to the prematurity and helplessness of human infancy. An 
important aspect of individual adaptation to social codes 
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and co-operation is the transformation of ambivalence into 
"object constancy" or love, by the turning inwards of 
aggression towards the self, in the form of conscience, 
self-criticism, or in the formulation of ideals. Finding 
creative uses for aggressive energy is a continuous 
cultural, and individual, task. Many aspects of religion, 
education, institutional routine, sports, etc. provide 
creative uses for aggressive energy and other sublimated 
forms have included developments in the arts, notably 
modernism, in the sciences and in culture. Flugel's (1955) 
book on the cultural aspect of the superego includes the 
following historical speculation: 
The development of the capacity to turn one's own 
aggressiveness inwards and then to put it in the 
service of morality represents •.. a very ingenious 
device of Nature for rendering man fit for social life, 
and it may have played a very significant part in 
making him a gregarious animal capable of participating 
in an elaborate and hierarchical society in which both 
assertion and submission are required. The process 
might be compared in some respects to those tours de 
force of phylogenesis whereby an organ acquires new 
functions in the course of evolution, as when the 
pineal gland, originally a cyclopean eye, became 
endowed with the power of manufacturing a secretion 
which appears to have function of retarding the onset 
of maturity (itself an extremely important 
characteristic of humanity). (46) 
Flugel's analogy of the transformation of the function 
of an organ can also be found in a number of other studies 
of the superego, notably Isakower (1939) and Comfort 
(1960). Isakower draws very strong connections between the 
anatomy and morphology of the ear and acoustic sphere, and 
the functions of the superego. Isakower shows that the 
human ear is the phylogenetic descendent of an organ called 
the otilith in earlier creatures. The otilith apparatus is 
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still found in animals such as crustacea where it is used 
as an orientation device, incorporating a piece of the 
environment and turning it into an integral part of the 
organ. In humans the auditory sphere, language and sound 
has an analogous function: "The auditory sphere is one of 
the most important apparatuses for the regulation of 
relations with the environment, an arrangement absolutely 
specific for the human species." The ear, or inner ear, is 
well known to be an organ regulating the physical sense of 
balance, and Isakower notes that the human ear is related 
to the otilith "organ of equilibrium" both phylogenetically 
and ontogenetically as they originate in a single tissue. 
How is the auditory sphere related to the superego and its 
functions of self-criticism, conscience and morality? 
Isakower claims that: 
It is self-evident that experiences and impressions 
of the environment are necessary in order that a 
superego may be built up. It is just as self-evident 
that these experiences and impressions are acquired by 
way of sense perception. But can one imagine that 
purely optical sense-impressions, for example, by 
themselves and without showing any linguistically 
ordered structure could possibly lead to the building 
up of a logical or ethical judgement? Without further 
discussion, this question can be answered in the 
negative. But the claims of the auditory sphere to be 
the primary plane in the building up of the superego 
would thereby be established. (47) 
Somewhat logical as an argument, "it cannot be the 
visual sphere, therefore it has to be the acoustic sphere", 
rather than historical or psychological. But this was 
argued before the structuralist conception of culture as a 
symbolic system, in which language was centrally important. 
Isakower reaches very similar conclusions by way of a 
different tack. Language is the "nucleus of the superego", 
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he claims in many ways, following Freud, but, importantly, 
"It is not the content of language that is characteristic 
of the superego but almost exclusively the tone and shape 
of a well-organised grammatical structure." 
This is a startling remark as it, so closely, 
correlates with the problematic produced by linguistic 
study of syntax, of knowing the speaker-hearer's 
"intuition" which judges whether sentences are correct or 
incorrect, meaningful or not, as this cannot be judged in 
any objective or scientifically predictable way. The shape 
of syntactic structure, then, might be related to superego 
structure. Isakower emphasises that his proposition is 
nothing more than an elaboration of what Freud 
meant when he replaced his first graphic representation 
of the structure of the mind by another. In the first 
of these, in 1923 in The Ego and the Id, the ego has on 
one side 'an auditory lobe' ... in the repetition of 
this sketch, in 1933, in his New Introductory Lectures, 
and which in other respects is practically unaltered, 
this auditory 'lobe' is no longer seen. The 
corresponding position is now occupied by the superego. 
( 48 ) 
Comfort (1960) attempts an interrelation of biology and 
psychoanalysis by showing the connections between Darwin's 
Descent of Man and Freud's concept of superego, "Darwin 
relates the evolution of morals to the family situation and 
reaches, as it were, the edge of the superego concept." 
Comfort's aim is to show how infantile sexuality, and its 
corollary, the Oedipus complex, has its basis in aspects of 
bodily prematurity characteristic of humans other primates. 
The Oedipus complex, and its resolution in the castration 
complex, is described by Comfort as "a temporary organ", 
following Ferenczi (1954) who explored two aspects of the 
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Oedipus complex. Ferenczi notes that "Oedipal responses 
not only have every appearance of being in some way built 
in, but they look uncommonly like a temporary organ with a 
function", which he connects to the enigma of infantile 
sexuality. Since, in all other species, sexuality is a 
correlate of reproduction, the mention of infantile 
sexuality "at once calls for some explanation of what 
sexuality is doing in infancy." Comfort speculates as to 
whether this might be an adaptation of an old mechanism 
(sexuality) to a new function. The repression of an 
immature sexuality, through the castration complex, would 
produce an adult sexuality very easily displaceable, not 
necessarily fixed to an object, or in other words 
adaptable. Furthermore, Comfort speculates, "It is not 
impossible that by necessitating repression and a mind 
divided actively into conscious and unconscious levels they 
produced the most significant adaptation in mammalian 
history, the emergence of symbolic thought." 
To summarise, Flugel, Isakower and Comfort, integrating 
psychoanalysis with evolutionary theory, describe the 
superego as an organic phenomenon. The complex 
interactions of symbolisation, language, morality or 
ethical judgement (which Freud claims is based on the "no", 
the negative aspect of the pleasure principle) and self-
criticism, or the redeployment of aggression toward the 
self, are constitutive of the superego, which is based 
partly in the id and partly in identifications. This main 
mechanism of cultural transmission is the "heir to the 
Oedipus complex", the point at which passionate feeling 
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towards the parents is replaced by interest in culture and 
the outside world, through symbolic displacement. 
It is impossible to conceive of the superego as a 
purely cultural or social phenomenon, as social sciences 
would maintain, nor as a socio-neurological mechanism, as 
Levi-Strauss claims, in his concept of "The Symbolic" 
(1949, 1950). Equally misleading is Lacan's description of 
the superego as the unconscious "other", a linguistic 
structure, or the codes upon which symbolism is based. The 
Law, or the Nom-du-Pere, of the Lacanian symbolic father is 
an effect of the superego and not its cause. 
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Totemism as a symbolic projection of superego 
The psychoanalytic theory of totemism, advanced by 
Roheim, extends Freud's analysis to include contemporary 
knowledge of evolutionary theory and of the pre-Oedipal 
processes in the human subject. In many respects Roheim's 
(1945) theory is confirmed by Tanner's evolutionary theory, 
as they both take the mother-infant dyad as the basic 
social unit, and consider the historical development of 
women and children as an integral part of social structure. 
The 'primal horde' is used as a loose term to describe "a 
period in the transition in phylogenesis from a pre-human 
to human form of society", and the act of parricide is 
replaced by a concept of a necessary repression of 
aggression in ontogenesis. Roheim's "ontogenetic theory of 
culture" stresses the importance of the neotenic human 
development towards prematurity at birth and extended 
dependence on maternal protection and interaction, in the 
creation of culture. The vulnerability of human infants to 
separation and loss resulted in the creation of internal 
objects, symbolising both the self and the loved object, as 
an attempt to find security against object loss. 
Defence systems against anxiety are the stuff that 
culture is made of ... the threatening event of object 
loss suffered by the infant in a series of separation 
traumas from the mother forms the basis of our terms 
regarding the final farewell. 
The destructive impulses are particularly activated by 
separation traumas and totemism is described as a defence 
"That system against destructive impulses in particular. 
totemism is something that unites, that it is a bond, an 
identification, can hardly be doubted. The origin of all 
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identification lies in the identification of mother and 
child, and this again is partly a reality and partly a 
denial of separation or of separation anxiety." 
Like Freud, Roheim attributes the Oedipus complex to 
biological factors: 
The tie between mother and child lasts longer than 
in any other species, and the sexual impulse has 
already attained a measure of object-directedness when 
the only available object is the mother ... the ego is 
a protection against premature inundation of the 
libido. Our relative immaturity would therefore 
explain the traumatic nature of the early sex 
experience. (49) 
This is true of human culture generally and does not 
specify the characteristics of totemic species worship and 
exogamous clan structure. Roheim continues: 
Totemism as a social institution is a defence 
against separation anxiety. As a religion it 
represents the genitalisation of the separation period 
and the restitution that follows destructive trends. 
As an aid to man's struggles with internal and external 
difficulties, it is a balancing apparatus consisting of 
a series of projections and introjections. Finally in 
its mythical form ..• it represents our efforts to deal 
with the problems of growing up, aided by the illusion 
of an eternal future. (50) 
The worship of the totemic species is seen as a form of 
ancestor worship, a pre-literate form of historical or 
genealogical reckoning. That totemism is directed at 
gaining security against earliest forms of separation 
anxiety is obvious in the ritualistic totem meal. The 
phantasies of killing and devouring are as much directed at 
the imaginary mother as the symbolic father. Whiting's 
(1958) empirical study of paternal and maternal 
identification in the totem meal of totemic societies 
supports this view. 
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But it is not only the earliest, oral, forms of 
separation that totemism defends against; Oedipal conflicts 
are eminently present in initiation rites. All totemic 
cultures have puberty rituals which Roheim analyses as 
castration symbolism, (circumcision, tattooing, pulling out 
of teeth, body mutilation, scarring, social isolation, 
etc.): 
The puberty ritual is an institution which aims at 
diverting the libido of boys from their mothers; partly 
by offering them substitute mothers, women of their 
own, with the approval of society; and partly by 
offering them their fathers and their own selves as 
love objects. 
Bettleheim too analyses initiation rites as combining 
separation from mothers and, simultaneously, identification 
with mothers (1955). But the rites are symbolic, and 
language, with other non-linguistic symbolic systems, works 
in conjunction with the ego to secure the separation of 
internal and external reality. Language and symbolism 
comprise the articulation of internal and external reality. 
As Freud noted, "It was not until a language of abstract 
thought had been developed, that is to say, not until the 
sensory residues of verbal presentations had been linked to 
the internal processes, that the latter themselves 
gradually became capable of being perceived." (51) Before 
language, all internal processes would be directly 
projected onto the outside world, Freud suggested. with 
the extension of language into writing and a historical 
sense, awareness of the internal world would develop. 
Early forms of symbolisation should demonstrate this 
articulation of internal and external reality. 
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Roheim frames the problem of totemistic symbolism in a 
different way: 
Rites are representative; they aim at making up for 
object-loss by retaining the memory image of the 
object. The functional value of the memory image lies 
in its protective aspect; it is a substitute for object 
loss, and from the point of view of libido economy an 
intermediate object between object love and narcissism. 
The defence mechanism connected with the formation of 
the image is fission (splitting) and condensation. The 
fission of the original (parental) images leads to 
series formation, which unites society in a series of 
'good objects' as represented by the classificatory 
system. (52) 
The classificatory system is seen as a product of a 
relation of emotional, libidinal and dynamic factors a set 
of 'good objects' representing fusion of self and other. 
This theory gives a psychoanalytical interpretation of 
totemic structure which shows the specificity of totemism 
to pre-literate culture, and also describes the common 
psychological basis of preliterate and contemporary social 
and cultural structures. It presents a theory of the 
IIpsychic unity of mankind ll that is non-reductive and is 
fully historical. 
IIIn the beginning was the deed ll 
Freud's concluding words of Totem and Taboo have 
presented cultural historians and cultural analysts with a 
difficulty that has often resulted in the book being 
dismissed or overlooked. Girard (1978) calls it lIa work 
that has been unfairly treated and literally scapegoated by 
the whole intellectual communityll (1978), p.208) and calls 
for a reinstatement of the theory of a real event at the 
origins of symbolism and language. 
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I have examined a number of works that criticise, or 
occasionally confirm, Freud's hypothesis and his 
theoretical framework, and consider the psychoanalytic 
paradigm to offer a more substantial account than the 
anthropological critiques. To assimilate the concept of 
superego to that of a socio-symbolic law, whether this law 
is understood as incest-prohibition, or as linguistic law 
of exchange, is to misrecognise the fundamental infantile 
derivation of the superego. 
It has been suggested that the prohibitory aspect of 
the superego comes not so much from the internalisation of 
social or parental restrictions, as from the immaturity of 
the oedipal child itself. The incapacity for fusion 
(incest) and procreation is traumatic and the ego protects 
itself by displacing an internal inability onto an external 
prohibition. Social forms of prohibition, such as the 
incest taboo, would therefore reflect the Oedipal 
predicament. 
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The origins of language 
From the perspective of the life sciences, the 
origin of symbolic thought is a meaningful problem but 
one which will never be solved in the absence of the 
proper historical information. Levi-Strauss, 
Structural Anthropology. 
It has often and confidently been asserted that 
man's origin can never be known: but ignorance more 
frequently begets confidence than does knowledge: it is 
those who know little, and not those who know much, who 
so positively assert that this or that problem will 
never be solved by science. Darwin, Introduction to 
The Descent of Man, 1871. 
There are some sound reasons for doubting the value of 
a search for origins, and structuralists from a wide range 
of practices have given priority to the synchronic study of 
a particular structure over the study of its origin, 
evolution and development through time. The structuralist 
paradigm has usefully identified the difficulty of 
accurately knowing a pre-social or pre-linguistic moment or 
process. Levi-Strauss has emphasized the point that, from 
the moment of their existence, socio-symbolic structures 
such as "representations collectives" or institutional 
forms, have generated a difference in kind, and not merely 
of degree, between the natural and the human worlds, which 
means that the post- and pre-symbolic worlds cannot be 
usefully related. Levi-Strauss suggests: 
Whatever may have been the moment and the 
circumstances of its appearance in the scale of animal 
life, language could only have been born in one fell 
swoop. Things could not have set about signifying 
progressively. Following a transformation, the study 
of which is not the content of the social sciences but 
that of biology and psychology, a crossing over came 
about from a stage when nothing had a meaning to 
another where everything possessed it. (1) 
It is important to preserve something of this insight 
if we are to avoid oversimplified naturalist explanations 
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of contemporary social predicaments. Similarly, Lacan and 
Derrida suggest that the search for origins in metalanguage 
is an intellectual equivalent of the human subject's search 
for a centred ego or self: each is doomed to discover that 
the centre is an illusion fostered by the very language 
through which the subject is divided. 
More pessimistic still is the knowledge, from Freud, 
that every idea of an origin is bound to be strongly 
influenced by unconscious phantasies of bodily origin. 
Because the unconscious contains the repressed memories of 
infantile sensuality the question of origin, as theoretical 
question, will always carry the unconscious meaning of 
"Where did I come from?", so that all scientific 
investigation of origins, if indeed a metalanguage is 
possible, will have to take cognisance of certain 
ubiquitous unconscious phantasies such as the primal scene, 
seduction and castration (2), and will have to find a way 
of working through the relation of conscious, scientific 
discourse, to its own unconscious origin. 
This suggests that the greatest barrier to knowledge of 
ourselves, our society and its institutions, is human 
narcissism; and that it is because our desire to know the 
world and its history is preceded by and to a large extent 
motivated by an inconclusive unconscious search for 
knowledge of, and control over, one's own bodily origin 
that the theoretical questions of origin and history are 
especially difficult to think through. 
Nevertheless, challenges to structuralism's "confident 
assertion" of the impossibility of knowing an absent origin 
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can be found. Marxism emphasises the way in which 
knowledge of the history of relations of production 
contradicts a theory of the primacy of exchange relations. 
Foucault stresses the historical force of power relations 
as they have altered the balance between different social 
and institutional discourses. Freud emphasises the primacy 
of the Oedipus complex as a determinant of individual and 
group behaviour, of institutions such as religion and 
marriage, and ultimately of 'Civilisation' itself. More 
recently Rene Girard has criticised structuralism for its 
avoidance of the problem of origins "in order to maintain a 
pure formalism". (3) 
But perhaps the strongest challenge to the formalism of 
cultural-determinist orthodoxy in the social sciences has 
come from the feminist thought of the past two decades. 
The feminist challenge to existing cultural and scientific 
definitions of human needs has generated a new paradigm. 
From this perspective, outlined in chapters one and two, it 
is possible to question the explanatory omnipotence that 
has been ceded to cultural determinism, and so to rethink 
the questions of history. 
The evolutionary perspective of psychoanalytic 
materialism offers a time scale which reinstates the 
significance of cultural prehistory. The challenge to 
anthropocentric historical scale is clear, and the 
difficulties in recognising this have been characterised as 
akin to the disbelief in the Copernican, Darwinian and 
Marxist revolutions (Althusser, 1969, p. 218), and 
characterised as a "blow to narcissism". If feminism 
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reveals the androcentric bias of most social theory, and if 
anti-racist politics have revealed a similar white, and 
Euro-centric bias, the two can also be shown to share an 
implicit critique of anthropocentrism in theoretical 
perspectives. This bias can be seen in the conventions 
which have led historical societies to be defined in terms 
of literate and non-literate culture. The status accorded 
to the visibility and tangibility of written records of 
history reflects the overvaluation of the Logos inherent in 
the "Western Episteme" (Kristeva, 1979). Williams (1976) 
notes the etymology of the term 'history' and the 
variations in its meanings brought about by the emergence 
of philosophy and then Marxism. The word 'prehistory' was 
used for the first time in 1851 in the title of an 
Archaeological Study of Scotland. (4) By the late 
nineteenth century, archaeologists, naturalists and 
anthropologists, such as Lubbock and Tylor, were using the 
term freely. The concept then began to be defined with 
increasing precision, going back to the system of 
classification formulated by archaeologists between the 
1830s and 1850, which differentiated between different 
stages of technological development. This system, which 
names the Paleolithic (Stone Age), Neolithic (Iron and 
Bronze Ages) and Historical (subsequent to the invention of 
writing) stages of cultural development, was adopted by the 
British Museum in 1866. 
However, an alternative system of classification, based 
on economic rather than technological differentiation, was 
also in use, invented in the 1830s by Norwegian 
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archaeologist Nilssen. Of influence on Morgan's Ancient 
Society (1877), Nilssen's economic classification used 
categories of 'savagery' (hunter-gatherers) to herding and 
nomadic agricultural society, to civilised society, 
characterised by writing, class divisions of labour and the 
usage of money. Morgan's theory in Ancient Society, 
subtitled 'Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from 
Savagery through Barbarism to Civilisation' was of profound 
influence on Marx and Engels' historical materialism. 
Morgan identified seven periods of prehistory 
(mistakenly identified as 'ethnic periods'): Lower Savagery 
spanned the emergence of 'homo sapiens' through to the 
discovery of fire; Middle Savagery from fire to the 
invention of the bow and arrow; Upper savagery from bow and 
arrow to the invention of pottery: Lower Barbarism from 
pottery to the domestication of animals, Middle Barbarism 
from domestication to the smelting of iron ore: Upper 
Barbarism from iron to the invention of a phonetic 
alphabet; and Civilisation, which started from the 
invention of the phonetic alphabet and included writing, 
the keeping of records and history 'proper'. Not as 
systematic as Nilssen's classification, which was entirely 
based on 'economy', Morgan's system used an eclectic method 
of economic, technological and cultural features as 
demarcations of prehistory. Although Western European 
archaeology has maintained the use of technological 
classification, Soviet prehistorians have changed their 
systems several times. They started with the three 
technological ages of 'Man', then used the Morgan-Engels 
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system after the revolution until the 1920s, at which point 
the Morgan system was adapted into an economic system of 
'grades ' • The three grades (comprised of pre-clan society, 
clan society and class society. This system is still in 
operation in Soviet archaeology. 
So it is clear that theoretical differences create 
differing conceptualisations of the past, and construct 
different histories. Chronology is possibly the most 
straightforward aspect of historical knowledge but is not a 
means of solving the differences in explanatory, or causal 
history. Since 1945 carbon dating (a by product of nuclear 
physics) has facilitated very accurate chronological 
classification of any organic substance, and this has 
helped to establish connections between artefacts and 
evidence of social structure. Again recently, molecular 
genetics has facilitated very accurate estimates of the 
divergence of distinctly human apes from the other apes and 
apelike primates which preceded us. Although chronology is 
crucial in providing a time-based structure for rigorous 
speculation on the causes and sequences of human 
prehistory, it offers only clues about the causes and 
determinants of change. As we have seen, the theories we 
have, with which to interpret empirical data, are based on 
differing concepts about the defining characteristics of 
human beings, and are to some extent mutually exclusive. 
Some of the narrativisations of historical sequence are 
clearly motivated by unconscious fantasy. Before the more 
systematic accounts of prehistory were formulated in the 
mid-nineteenth century, a more irrational concept of 
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prehistory, popular in The Enlightenment, was current. 
Ellenberger characterises this as part of the The 
Enlightenment "search for the primitive world": 
A world which was supposed to have existed at the 
origin of mankind, a world endowed with supreme 
knowledge and unfathomable wisdom. This world was 
believed to have been destroyed by some catastrophe, 
but that parts of its traditions had been secretly 
transmitted by a chain of a few initiated wise men. (5) 
Several metaphors of inundation, such as the biblical 
deluge and the submerged Atlantis, were popularly linked to 
the catastrophic destruction of "primitive civilisation". 
Many mystical societies, such as Masonic societies, used 
rites which were supposed to reproduce some of the 
imaginary ancient Egyptian rituals. This curious mixture 
of rationalism and fantasy might indicate an unconscious 
recognition of the pre-Oedipal world of infantile sexuality 
(supreme non-rational knowledge) which is destroyed 
catastrophically at the Oedipus complex and castration 
complex. Inundation might indicate grief and submergence 
might be a metaphor of repression. 
The question of the origins of language is being asked 
as a part of a more general inquiry into the meaning of 
origin, and the history of symbolic thought. 
Some of the strongest arguments put forward within the 
feminist applications of structural psychoanalysis have 
claimed that the experience of being female is largely 
determined by the structures of symbolic thought, and by 
social structure. 
For example, the Althusserian-Lacanian view described 
in chapter 2 claims that sexual difference has no 
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representation in the unconscious. Because of the 
structuring function of the binary logic of symbolic 
thinking, the signifier as a mark of difference can only 
represent presence or absence. With the phallus as primary 
signifier, femininity is thus always represented as an 
absence, or void. 
If this is true, and if this description of the psyche 
is to be used for negotiating social and psychic change, 
some account must be given of how masculinity and 
femininity may be realigned in relation to signification. 
If it is true, it is also possible to "test" this 
historically. What is the history of the signifier? What 
differences are there between auditory, vocal, visual, 
graphic representations? What basis do we use for 
differentiating between arbitrary and motivated relations 
of signifier to referent? The theories of the origins of 
language have here been subdivided into two sections. The 
origins of speech and vocal auditory signification are 
discussed first in order to compare a range of twentieth 
century hypotheses. Secondly the origins of writing are 
discussed. Three "transitional" scripts from sumeria, 
Egypt and China are discussed. The signification of sexual 
difference is particularly explored, in order to rethink 
the theory of the primary of the phallus as signifier. 
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Theories of the Origin of Language 
Social anthropology suggests that all societies have 
their origins myths which weave together unconscious 
phantasy and environmental information into a pattern or 
narrative. Most of these myths make some reference to the 
origins of language, often as a gift from the gods (Ancient 
Egyptians) or as the cause of a fall from grace (Old 
Testament). 
The ubiquity of the association between language 
origins and some concept of paternity would seem to bear 
out structuralist theory. In particular, origins myths 
tend to isolate the word or the name as a single entity, or 
naming as a moment which marks a transformation from chaos 
to order, or as Levi-Strauss suggests - from "a stage where 
nothing had a meaning to another where everything possessed 
it." This aspect of the Genesis myth is well known and has 
been documented by Leach (7); whilst other biblical 
references to the origins of language such as the story of 
the Tower of Babel and the story of Adam naming the animals 
are more obscure, but can be understood as part of a 
theological tradition which uses the search for origins in 
order to resolve questions about divinity. Another such 
version is Herodotus' story of the Babylonian king who 
wanted to know which language was the most elementary (and 
thus the most divine) and so shut away a child from birth 
to see which language would be spoken spontaneously. (8) 
Although, obviously, the experiment was unsuccessful and 
cruel, contemporary researchers such as Lenneberg have 
noted how language learning can be almost unimpaired by the 
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most extraordinarily adverse environmental conditions, and 
this has been used to support innatist rather than 
religious hypotheses. There seems to have been no 
scientific speculation on the original language until the 
middle of the nineteenth century in western Europe and it 
remains a local and comparatively limited phenomenon. 
Some similarity remains between the theological 
(mythic) and scientific (theoretical) traditions in that 
linguistic theories tend to stress the absolute nature of 
the difference between animal and human communicative 
behaviour, as did the theological accounts, whilst 
evolutionary theories tend to find continuities between 
human language and its precursors. Within scientific 
investigation of the origin and evolution of language and 
speech there is much controversy over the dating and 
placing of 'homo loquens' or 'homo symbolicans' within the 
variety of fragments of the history of homo sapiens. Most 
authors agree that the presence of language, or the 
capacity for symbolic behaviours, is one of the principal 
characteristics of homo sapiens, and that it is closely 
linked with toolmaking. Language, like ritual and other 
social behaviours, does not fossilise, and so its presence 
must be dated through inferences of the archaeological 
record, or by comparative genetics. In the first case it 
is quite easy to be precise about timing since the carbon 
14 process can be used to calculate the ages of organic 
matter such as in the cave paintings and sculptures of the 
Aurignacean period of the Upper paleolithic, the evidence 
of ritual burial of the Chellan, Lower Paleolithic period, 
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and the tools of the earliest hominids, the homo habilis of 
the Pliocene. This limits the range to about two million 
years, and raises questions about how to define language 
and speech within the broader category of symbolic 
behaviour. The second method of dating language origins 
come from comparative zoology and consists of using 
molecular genetics to establish the evolutionary closeness 
of the human lineage to related primate species. This 
method gives very accurate information about the point at 
which homo sapiens diverged from the hominid line. 
Neither method can positively date the emergence of 
language, but these are both used to inform speculation and 
in some cases to support a specific claim about language 
origins. 
A great deal of controversy exists over the definition 
of what is meant by 'language'; as noted above, the 
theories tend to fall into two groups - those that stress 
the differences between language and other forms of 
communication and those that stress the continuity between 
language and symbolisation. The first group could be said 
to be offering an account of the emergence of homo loquens; 
as it tends to focus on language as a vocal auditory 
system, its theories are mainly linguistic. The second 
group is concerned with 'homo symbolicans' and sees 
vocalisation as one aspect of symbolic behaviours and its 
theories tend to be mostly anthropological. 
Comparing the two kinds of theories can usefully 
demonstrate how discourses inflect their object and terms 
of reference. Hockett (1960), Lenneberg (1967) and 
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Liebermann (1975) as proponents of the primacy of speech 
(homo loquens) theory point out that language is a system 
of combining a limited number of phonemes to produce vocal 
signs for an unlimited number of meanings. Hockett has 
produced a useful list of thirteen distinguishing 
characteristics of language. Lenneberg and Liebermann have 
tended to study the physical evolution of the vocal 
apparatus. Proponents of the 'homo symbolicans' theories 
have often linked the origins of language to gesture, 
Revesz (1946) and Jesperson (1922) note that much non-
verbal communication accompanies language in humans. 
Anthropological theories such as Ashley-Montagu (1976), 
Macdonald critchley (1960), Girard (1969) and Gans (1981) 
argue that important transformations in social behaviours 
and organisation accompany, and even determine the 
emergence of speech. 
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The History of Theories of the Origins of Language 
Two recent studies, Stamm (1976) and Aarsleff (1976, 
1982) describe the vicissitudes of the question from 
classical antiquity to present day linguistics. They note 
that contemporary synchronic analysis of language, whether 
phonological or syntactic structures, has long since 
displaced the philology of nineteenth century Europe. Yet 
Chomsky has located his work within the tradition of 
cartesian innatism, which, coupled with the rationalist 
tradition of eighteenth century philosophy, formed the 
foundations of the French school of Port Royal grammar and 
logic. During the eighteenth century there was also a 
great deal of speculation about language origins, counter 
to the Port Royal tradition. Rousseau's essays proved 
immensely popular and influential, and Condillac's "Essay 
on the origin of Human Knowledge" (1746) was widely read 
and very influential in Germany in particular, where it led 
to the Berlin Academy offering a prize for the best essay 
on language origins. This was won by Herder in 1772. 
Debate flourished and the eighteenth century essays tended 
to mix empirical research with speculative methodology such 
as in Lord Monboddo's "Of the Origin and progress of 
Language" (1775). By the nineteenth century, Aarsleff 
notes, a clearer distinction between rationalism and 
empiricism had been drawn and the philosophical and 
theological debates tended to give way to the new 
positivism. The debate was taken over by the naturalists, 
ethnologists and anthropologists. Darwin addressed human 
origins and language origins in The Descent of Man (1871) 
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and many applied his concepts of Natural Selection from The 
Origin of Species (18S9) to the question of language: of 
these, Schleicher (19863, 186S), Muller (186S), Bleek 
(1867) and Haeckel (1867) have recently been reprinted in 
the series Amsterdam Classics in Linguistics (1983) as more 
interest grows in historical linguistics. In the 1860s, 
however, the popularity of the question generated so many 
essays that in 1866 the Societe de Linguistique de Paris 
established a standing rule barring papers on the origins 
of language from its sessions. This prohibition, coupled 
with the increasing influence of the comparative method (of 
nineteenth century ethnology and anthropology) had the 
effect of "channelling the energy of linguistic 
investigators towards synchronic analysis and the gathering 
of more information about existing languages in their 
contemporary forms" (9). Stamm (1976) provides a useful 
classification of the nineteenth century theories into six 
types, using the names under which they were popularly 
known. Aarsleff (1976, 1982) links the nineteenth century 
theories to their intellectual antecedents in eighteenth 
century philosophy where he follows Locke's argument 
against neoplatonism and against Descartes, and also 
emphasises the influence of the philosophical tradition on 
Saussure: "Both the doctrine of linearity of speech and the 
arbitrariness of the linguistic sign are fundamental to 
Condillac and his followers" (10). A previous resurgence 
of interest in the question is noted, by Aarsleff, in the 
Renaissance in Britain and Europe, where Jewish mysticism 
and neoplatonism joined forces producing strange version of 
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Cabbalistic, Old Testament and Egyptian, Roman and Greek 
mysticisms. A complete collection of writings on the 
question can be found in Gordon Hews' two volume 
bibliography on Language Origins (1975). The mystical, 
mythical, theological and philosophical accounts have been 
omitted in order to focus on contemporary language origins 
theories. 
The origins of Homo Loguens: the vocal-auditory theories 
Hockett (1960) uses comparative zoology "to help 
reconstruct the communicative habits of the remote 
ancestors of the hominid line", and draws up a table of the 
incidence of 13 characteristics as these occur in other 
species' communication systems and in human non-verbal 
communication. These include arbitrariness (thereby 
excluding visual and onomatopoeic forms), discreteness, 
displacement (referentiality), the use of morphemes in 
structures of binary opposition, as well as dependence on 
the vocal auditory channel (excluding gestural language, 
and such animal phenomena as the bee dance). Thus Hockett 
devises a system for identifying the precise form of 
language which is species-specific to humans. The 
evolutionary aspect of his theory examines the 
interrelation between anatomical transformations and social 
changes, focusing particularly on how mechanisms of natural 
selection led to an increase in the length of childhood 
dependency and helplessness, in order to extend the period 
of plasticity and learning. Language, he suggests, is a 
genetically transmitted capacity for extra-genetic 
learning, and with selection for language would come a 
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selection for "prolonged childhood", allowing for greater 
extra-genetic transmission of behaviour and information. 
This description clearly echoes the Freudian thesis of the 
retention of the Oedipus complex in adult subjectivity. 
Lenneberg's work, The Biological Bases of Language (1967) 
provides much of the data and framework for most 
contemporary investigations of the origins of language, as 
well as for Chomsky's researches into the neuroanatomy of 
innate syntactic structures. The evolution of the human 
mouth, larynx and diaphragm is documented via the fossil 
record of cranial capacity, skeletal posture and dentition. 
Although it is more functional than evolutionary biology, 
and Lenneberg avoids speculative reconstruction, his data 
is used by Lieberman in On the Origins of Language (1969) 
to support his Darwinian hypothesis that "earliest changes 
in dentition and bipedal gait facilitated the evolution of 
the supralaryngeal vocal apparatus". Lieberman argues that 
environmental changes in habitat, the development of 
bipedalism, allowed for changes in the vocal apparatus 
which provided the basis for language and thereby 
facilitated the convergence of several factors later 
associated with natural language such as encoding, 
cognitive ability and brain lateralisation. Hockett, 
Lenneberg and Lieberman all cite neoteny as the most 
important evolutionary mechanism associated with language: 
The human neonate is considerably more immature at 
birth than our closest of kin, with a concomitant 
prolongation of differentiation periods and increased 
susceptibility for various factors to impinge upon the 
direction of further development. The acquisition of 
language plays a definite part in this developmental 
history, its emergence occupying a fixed position 
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within the array of developmental milestones, and there 
are definite indications that its development is 
contingent upon a certain aspect of what might be 
called cerebral plasticity. (II) 
Neoteny is linked to but separate from the phenomenon 
of increased prematurity at birth. Jay Gould notes that in 
selection for an increasingly narrow pelvis for bipedalism, 
there is a contradiction between this and the 
simultaneously increasing brain size, which leads to 
greater prematurity at birth (12). Neoteny and 
paedomorphosis are the evolutionary mechanisms which 
describe the retention of formerly juvenile characteristics 
by adult descendents produced by the retardation of somatic 
development. These theories raise important points as to 
the value of a recapitulationist account of the relation 
between phylogeny and ontogeny, and this will be explored 
below. 
The origins of Homo Symbolicans: gestural theories 
As noted above, theories which locate the origins of 
language primarily within the context of other symbolic 
behaviours tend also to be those which focus on the extent 
of the continuity between human and non-human behaviour. 
In this they are unlike the linguistic (and theological) 
models which tend to emphasise the difference of kind, 
rather than degree, between human and non-human 
communicative acts. 
Johanneson (1949), Diamond (1959) and Revesz (1956) all 
propose theories of the gestural origins of language. 
Diamond, unfortunately repeats some of the most doubtful of 
our origin myths as he conjures up an image of "man the 
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hunter, ferocious groups of half-human males racing after 
big animals" (13): 
Language emerged out of requests for assistance 
addressed by one male person to another in those small 
semi-nomadic groups out of which human society seems to 
have developed. What were the meanings of these 
requests? It is suggests that they were requests ... 
for action requiring the maximum bodily effort, to 
break, cut, smash, kill. 
Johanneson advanced a theory that gestures of the body, 
and especially the hands were the first communicative 
system and that vocalisation followed in an attempt to 
imitate, with the speech organs, the gestures of other 
parts of the body. He gives particular examples from the 
Semitic and Indo-European languages and argues that these 
are both forms of a common linguistic system dating from 
10-20,000 years ago. 
Revesz, Montagu and Critchley all propose theories of 
social primacy as direct challenges to the philosophical 
tradition of cerebral primacy. Critchley's version is that 
selection would have favoured speaking proto-hominid groups 
because of the survival value of toolmaking and co-
operation. Language use may then have modified behaviour 
by increasing the differentiation between thalamus and 
cortical systems of the brain thus facilitating control of 
behaviours through impulse inhibition, and thus giving rise 
to morality and altruism: 
In this way there arises - again indirectly out of 
the beginnings of language - the beginnings of choice 
as to conduct . ... so arise ethical and altruistic 
considerations. The earlier stages of these aspects of 
behaviour can be visualised in the animal kingdom in 
the instinct of maternal solicitude. This instinct is 
restricted in time and place; with the achievement of 
adulthood the young animal no longer receives maternal 
solicitude. The instinct too is restricted to the 
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immediate family group. Altruism extends from beyond 
the family circle to the clan only with the attainment 
of human status. (14) 
Here Critchley is following closely Darwin's argument 
in The Descent of Man which attributes the moral sense to 
early humans as an innate characteristic possibly resulting 
from the family form. In Freudian terms, such behaviour 
requires a fairly sophisticated psychological mechanism, 
the inhibition (and perhaps projection of repression) of 
aggressive instincts would presuppose A) a mechanism for 
the internal redeployment of instinctual energy, B) a 
mechanism for prohibition and C) would result in the 
capacity for deferral of instinctual discharge and so the 
beginning of a sense of time. As Montagu has noted, 
The areas of the cerebral cortex for hand, tongue and 
speech situated within the left hemisphere, as well as 
for the area for hand gestures during speech are all 
closely associated with the areas for logical 
analytical operations and temporal, sequential 
ordering. (15) 
Badcock (1986) suggests that "a dynamic, psychological 
mechanism could influence behaviour just as effectively as 
a more directly genetically encoded determinant ... but 
with an added advantage: an ability to interact dynamically 
with the environment". In Freudian terms, this view 
locates language at the point of interaction of organism 
(instinctual aggression and environment (group, clan), and 
with internal transformations in the brain mechanisms 
dealing with sensory and cognitive processes (thalamus and 
cortex) • It also connects brain lateralisation and 
increasing complexity of intra-organism instinctual and 
sensory co-ordination, with the beginnings of the 
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differentiation between conscious and unconscious mind, 
between ego, superego and ide Altruism, or the moral 
sense, would be explicable as identification, particularly 
unconscious identification, in which id impulses are 
redeployed by the ego having been inhibited or prohibited 
by the superego. 
What are the consequences of this speculation for 
understanding the origins of language? Badcock's recent 
work on altruism suggests: 
If we make the by no means unreasonable assumption 
that human language evolved originally in large part as 
a medium of communication for reciprocal altruism, then 
it is also not unreasonable to suggest that the 
apparent imperfections of human languages, may all 
reflect not merely the need for this means of 
communication to convey information but also its 
usefulness in communicating misinformation. (16) 
If language is to be located as part of a mechanism for 
maintaining unity through redeployment of aggression, it is 
not unreasonable to see in it at least a residue of that 
aggression it serves to deflect. Badcock suggests also 
that psychology evolved in order to detect "cheating" in 
others and resulted in the by-product of a capacity for 
"insight", just as language is a means for misinforming, as 
much as for the transmission of information. 
"Misinformation" is Badcock's term for the use of 
communication in order to conceal malevolence or simply 
non-reciprocation. Where language would seem to imply a 
reciprocity or exchange between speaker and hearer, Badcock 
identifies language as a social form of "controlled hate". 
Badcock's theory is a synthesis of sociobiology and 
psychoanalysis which aims at integrating an account of 
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social change, psychological change and somatic change; 
these functions he sees as being co-ordinated in the human 
subject by means of the superego, ego and id respectively. 
This aspect is more closely argued in chapter 3. 
Tanner (1982) could be classed with the gestural 
theorists although she makes no specific reference to 
gesture; her account of language evolution acknowledges 
that most linguistic analyses have stressed the differences 
between the communicative behaviours of different species, 
but she suggests that "the challenge is to hypothesise the 
development from cognitive, social-affective ties to 
symbolic thought, language and culture." The most 
important question, she maintains, is to know how the 
somatic, expressive communication already present in the 
ancestral population mediated the development of more 
arbitrary symbolic and referential aspects of the fully 
human communicatory system. She notes that: 
Chimps and other primates have the capacity to 
exchange information between different sensory 
modalities especially vision and touch. Cross modal 
perception was thought to be an exclusively human 
trait. This ability to make transfers between the 
senses is considered to be a necessary neurological 
basis for language, it lies at the basis of 
conceptualisation, which is fundamental to 
symbol isation. (17) 
What Tanner calls the "association area" of the human 
neo-cortex is very extensively developed, allowing for a 
number of different permutations of transformations between 
visual, auditory, vocal and tactile senses. 
Tanner's theory provides an integrated biological and 
anthropolgical account of human evolution; its stress on 
the centrality of women's place in that evolution means 
223 
that it is compatible with a psychoanalytic account of the 
origins of culture. 
Eric Gans' The Origin of Language (1975) follows 
Girard's work on the origins of totemism and ritual in 
violence, sacrifice and ritual scapegoating. According to 
Girard, violence arises from the "mimetism" that is so 
highly developed in human beings due to the prolongation of 
childhood dependence. His theory posits some degree of 
intrapsychic organisation, such as a rudimentary ego 
structure, to have been in operation in the early human 
behaviour he describes. Although Girard's theory is 
explicitly set against Levi-Strauss' circular arguments, it 
is nevertheless quite dependent on a Durkheimian concept of 
the social nature of representations collectives. Girard, 
however, uses the Durkheimian matrix as the basis of a 
historical theory, and posits a definite originary 
structure as marking the transition from a natural to a 
social order. Unlike Levi-Strauss, the primal structure is 
not the taboo on incest but is centred on the attempts to 
regulate violence. Girard's hypothesis unfolds in five 
steps: 
1) Whereas all species have some capacity for mimicry and 
mimesis; as has been discovered by the natural sciences 
(18), humans have developed a greater capacity for 
imitation than any other species. This may be because 
imitation is a process which underlies most learning in 
infancy and childhood. 
2) Whereas other species have mechanisms for the 
instinctual control of intraspecies aggression, such as 
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dominance hierarchies and 'pecking orders' which serve to 
control the strong rivalry generated by mimesis, human 
beings have no such instinctual mechanism. The extremely 
strong rivalry is controlled instead by the representation 
of the group. 
3) However, in order for this representation to take 
effect, to become a subjective reality, an event must take 
place, or have taken place. Such an event could be 
narrativised as follows - the crisis of tension or 
aggression generated by the "order of the double" tends to 
seek stability through discharge of that tension onto an 
arbitrarily designated individual, a victim. (The 
designation may not be entirely arbitrary in that the 
victim may be a "magical figure", a twin, a diseased or 
crippled person or someone of strange appearance or origin; 
but the victim is arbitrary in relation to the crisis of 
which he or she is seen to be the cause). With the 
discharge of aggression onto the victim, possibly through 
murder, the group is formed from the dyad. Violence, once 
acted out, projected, "creates the condition for the 
coincidental emergence of representation". 
4) The discharge of violence leaves the group in calm and 
quietude, giving rise to the perception of the murdered 
victim as the object of "the first non-instinctive 
attention" of the group as a whole. in other words, the 
presence of the group as a group, is represented to itself 
via the intermediary of a common object - the body of the 
victim - which comes to signify the whole process and thus 
to signify "sacredness". This is the first transcendental 
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signifier, Gans claims. 
Finally, 5) the process is repeated indefinitely; the 
situation is periodically reproduced with pre-designated 
victims, scapegoats, who are subjected to physical or 
symbolic sacrifice. The process has become a ritual in 
which the sacrifice is a representation of the "original" 
event. 
Gans argues that it is the original purpose of 
language, as a form of representation-in-general, to 
mediate "the imposition by the group on itself, of a non-
instinctive restraint that defers further violence and 
constitutes thereby the origin of all cultural deferrals". 
(19) Deferral is an important characteristic in two senses 
because it is the basis of the reality principle, and 
because it is through the deferral of meaning that 
signifying elements can be combined into articulated forms. 
Gans translates Girard's sociology into a theory of 
representation. 
Gans suggests that vocalisation in speech derives from 
the cries accompanying the externalisation of aggression, 
but that the referential function of representation 
(Hockett's category of displacement) is derived from 
gestural movements. The sign, he suggests, was originally 
a designation. The instinctual mechanisms of grasping, 
reaching out to hold or to take are original mechanisms of 
appropriation. Interestingly they are also one of the 
earliest reflex actions of infancy and have developed 
psychological significance as maternal care has grown to 
make them less biologically necessary for human survival. 
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The reflex of grasping, when inhibited, becomes an abortive 
gesture which thus designates instead of appropriating. 
The gesture takes the place of the action and thus becomes 
a linguistic sign. 
In Girard's theory, unlike Freud's Totem and Taboo, 
there is no hypothesis of the father as designated victim, 
nor of devouring the victim, but rather the suggestion that 
the association between touching the dead scapegoat, (i.e. 
designating the object of the first non-instinctive 
attention), transmutes of the grasping reflex (associated 
with food as well as maternal proximity and security) into 
gesture, forming a matrix of interconnected meanings, 
through memory traces, in the rudimentary psyche of the 
hominid-human being. 
Gans' theory is a formal theory, which puts forward a 
set of hypotheses about the development of syntactic, 
grammatical language, from the basis of the representation 
in general which preceded and which may still, 
psychologically, underlie it. Gans' conclusion is in many 
ways very similar to Badcock's view of language as 
misinformation: 
Ultimately we do not deal with signs because they 
are more convenient than their referents, nor even 
because their reproducibility prevents conflict, but 
because they reproduce mimetic conflict in a domain of 
diminished violence. (20) 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that in 
. h "It Isakower's concept of the audItory sp ere - superego, 
is not the content of language which is characteristic of 
the superego but almost exclusively the tone and shape of a 
well-organised grammatical structure". And it was 
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suggested that Isakower's theory can be connected to 
chomsky's more recent theory of syntax as deep structure. 
The role of syntactic deferral of meaning, and the 
articulation of units into structured unities might, 
plausibly, be closely linked with the psychological 
mechanism for the redeployment of aggression. Ward (1979) 
suggested that certain aspects of syntax and humour are 
best explained in terms of superego functions and 
instinctual aggression. (21) 
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Mothers, infants and paedomorphosis 
It seems that the debates and disagreements on the 
origin of language particularly the differences between the 
groups here characterised as "homo loquens" and "homo 
symbolicans" theorists, will not be immediately resolved. 
Concluding the Colloqium on the Origins and Evolution of 
Language and Speech in New York, 1976, Fox remarked: 
In some areas the difference between theories is 
quite extraordinary, so that, for example, the origins 
of language have been placed either with the early 
Australopithecines or in the Upper pleistocene .... 
(22 ) 
However, one extremely significant divergence of views 
could be noted here. There are those who, like Gans, 
Diamond and Montagu, explicitly or implicitly attribute 
early language learning and usage to adult (usually male) 
members of the hominid group, in their work, toolmaking or 
hunting activities. Then there are those who have 
underlined the importance of the ontogenetic origins of 
language and learning: Marshack, Lenneberg, Tanner. 
Marshack notes: 
If language was to be learned, it would not have 
been in the context of the hunt, (a point made also, 
forcefully, by Tanner). It would have been learned 
young and before the individual was economically 
productive. It would have been learned in the context 
of the maturing generalised cognitive capacity and 
within a child's widening increasingly complex 
relational competence. (23) 
Before exploring the most important, and probably the 
most troublesome concept here - the relation between 
phylogeny and ontogeny, we shall state the phylogenetic 
case as it has been reconstructed from the archaeological 
record. Both the linguistic and the anthropological 
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accounts of language origins use archaeological data to 
ascribe a historical context. Isaac (1974), Montagu, 
Marshack and Jaynes (1976) identified a rapid acceleration 
of both physical and cultural changes in the mid-
Paleolithic period. Jaynes' data is the most inclusive, 
citing the 100,000 year transition from Acheulian (Lower 
Paleolithic) to Neolithic periods as the time of the 
acceleration which would seem to indicate the emergence of 
language. Marshack narrows the range to the Upper 
Paleolithic 30,000 year Aurignacian and Magdalanian 
periods. Isaac suggests that the somatic and social 
transformations of the earlier Pliocene and Lower 
Pleistocene periods (such as walking upright, toolmaking, 
hunting/gathering and food-sharing) evolving slowly over 
some two million years, set up the necessary conditions for 
the very rapid changes of the Mid-Upper Pleistocene 100-
150,000 years ago. From the time of the Upper Paleolithic 
onwards, "the record gives the appearance of a threshold 
having been crossed", with more complex and more symbol-
ridden systems of culture". Oakley (1951) was the first to 
suggest that developments in language may provide the best 
explanation of the cultural spurt of the Upper Paleolithic. 
All given contemporary sources consider this a plausible 
hypothesis, it does not contradict the historical dating 
suggested by Lenneberg, Liebermann or Tanner. 
There have been many attempts to correlate the 
phylogenetic record with contemporary ontogenesis, the most 
important are the nineteenth century recapitulationist 
theories and the twentieth century inverse or neo-
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recapitulationism known an neoteny or paedomorphism. 
The theory of recapitulation has a long history in 
biological sciences, as Gould documents in his Phylogeny 
and Ontogeny, and its influence on psychoanalysis has been 
well documented by Sulloway (1979). A very brief account 
of the principal differences between the formulations of 
the 'law' as these changed over the last century will be 
given here. In its earliest form, as the Meckel-Serres 
(1808) law of parallelism, it states that a higher animal, 
in its embryological development, recapitulates the adult 
structures of animals below it on a "scale of beings". 
Apart from being based on a mistaken notion of the relation 
between species, in this form the law is not necessarily an 
evolutionary theory. By 1812 Cuvier's classification of 
species has undermined the idea of a single "scale of 
beings" and thus provided the impetus for an embryological 
exploration of recapitulation within classes of species, 
and the comparison between them. The science of embryology 
founded by Von Baer in the 1820s provided data which led to 
the refutation of the Meckel-Serres formulation; in 1828 
Von Baer stated "the embryo of the vertebrate animal is 
from the very first a vertebrate animal and at no time 
agrees with an invertebrate animal". contemporary 
embryologists consider that Von Baer's four laws of embryo 
development are still valid today, even though Von Baer was 
sceptical about evolution and did not elaborate his theory 
in this direction. It was Darwin who, in 1859, proposed 
the link between ontogeny and phylogeny within an 
explicitly evolutionary theory: "In two groups of animals 
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(however much they may at present differ from one another 
in structure and habits) if they pass through the same or 
similar embryonic stages we may feel assured that they have 
both descended from the same or nearly similar parents, and 
are therefore in that degree closely related. Thus 
community in embryonic structure reveals community of 
descent." Following this, In 1864, von Muller's tract Fur 
Darwin was the first attempt to describe the process of 
embryonic recapitulation of ancestry, and his ideas 
influenced Haeckel who formulated his well known biogenetic 
law in 1866 in The General Morphology of Organisms. 
Haeckel's was a reworking of the Meckel-Serres law as 
modified by intervening knowledge; it stated that the 
ontogeny of an organism recapitulates its evolutionary 
history, within the terms of the phylogeny of that species. 
Thus for example the gastrulation stage of cellular 
development shortly following conception, in which the 
spherical layer of rapidly multiplying cells begins to 
invert itself to form a sac-like structure of two layers 
with an opening at one end, is the formation of the first 
'organ' of the foetus (eventually the stomach and the 
mouth) and also represents a crucial turning point in the 
evolution of higher animal life (with some marine organisms 
remaining at this stage). Although unable to specify the 
process through which this retention of ancestral forms are 
manifested in foetal development, and unable to suggest (as 
has been done most recently in 1982), that "the ties that 
bind ontogeny and phylogeny must not be studied animal by 
animal but rather organ by organ" (Delsol and Tintant), 
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Haeckel was nevertheless a firm evolutionist and proposed 
that phylogeny was the cause of ontogeny. Haeckel also 
incidentally formulated the first full critique of the 
doctrine of cerebral primacy. 
In the twentieth century, De Beer's Embryos and 
Ancestors (1940, 1958) integrated the recapitulationist 
theory with modern biology, and produced the first theory 
of neoteny or paedomorphosis. More recently Gould has 
approached the issue from two perspectives, the history of 
ideas, and as a working theory for evolutionary biology. 
Gould notes that whereas the nineteen century theories were 
predominantly accounts of metamorphosis (the idea of an 
anatomical development going beyond the ancestral forms), 
the evolutionary development of human beings is 
paedomorphic, retaining certain physical traits that are 
characteristic of the immature forms of ancestors. 
The neo-recapitulationist theory of neoteny is the best 
explanation of the rapid change characteristic of human 
evolution. We noted the evidence from archaeology and 
language origins theorists of a particularly intense period 
of change in the Middle to Upper Paleolithic periods, which 
is often interpreted as marking the emergence of language 
use in man. An accelerated development growth such as this 
is best explained, biologically, by the theory of 
paedomorphosis. This form of evolution is particular to 
humans (although other primates show similar mechanisms), 
and requires minimal genetic action because the biochemical 
processes that control the rate and scale of foetal growth 
are relatively easily targeted through minimal genetic 
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change. Since major genetic change takes many breeding 
generations to take place (Dobzhansky, 1960) the processes 
of natural and sexual selection alone could not account for 
such rapid bio-cultural change. Paedomorphosis generates 
rapid changes in a small population (Gould, 1978, p.61), 
and the flexibility of rate of maturation (heterochrony) 
offers many ecological advantages. 
The neoteny theory of evolution is fully compatible 
with the findings of molecular biology, and supports the 
psychoanalytic account of psychological development. 
Moreover it would seem to explain why Freud remained a 
Lamarckian despite his understanding of Darwin's refutation 
of the doctrine of acquired characteristics. paedomorphic 
development would be the evolutionary mechanism which would 
allow for the psychological acquisition of culturally 
transmitted information and behaviour, with extended 
parental care providing the biological basis of the 
linguistic and psychological inner world. 
Yazmajian was the first to correlate neotenic 
evolutionary theory with psychoanalytic theory: 
Human intra-uterine foetal development and growth 
has an expanding spiralling quality which is 
characteristic of all mammalian forms of life. Neither 
marsupial nor placental mammals complete foetal 
development in utero; all mammals, including man and 
other primates, are born with persisting foetal traits, 
and must complete foetal development outside the 
uterus. Human extra-uterine foetal development extends 
over a period of about four to six years. ( ... ) The 
last great spiralling sweep of the phylogenetic 
recapitulation occurs during this extrauterine period 
and follows the oral, anal, urogenetical progression 
outlined by Abraham. Further, this progression 
coincides with and influences the oral, anal and 
phallic infantile psychosexual stages as described 
psychoanalytically. The writer considers that 
Abraham's essentially philosophic comments about the 
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'parallels' between early embryo development and 
infantile sexuality reflect a literal truth. These 
observations are correlated with the broader concepts 
which Freud developed from the dual instinct theory. 
( 24 ) 
More recently, differences have arisen within 
psychoanalytic theory as to the usefulness of the genetic 
line of development (the theory of libidinal stages). The 
object relations school has focused more on the 
psychological capacities for dyadic relationships with 
internal and external objects, and this model is used 
alongside the more standard Freudian concept of infantile 
psycho-sexuality. Sandler, a 'standard' Freudian, has 
coined the phrase "the child within" to describe the effect 
of the dynamic unconscious, the repressed infantile 
development, on the behaviour of adults. Perhaps it is the 
resistance to unconscious knowledge, and to acceptance of 
the crucial significance of the infantile condition that 
has impeded scientific progress in this field, Gould notes 
that "A neotenic hypothesis of human origins has been 
available for some time, but it has been widely ignored and 
ridiculed. Nevertheless it is fundamentally correct." 
(25) Glover, discussing the resistance commonly found to 
the idea of infantile sexuality, and its unconscious 
existence in adults, was not hopeful: "I question whether 
man will ever take kindly to the view that he regulates his 
group affairs by laws which were originally fashioned in 
the jungle and are reaffirmed by every generation in the 
nursery." (26) 
Comfort (1960) proposed an interesting vindication of 
the Freudian theory of sexuality from the point of view of 
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evolutionary theory: "infantile sexuality, and its 
corollary the Oedipus complex, has a basis in aspects of 
the bodily prematurity which characterises humans (and 
other primates) as different from other mammals it is 
not impossible that by necessitating repression and a mind 
divided actively into conscious and unconscious levels they 
produced the most significant adaptation in mammalian 
history, the emergence of conceptual thought and 
symbolisation." (27) 
Two linguists have attempted to relate the ontogeny and 
phylogeny of language. Klein (1949) proposes a loosely 
recapitulationist model including gestural theories and 
phonological analysis of a range of contemporary languages. 
Lamendella (1976) constructs a strong argument for a 'neo-
recapitulationist theory of the origins of language', which 
integrates neotenic evolutionism with recent theories of 
language acquisition in children (Ferguson and Slobin, 
1973). He aims to show that recapitulation is present not 
only in physiological systems but also in cognitive and 
linguistic patterns of development. (28) The hypothesis of 
recapitulation is used to support the view that young 
children with so-called 'holophrastic' or one-word 
sentences do not thereby have the 'beginnings' of adult 
language but have their own system of meaning and 
communication; and that this is "a vestigial retention of 
prematurational stages of ancestral communication". An 
analogy is drawn between language acquisition and 
physiological processes, and Lamendella proposes also that 
crawling, for example, is not a first stage of walking or 
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running but "is in fact a modified recapitulation of an 
ancestral ontogenetic stage of cross-coordinated 
quadrupedal locomotion before the evolution of bipedal 
locomotion." (29) 
237 
The origins of writing 
The differences between the vocal/acoustic and 
gestural/visual concepts of the origins of language 
described above indicate how varying discourses tend to 
inflect their objects and their terms of reference. The 
'vocal' concept tends to find significance in the 
discontinuities between speech and other forms of 
communication, whereas the 'gestural' conceptualisation 
tends to establish connections between presymbolic and 
symbolic systems of behaviour, including language as 
speech. 
It would seem that Saussurean semiology, with its 
emphasis on the arbitrariness of the phonemic signifier, 
had tended to direct structuralists towards the first of 
these two conceptualisations of language. The first group 
tends to find discontinuities between presymbolic 
(natural) and symbolic (cultural) behaviours, which is 
directly reflected in Levi-strauss' comment that language 
must have been born "in one fell swoop". Levi-Strauss' 
concept of the symbolic has been described above, and the 
influence of this concept on Lacan's theory of subjectivity 
is well documented in secondary sources. (30) As the realm 
of signification, of the Law, and of prohibition, the 
Symbolic has been linked, by Lacan, to the realm of 
auditory perception and the function of the voice. Freud 
also established a connection between the form of the 
superego and the auditory sphere, as Isakower has noted. 
There would seem to be good reason to suggest that the 
emergence of language, on the evolutionary scale, was 
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inextricably bound up with the emergence, in the psyche, of 
the superego. This would hold true for both types of 
conceptualisations of language. If this were the case, it 
would also be necessary to speculate that this psychic 
transformation was reflected in changes in the social 
organisation of the human primates, entailing the 
internalisation of aggression through symbolisation, and 
the controlled, repeated, externalisation of aggression 
through the type of ritual violence suggested by Freud, 
Girard and Gans. The second part of this hypothesis has 
been discussed in Chapter 3 above and is not of direct 
significance here. The first part is directly relevant to 
the discussion of the origins of writing and speculation on 
the significance of different types of signifier. That the 
signifier is a fact that is simultaneously 'natural' and 
'cultural', gives meaning to the otherwise empty term 
"human nature". Durkheim's research into the signifier as 
a social fact provided the foundations of the structuralist 
edifice, which attribute, to the signifier, a central place 
in determining the reality and the meaning of sexual 
difference. I have argued that the three decades of 
theorising the place of sexual difference in human nature 
and society have greatly overemphasised the importance of 
the signifier. The bias towards social determinist 
theories of sexual difference in society has been 
maintained by the creation of its imaginary adversaries, 
"biological reductionism", "essentialism" and 
"psychologism". Not only have social determinists negated 
a broad range of theories and objects, but they have tended 
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to produce theories which are extremely conservative, even 
mysogynist. The Lacanian concept of the phallus as primary 
signifier of difference has been widely used by many 
feminisms, and is both essentialist and misogynistic. It 
is also, as I hope to demonstrate with historical case 
studies, inaccurate and misleading. 
The Lacanian concept refers to the status of the 
signifier in the unconscious, for which there is little 
direct empirical evidence. Most theories of representation 
in the unconscious establish its specificity vis-a-vis 
conscious language through theoretical speculation and 
through analysis of manifest signification. Freud's 
speculation dating from the earliest work, On Aphasia 
(1891), is based on the theory of the first topography -
the division of the psyche into systems Conscious, 
Preconscious and Unconscious. According to this 
topography, the Unconscious is differentiated from the 
other two levels, and each level has its own psychic 
function, its own type of signifying process (primary 
process or secondary process), its own type of signifying 
process (primary process or secondary process), its own 
type of energy (bound or unbound), and its own ideational 
content. These three levels are separated by barriers of 
censorship, more or less permeable. The least permeable is 
the barrier between the 'Systems Unconscious' and the other 
two levels, making the unconscious a qualitatively 
different form of psychic process and content. 
The conscious presentation comprises the 
presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the 
world belonging to it, while the unconscious 
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is: 
presentation is th: presentation of the thing alone. 
The system unconSCIOUS contains the thing - cathexes of 
the objects, the first and true object cathexes· the 
system Preconscious comes about by this thing- ' 
p:esentation being hypercathected through being linked 
wIth the word-presentations corresponding to it. (31) 
The diagrammatic form Freud gives to this formulation 
~Wvs+\' 
viM"-I tAc-fllt 
The signifier in the unconscious, according to Lacan, is 
primarily visual, it is the imago. But its materiality is 
less important than its path of displacement along the two 
axes of the primary process, the metaphoric and metonymic 
pathways. In the textual analysis of the three 
pictographic prehistoric scripts it seems that the 
representation of sexual difference follows different 
symbolic pathways with masculinity and femininity through 
metaphoric association. Two of the three scripts have a 
signifier of the phallus and although these predate 
classical antiquity (which is the historical origin that 
Lacan attributes to the significance of the phallus), these 
three scripts reveal some logic of gender classification, 
which includes the phallus as one term of difference. 
In selecting prehistoric 'transitional' scripts for 
textual analysis, some reference needs to be made to the 
history of writing. Derrida recommends that a history of 
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writing needs to be researched in order to challenge the 
"phonologl'sm" of Sa 1 ' 't ' d ussurean lnguls lCS, an suggests that 
a 'psychoanalysis graphology' might be an integral part of 
such a history (Derrida, 1978, p.23l). Certainly, some 
historical, empirical, context needs to be added to the 
textual analysis in order to substantiate interpretations. 
The history of writing has, at present, no unified theory 
or frame of reference. It is a variegated set of 
discourses, primarily archaeological records, centring 
around two strands; epigraphy, the study of inscriptions on 
hard materials such as clay and stone, and paleography, the 
history of ink on paper. 
The theoretical framework used in this study derives 
from the evolutionary paradigm which has been gradually 
elaborated in the previous chapters, and in the discussion 
of the origin of language. Within this paradigm it is 
possible to correlate the theories and methods of 
linguistics, anthropology and psychoanalysis. From this 
paradigm it is possible to challenge the idealist 
orthodoxies of cerebral primacy and to show how the related 
processes of paedomorphosis (extended dependency in young) 
and neoteny (the evolutionary influence of the species 
through foetal growth rates) are the basis of the most 
significant characteristics including language. It is also 
reasonable to claim that the immense significance of 
prematurity at birth and of extended helplessness during 
childhood has been overlooked in most pre-feminist theories 
of origins. The fact the human infancy has been considered 
unimportant in constructing the history of human adults is 
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probably due to the same causes as the fact that the human 
unconscious is consistently ignored, denied or overlooked 
in most historical theories of adults and their 
institutions. 
The evolutionary paradigm does more than provide 
substantiation of the interpretations arising from the 
'psychoanalysis graphology'. It can ascribe a fairly 
precise date to the evolutionary emergence of language and 
writing. The earliest evidence of ritual burial dates from 
500,000 years ago, and there is good reason for considering 
burial itself to be a form of symbolic behaviour, 
indicating a recognition of death and thus a psychological 
or at least emotional response to death. Written 
representation necessarily carries the significance of a 
permanent record. However the earliest evidence of visual 
representation, in maps, symbols and ritual mark-making is 
attributed to 250,000 years ago, in the Upper Paleolithic 
age, and the marks are considered to have had a ritualistic 
or magical function rather than a denotative one. The 
earliest denotative, historical symbolism emerged some 
5,000 to 4,000 years ago, bringing with it the transition 
to historical society: "with the invention of writing, and 
societies documented by the written word, and a surviving 
material culture." (32) 
The earliest records of historical notation are from 
Sumeria, 3,000 to 2,000 years BC and have survived well due 
to the cuneiform script imprinted into clay tablets. The 
Ancient Egyptian and Chinese scripts are known as 
'transitional' scripts, marking the transition between 
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purely pictorial representation and purely phonemic or 
alphabetic representation. In terms of semiotics, these 
scripts are ideographic, combining aspects of iconic, 
indexical and symbolic reference. Diringer (1948) notes 
that each of these three earliest transitional scripts was 
invested independently from the others, and that a number 
of these pre-alphabetic languages flourished and became 
extinct before the invention and dissemination of the 
alphabet. It seems that alphabetic, phonemic, writing was 
invented "in one fell swoop", spreading through cultural 
diffusion across all Middle Eastern and Mediterranean 
cultures, and throughout the world. 
A comparison of the three ideographic, pre-alphabetic 
scripts is an integral aspect of the history of writing. 
It can also raise useful questions for a contemporary 
theory of signification. The relation between linguistic 
and pre-linguistic aspects of representation remains one of 
the most paradoxical questions of semiotics, and this 
question is of especial importance to understanding the 
symbolic construction of gender difference. Without 
reducing the historical epoch of the pre-linguistic to the 
synchronic concept of the pre-linguistic, some useful 
comparisons can be made between those different forms of 
representation. Furthermore, each of the three 
transitional scripts includes the terms of sexual 
difference as a central structure within its lexicon. 
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The representation of sexual difference in three pre 
symbolic scripts (33) 
1 Sumerian (Early Cuneiform) writing (Figure 1) 
cuneiform writing consists of imprinting triangular 
marks on clay tablets with appropriate stick tools, this 
version is an early form with some pictographic elements 
within a largely ideographic system. 
It is immediately apparent that the representation of 
the sexes results from some form of classification which 
also contains reference to status difference. The sign 
denoting 'woman' is also, pictographically and 
conventionally, the sign for her sexual organs. The sign 
for 'man' is separate from the sign for his body parts 
(head, mouth) and penis, and a different sign exists for a 
man of royal status, the prince. A female slave and a 
female of royal status, however, are designated by the same 
pictographic unit for female (pudenda) in conjunction with 
an additional picteme (cloth, mountain); and the sign for a 
male servant uses the picteme 'penis' rather than the 
picteme 'man'. This complicated system of classification 
and 'naming' has, partly, to be explained with reference to 
the historical context of Ancient Mesopotamia, where the 
process of urbanisation, starting around 5,500 BC, created 
a polarisation of the population into city and country 
communities, with the urban centres assuming power in 
political hierarchy. The concept of 'mountain' or 'from 
the country' would serve to connote this political 
difference between urban and rural communities. However 
the logical classification of gender difference would seem 
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to correspond to Lacan's conceptualisation of the absence 
of signification of woman in the unconscious: MALE: FEMALE 
:: HUMAN: SEXUALITY, the 'castration' of woman would be 
signified by her representation as being reduced to her 
sexual organ. The absence of the representation of sexual 
difference in the unconscious being inverted, on the level 
of consciousness to be nothing but sexual difference. The 
relational equation could also be expressed as MALE : PENIS 
:: FEMALE: SELF. The coupling of male and female is 
represented as an aspect of femininity itself, and whereas 
the feminine remains identified as the site of the body, 
and sexuality, the man is an entity who 'transcends' (in De 
Beauvoir's vocabulary) the immanence of the body, and 
enters the realm of abstracted difference, the social 
realm. Meanwhile, woman, representing lack, remains 
undifferentiated from the body so signifying only through 
and because of her sexual difference. That this logical 
classification exists as part of a power hierarchy is 
evident in the representation of social class, the sexual-
bodily meaning is the debased meaning (male servant = 
'penis from the mountain') and a woman's sexual status is 
present in the representation of both slave and princess. 
But there are some complications in this classificatory 
system which inflect, and to some extent alter the meanings 
of male and female, and which show the influence of 'pre-
Oedipal' meanings on the logic of castration. For example, 
the sign for woman/pudendum ~ is a close visual homonym 
for the sign for bread/food ~, indicating an association 
between nurturance and femininity. This associative chain 
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leads us to the sign for belly, which is the synonym for 
both heart and interior; and this sign is one of the only 
abstract concepts represented in the iconic system. It is 
a visual sign for something of which we have no visual 
experience, its meaning is entirely metaphoric, and in this 
way comes close to being a symbol, with a purely arbitrary 
and conventional signification. There are two associative 
axes, the metonymic chain in which masculinity is 
represented through the relation (visual and logical) of 
'part' to 'whole'; and the metaphoric chain through which 
femininity is associated with food, belly, heart (love), 
and interiority (feelings, sensations?). 'Interiority' may 
also refer to the female sexual organ, vagina, as internal 
and 'hidden' as compared to the male organ. 
A second set of meanings which is significant here 
concerns the duplication of identical signs. The most 
elementary repetition refers to counting, numbers and 
numerical concepts such as time passing. I I to double, or 
multiply, and the anthropomorphic origin of numerical 
concepts is evident in the sign for addition xl which 
'1',- 'Y Y 
connotes human procreation. More interesting still is the 
L repetition of the sign M· 
prince, to form the sign 'hero' 
We could speculate as to why it should be necessary 
to have two separate concepts for ideals, when royalty acts 
as an unconscious symbol for an ideal or parent imago. 
What is the significance of the difference and of the 
doubling? Girard and Gans have noted the strong human 
capacity for mimesis, Freud and Roheim recognised the motif 
of the double, mirror image, twin, rival, imaginary friend, 
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shadow or 'doppelganger', as a transcultural and 
transhistorical theme. Girard notes that twins are often 
used, in some societies, as either sacrificial victims or 
as sacred deities; possibly because twins are a biological 
aberration in human reproduction or more likely because the 
concept of twin defies the laws of classification through 
binary opposition and thus becomes taboo. Psychologically, 
the idea of the double as visually experienced relation 
(more than the echo for instance) evokes deeply ambivalent 
feelings characteristic of the earliest infantile 
dependence, and dealt with through the most primitive 
defences of splitting and projection. The desire for union 
with the other is represented as blissful, and this 
imaginary return to infantile omnipotence underlies many of 
our ideas of the sublime as a religious force, and of love. 
But the merging of two into one is also an extremely 
frightening idea because of the primal aggression which is 
evoked by the double. Fusion means death, annihilation, 
and the rival must be fought unto death; Girard sees in 
this the mimetic rivalry and violence of the species, Lacan 
and Freud a more psychological notion of the aggressive 
drive. In the Sumerian script it seems that the hero is a 
representation of the process of identification itself, the 
experience undergone by the unconscious of the reading 
subject as his ego is interpellated through the circuit of 
signification set up by the text. The reader is 
temporarily reunited, through primary identification, with 
another's interior world exteriorised in the text, and the 
reading self loses his difference and isolation. That an 
248 
exterior signifier is the necessary catalyst of this 
psychological process has been argued by Lacan in The 
Mirror stage as Formative of the Function of the I (1949), 
which would support his view that identification is so 
structured for the human subject that "the signifier 
represents the subject for another signifier". Freud has 
also noted that doubling is used, in the dreamwork, as a 
defence against the idea of castration ("This invention of 
the doubling as a preservation against extinction has its 
counterpart in the language of dreams, which is fond of 
representing castration by a doubling or mUltiplication of 
a genital symbol" SE XVII, p.235). Yet, as we have seen, 
the theme of the double also refers back to the primacy of 
the physical and psychological to the mother, the ideal ego 
of the Imaginary being a projection, forwards, of a memory 
of primary narcissism; a stage at which the infant was 
omnipotently suspended in the mother's "primary material 
preoccupation". 
2 Ancient Egyptian script (Figure 2) 
This is again a transitional script, between the 
pictographic signs of the earlier systems and the fully 
phonetic hieroglyphic scripts of the Egyptian New Kingdoms 
(1,500 Be). The ideographic system does seem to contain 
some evidence of a form of binary classification operating 
in its semantic structure, and the later Egyptian 
vocabulary did contain words of antithetical meaning as 
noted in Abel's philological essay (18a). How then is 
sexual difference encoded within this system? The signs 
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~ and ~ denote man and woman and carry the additional 
meaning 'first person' and 'first and second person'. 
Thus the semantic unit 'man' is also the grammatical 
category 'first person singular', whereas woman also 
signifies a plurality of voices, or at least an 'I' and 
'You', an intersubjectivity or possibly an intrasubjective 
relationship. As in the Sumerian script, an associative 
axis of visual resemblance connects the sign for woman and 
the sign for 'God or divine person', and woman bears a 
closer resemblance to the latter sign than to the supposed 
complement of 'man'. Once again there is a division of 
labour which hinges on the opposition active-passive for 
the actions of praying, worship and entreaty are denoted by 
the male figure, and the female form is associated with the 
object of this action, the divinity towards whom this 
religious activity is directed. (Egyptian deities of this 
epoch were mostly male-animal hybrids, so it is not their 
explicit content or identity that is female, but their 
meaning). The connection between divinity and femininity 
is also made in signs @ and (jj; ~ signifies 'phallus, 
front, male, masculine, procreate', and the small oval ~ 
signifies 'woman, goddesses and cities'. In a larger form 
the oval becomes a cartouche 0), which was used to 
encircle a name to indicate royalty. Royalty and divinity 
were similarly linked for the Ancient Egyptians. A 
striking similarity with the Sumerian script is the 
metonymic and iconic axis of meaning which connects the 
meanings around masculinity and the metaphoric, symbolic 
axis around which femininity is signified. The ovum used 
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to denote 'woman, goddesses, cities' is not an iconic 
equivalent to the penis (the human ovum was not discovered 
until the late nineteenth century, by the embryologist 
Louis Bolk) but at most an indexical sign, possibly 
denoting eggs or grain of other species or the concept of 
the vagina as encircling the penis. It is more likely that 
it is purely symbolic, referring to unconscious meanings of 
a home, mother, the concept of a 'container'. In contrast, 
the sign of the male is the erect and ejaculating penis or 
phallus, an iconic sign derived metonymically from the male 
body. Male thus means single, unitary (first person), 
frontal, phallic, procreative and active. Female means a 
pair (first and second person, plurality), and carries more 
abstract and metaphoric meanings of divinity and of 
domicile. 
This too accords with the Freudian hypothesis that it 
is the femininity of each sex which succumbs to repression 
in the resolution of the Oedipus complex, with masculinity 
and the male sexual organ having the function of signifying 
sexual difference. This would also confirm the Lacanian 
hypothesis that it is the phallus as signifier rather than 
organ which structures the primal repression, and that this 
Oedipal repression is structured like a metaphoric 
substitution. 
A further series of relations of equivalence could be 
noted here, first person: first and second persons :: 
human : divine being 
man: human :: woman: divine being 
furthermore, femininity is closely associated with writing 
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through the metaphoric associations of the ideograms for 
'cartouche' CIi) Roll of papyrus, which also denotes tying 
up, binding together, and a conclusion CDD and the symbol 
(CD for document, to 'group together' or categorise, and 
abstract ideas. The visual resemblance of these signs can 
be understood as deriving from the belief, held by the 
Ancient Egyptians that their hieroglyphs were a divine gift 
(Derrida, 1978, P.208) and Fillmore, 1976, p.20) and that 
the act of writing held religious meaning until the script 
became increasingly cursive and was transformed into a 
demotic rather than hieratic writing (Diringer, p.114). 
A striking, but obscure, series of relationships exists 
between the representation of 'lack, or negation' and the 
representation of hair. A comparison of signs @J .. \',ll\ and 
CDD 11 shows that the concepts of hair and of lack are 
related in some way. Also the ideogram for 'hair' also can 
mean 'bald', another example of antithetical meaning in 
Ancient Egyptian language noted by Abel. This curiously 
polysemic sign carries the additional meanings of colour, 
complexion, perhaps referring indexically to the facial 
characteristics accompanying the hair or hairlessness of a 
man, and the more abstract meanings of 'lack, want, and 
lacunae in manuscripts'. This particular sign exists as an 
iconic, indexical and symbolic sign, and each level of its 
signification seems to carry quite distinct meanings. A 
more stylised version of this sign CDD carries the 
symbolic meaning alone, denoting a purely abstract concept 
'negation' and also 'no, not, nothing, lack, want, need'. 
There seems to be little doubt that the concept of negation 
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is connected, in some way, to sexual difference, and this 
is true of the Egyptian script whilst not for the Sumerian 
script. The Sumerian sign for negation is simply iconic, 
t a line crossed out. 
Why should hair become the signifier of lack, denoting 
its opposite as well as 'the hair of men and animals'? A 
psychoanalytic reading would stress the sexual significance 
of hair, as an unconscious symbol. A Lacanian reading 
might emphasise the significance of facial hair as a visual 
mark of sexual difference in sexually mature adults. 
possibly the additional meanings of pubic hair, which both 
sexes have as adults, might serve as a representation of 
castration, and its denial. Lacan suggests that: 
The phallus can only play its role as veiled, that 
is, as in itself the sign of the latency with which 
everything signifiable is struck as soon as it is 
raised to the function of signifier. The phallus is 
the signifier of this Aufbehung itself which is why it 
inaugurates by its own disappearance. This is why the 
de m 0 n 0 f A l () w--:> ( S c ham, s ham e) i nth e an c i en t my s t e r i e s 
rises up exactly at the moment when the phallus is 
unveiled. ( .•. ) a condition of complementarity is 
produced by the signifier in the founding of the 
subject: which explains his Spaltung as well as the 
intervening movement through which this is effected. 
(34) 
So the sign for phallus, although it denotes the penis 
in its Aufbehung (for both Egyptians and sumerians), is not 
veiled and therefore signifies the function of the penis, 
procreation, whilst some other signifier must service to 
signify the lack and difference which would normally, 
unconsciously, be signified by the phallus. This function 
is represented by writing itself, the lines of the marks in 
signs ® and @ undergo a transformation from iconic to 
symbolic, and by the time they signify 'negation' the 
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traces come to represent the graphic marks made by the 
scribe, and the magic of symbolic representation itself. 
The religious function of writing has already been noted, 
and the psychological significance of this can also be read 
in signs ® and ®, both of which denote a roll of 
papyrus, perhaps itself a 'veiled' body at a time when the 
meaning of writing was known to very few, and only priests 
at that~. Sign <23) has additional meanings of 'tie 
up, and bind together', which accords with the idea of 
duality or the bringing together of two parts connoted by 
the sign for woman, but also means 'to come to an end'. 
This reference to ending, closure, perhaps narrative 
closure or grammatical closure, perhaps death or 
castration, is echoed in the following sign ® by a 
reference to 'abstract ideas'. It has been suggested that 
the capacity to conceptualise narrative closure is 
predicated on Oedipal triangulation (Barthes, 1966, p.124) 
and is linked to the capacity to understand sentences. 
Certainly, symbolisation requires the capacity to recognise 
loss and negation, as Freud's analysis of the Fort-Da game 
has shown, but the loss and absence which is worked through 
in symbolisation (whether in the sign of the cotton reel, 
the repetitions, the phonemes, or in 'words') is not 
necessarily structured in finite articulations. 
The transitional scripts of the sumerians and 
Egyptians display some of the characteristics of our own 
linguistic structures, and thus confirm some of the 
Lacanian hypotheses on the centrality of systems of 
signification in the formation of a 'divided subject' and 
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in the categorisation of ideas into a logic of 
'complementarity'. However, the status of these, mostly, 
pre-symbolic scripts as ideographic and pictographic 
systems of signification means that they do not accord with 
the Saussurean conceptualisation of the signifier, nor with 
a fully arbitrary and conventional linguistic system. 
As the materiality of the signifier is of especial 
importance in presymbolic systems of signification our 
comparison of these transitional scripts must discuss this 
aspect of their meaning. The Sumerian writing is either 
inscribed with a sharp implement, or indented with pressure 
through a triangular shaped stick (cuneiform) onto soft 
clay, which once hardened becomes potentially permanent. 
Here the signifiers are materially absent, the impression 
of the stick into the soft clay leaves a negative imprint, 
an empty space. Also, of unconscious significance, the act 
of writing is penetrative and more or less forceful. 
The Egyptians, inventing paper from the papyrus plant, 
pioneered the technique of layering ink or paint on flat 
light transportable sheets, although engraving, inscription 
and painting onto permanent surfaces was also common. The 
use of pigment on paper with brushes and pens gives 
signifiers of linear, threadlike, traces of one material 
superimposed upon another. The act of writing is less 
penetrative and perhaps more analogous to touch, a contact 
between surfaces: it is also closer to the purely symbolic 
form of writing in the relative immateriality of the 
signifier. 
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PICTOGRAMS 
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Ancient Chinese transitional script (Figure three) 
The Ancient Chinese used brush and ink on cloth and on 
pottery, combining the use of pictographic, ideographic and 
some phonetic elements. Even contemporary scripts retain 
some ideographic features, and the use of brush and ink , 
which reduces the separation between iconic and symbolic 
signification in Chinese culture. 
In this script the representation of sexual difference 
is almost completely figurative and non-metaphoric. The 
pictogram for woman comprises the element for man with the 
addition of breasts and a kneeling position. The female 
function of mother is denoted transparently compared to the 
heavily encoded layers of maternal symbolism in the 
Egyptian script. A pictogram for child exists alongside 
the concepts of man and woman, again an almost figurative 
denotation of the characteristics of enlarged head and 
outstretched arms (the clinging impulse). The highly 
imagistic nature of this Chinese writing suggests that this 
script maintains the least amount of culturally directed 
division between conscious and unconscious signification. 
The images are the words and, rather than metaphoric 
substitution of new abstract signifiers for older visual-
denotative signifiers, the phonetic script combines visual 
elements in ideograms of increasing complexity. 
Diringer claims that these three transitional scripts 
were invented independently of one another, within 1,000 
years of one another. The alphabet, on which all non-
ideographic contemporary writing is based, was only 
invented once and then spread through cultural diffusion. 
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All western scripts are based on the alphabet which started 
out as a North Semitic Hebrew alphabet in 1,100 BC, and 
which was used and amended by the Phoenicians, Aramaeans, 
Greeks, Etruscans and Romans in turn. From the invention 
of the alphabet writing has used arbitrary and conventional 
signs almost exclusively, and has been mostly cursive 
script, using ink on paper, until the invention of the 
printing press. 
Some of the decodings we have made of the oriental and 
middle eastern scripts from 4,000 to 6,000 years ago are 
bound to be distorted through the ethnocentric biases of 
twentieth century European culture. Similarly the English 
language equivalents given by Diringer for the Sumerian and 
Egyptian concepts are bound to be approximate. But there 
are nevertheless some clearly marked and repeated motifs 
and themes in the representation of sexual difference and 
lexical classification. 
Some Conclusions 
There is nothing in the history and prehistory of speech 
which corresponds to Levi-Strauss' idea of a sudden 
transition into a world of meaning, although different 
theorists place more or less emphasis on the continuities 
between pre-symbolic and symbolic forms of communication 
and behaviour. However, if we consider the invention of 
the alphabet, language encoded into a visual system 
recording, with greater or lesser permanence, the 
conventional and arbitrary signifiers of phonetic system, 
then Levi-Strauss' concept of a single and sudden 
transition corresponds to a historical truth. If the 
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sphere of the Symbolic, in structural terms, is not only 
the codes governing the production of meaning in the 
'langue' of spoken language, and its analogues in cultural 
systems of classification, but also the writing of that 
language, the circuit between verbal, auditory and visual 
signifiers, then the Symbolic can be said to coincide with 
the end of prehistory and the beginning of history, with 
the invention of writing in Sumeria 4,000 years Be. 
The questions uncovered by considering the history and 
origins of speech and language, from its probable invention 
in the Upper Paleolithic to the formalisations in the 
earliest pictographic and transitional scripts, a time span 
of some 40,000 years, are more complicated. This is a 
short time when measured in the phylogenetic scale, and as 
we have seen, the rapid changes undergone by the hominid-
human population during this time have to be explained by 
mechanisms, like paedomorphosis, which combine genetic and 
extra-genetic transmission of instinct and behaviour. This 
interface is the object traditionally studied by the social 
sciences, humanities and psychology, and yet this time 
scale is much wider than that used in the traditional 
social sciences. using a psychoanalytic model we can 
suggest, without contention, that during these 40,000 years 
of the transition to genus homo, and homo sapiens (or, as 
we described above, as Homo symbolicans) a material culture 
based on tool-making, symbol-using and changes in 
ecological environment, co-evolved with the human psyche. 
The psyche and the symbolic material culture could be seen 
as the 'internal' and 'external' correlates of a long 
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phylogenetic, biological and social transformation. 
What can the prehistory of language and writing tell 
us about the prelinguistic experiences and reality of 
ontogenetic development today? We have argued that a 
complex inverse 'recapitulationism' characterises the 
biological, anatomical and psychological relation between 
ontogeny and phylogeny. This IS not to resurrect the 
incorrect and cliched concept of prehistory as the 
'infancy' of mankind, but to suggest that there is a way in 
which infancy is the history of mankind. 
The human capacity for culture, language, 
symbolisation and its internal corollary, the psyche as 
structured by the dynamic unconscious, and the agencies of 
id, ego and superego, is a biologically given capacity for 
potential change and adaptation. This view is most 
strongly supported by both archaeological evidence and by 
evolutionary theory. It is a formulation also arrived at 
from a different route, by psychoanalysis, using evidence 
from paediatric medicine and observations of children. As 
Winnicott has put it: 
cultural experience is differentiated from psychic 
reality and external reality. It is neither inside nor 
outside. It is play (non-instinctual activity), it is 
neither 'me' nor 'not me' but, like a transitional 
object is a representation of the fusion between self 
and object. ( .• ) it is 'potential space'. (35) 
The relation of fusion between self and object has a 
special relation to sexual difference, and investigating 
the cultural representation of sexual difference we find a 
nearly universal contradiction between the idea of two 
sexes as complementary and a deep-rooted belief in their 
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non-complementarity. This contradiction could be said to 
be between what is known, possibly rationally and at least 
is said or professed, about women being equivalent to men 
as adults, workers, members of class, ethnic groups, 
institutions or nations, and what is felt to be true of 
women in general. It is a contradiction possibly between 
conscious thoughts and unconscious beliefs. 
What I have characterised, rather schematically and 
narrowly, as the structuralist position in which the 
sociology and psychology of women is described in terms of 
Levi-strauss, Lacan and the early Freud, the castration 
complex is understood as the lynchpin holding together the 
conscious and unconscious systems, or the Symbolic, 
Imaginary and Real spheres. A disorder of the articulation 
of these systems results in an inability to acknowledge the 
reality of sexual difference, resulting in the denials of 
some aspect of that reality as found in perversion, 
fetishism, neurosis and psychosis. More generally, as 
applied to the analysis of cultural systems, this theory 
explains that 'Woman' is feared, despised, avoided or 
punished because she carries the meaning, in the 
unconscious, of castration. This theory is based on the 
early Freudian theory of phallic monism, the view that 
psychological development in the pre-Oedipal stages is 
identical for both sexes, with neither girls nor boys 
having knowledge of the vagina until puberty. 
Some non-standard psychoanalysts have proposed 
significant amendments to this theory, a theory that Freud 
f h o IOf and himself was coming to doubt by the end 0 IS 1 e, 
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have suggested that there is a different pre-Oedipal 
development in boys and girls. Horney, Klein, Jones and 
more recently Erikson have concluded that early female 
sexuality exists as a different structure, and that the 
psychic development of boys and girls differs in the pre-
Oedipal as well as Oedipal phases, and that there are 
corresponding differences in the structure of the 
unconscious in adult men and women. Each includes the idea 
that there is some unconscious knowledge, through sensory 
experience, or innate knowledge, of the vagina of pre-
pubertal girls, and that corresponding anxieties and 
defences exist in the ego structure of adult women. The 
vagina being internal and unseen is not represented in the 
external world of cultural experience. Klein states that a 
very early Oedipal wish, in both sexes, is the wish to bear 
and feed children, and that this wish in its repressed form 
is found in many aspects of adult activity. Horney starts 
from a feminist and culturalist analysis and builds her 
psychological hypotheses from her theoretical framework. 
Jones, oscillating between the standard and the Kleinian 
schools of thought, eventually gravitated towards a theory 
of innate psychological difference for which he was much 
criticised by the Lacanians. More recently Erikson's 
studies of children's play have shown that girls tend to 
play with and construct internal spaces, whilst boys 
actively explore external space; and a range of feminist 
debates has developed within this framework over the past 
ten years. All the theories mentioned above are 
. h . based on phallic monism, which Incompatible with t eorles 
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emphasise the importance of the castration complex, the 
intervention of the Symbolic into the Imaginary dyad, the 
function of language in structuring the psychological 
significance of sexual difference. In the three 
transitional scripts discussed above a broad range of 
meanings are associated with the concepts of male and 
female. Also the categories of sexual difference occupy 
different structural positions within the lexical systems 
themselves, in relation to the other significant aspects of 
the natural and social environment. Some of the meanings 
associated with the concept of woman centre on the body as 
the site of sexuality, or of a debased subjectivity, 
evident from the hierarchy within which the other 
signifying units are combined. Yet Sumerian culture seems 
to have been matrilineal with a number of female deities, 
and was certainly not the most patriarchal of societies. 
For the Egyptians woman signifies both 'fusion' and the 
sacred. The Chinese refer man and woman to the concept of 
the child, which is unusual in the lexical systems of 
transitional scripts. In all three cases the assymetrical 
set of meanings, the relation of non-complementarity, 
invokes complex metaphoric chains linking femaleness to 
interiority, food, love, containment, intersubjectivity, 
multiplicity. We could interpret that 'w~man' represents 
"the fusion of self and object" because of her biological 
and psychological function as mother. yet the subjective 
experience is, emotionally, as violent at the "mimetic 
crisis" identified by Girard and Gans as the historical 
origin of symbolic behaviour in human groups. 
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without rewriting the story of the primal parricide 
with female protagonists, it is plausible that 'woman' is 
the primal victim. As one of the most fundamental of 
psychic representations and as the object of much infantile 
aggression, 'woman' must have become one of the most 
violently ambivalent internal objects. Today, when women 
are victimised, as women, the process is quite specific to 
the nature of the contradiction between conscious thoughts 
and unconscious beliefs. The form taken by this particular 
cultural process, and similar processes involving 
scapegoating such as racism, is best understood in terms of 
the infantile predicament of protracted dependence. The 
infantile distress and helplessness, the internalisation of 
aggression through psychosocial agencies such as the 
superego, and the primitive defences of splitting, 
projection and denial are fundamental to structures and 
institutions of cultural abuse. The representation of the 
mother is the first object of violence, of guilt, and the 
mechanism of denial is the most common defence against 
knowledge of this aggression. 
It has been suggested that the castration complex is a 
secondary reaction formation, a kind of denial of primary 
aggression, which serves to protect the immature ego from 
its own capacity for sadism, and from the recognition of 
The the biological inadequacy of the Oedipal child (26). 
most common form of oppression suffered by women is the 
covert sadism of disguised, denied and disowned unconscious 
aggression. As daughters, sisters, lovers, wives and 
t d by both sexes, as adults mothers, women are scapegoa e , 
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repeat the infantile attacks on the imago of the body of 
the mother. 
Feminism has struggled to theorise gender difference in 
terms other than anatomical difference of reproductive 
organs, as this seemed to mimic the logic of ideologies of 
sexism. Whilst there does seem to be some psychoanalytic 
evidence to support the view that anatomical difference has 
meaning, in the form of unconscious knowledge of the vagina 
in girls and equivalent forms of sexual identity in women, 
the most important biological basis of the psychical 
significance of sexual difference is the evolution of the 
difference between men and women in their social, economic, 
institutional structures and this has to be understood, not 
only in terms of the 'psychical consequences of the 
anatomical differences between the sexes' (Freud, 1925), 
but in terms of the vast differences between infant and 
adult. The differences which are manifested in the Oedipus 
complex and in pre-Oedipal sUbjectivity. 
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conclusion: the politics of representation 
The most extreme forms of social oppression, such as 
genocide and political persecution, are no different in 
their fundamental structure, from the ideologies that 
inform the daily life of contemporary Britain. Just as 
pathology and normality exist on a continuum, so extreme 
oppression and the habits of everyday thinking share a 
fundamental structure. The main example I shall elaborate 
is to compare projection as a part of normal psychic 
functioning, and ordinary thinking, with the extreme forms 
of projection in ideology which have led to brutality and 
persecution. The concept of a continuum that exists 
between extreme forms and ordinary life is not uniquely 
Freudian. Althusser's synthesis of Marx's "structuralism" 
with Lacanian theory contends that there is a continuum 
between ordinary subjectivity and extreme forms of social 
exploitation. Althusser's theory, described in detail in 
chapter 1, needs to be reformulated if it is to utilize the 
insights produced by feminism and psychoanalysis. I have 
explored the possible uses of Althusser's concept of 
"omni-historical reality" in chapter 2 when considering the 
question of origins and the superego. The resulting 
combination of Marxist analysis, of class contradiction 
structuralist analysis of symbolic systems, and 
psychoanalysis of unconscious phantasy is offered in 
relation to historical examples of racism. 
The specific reformulation proposed here concerns the 
thesis that ideology "interpellates individuals as 
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subjects". By historical analysis of the process by which 
this takes place, in relation to both genocide and milder 
, 
no less systematic, symbolic annihilation, "interpellation" 
can be redefined. Traditionally it has been the 
intersubjective and the linguistic aspects of 
interpellation that have been emphasized in explaining this 
process. Althusser gives the example of the subject 
"hailed" by the appellation, "Hey You!". However, the 
question of what it is that makes the listening subject 
respond to the call with the response of "Who, me?", 
remains obscure. I contend that the interpellating process 
is intersubjective and linguistic only in a secondary 
sense, since the condition for a response is primarily an 
intrapsychic structure. It is the superego of the 
listening subject that receives the appellation and directs 
it to the ego. The conflict betwen superego and ego, 
founded on unconscious guilt, is reflected in the 
intersubjective exchange of the interpellation. To 
summarise, we are interpellated as ideological subjects 
through unconscious guilt, it is the superego that hails 
"us". We have explored the theory concerning the 
interaction of aggression, syntax, language and the 
superego, in chapter 2. 
What are the practical consequences of this 
reformulation of Althusser's thesis. particularly, the 
concern of this thesis is to theorise the relation between 
knowledge, representation and sexual difference. How can 
this reformulation help to answer the initial question of 
the thesis: b 
?" 
"Why is it so difficult to think a out women. 
269 
In the introduction it was suggested that the 
polarisation of unconscious and conscious knowledge, in the 
form of the opposition between intuition and reason cannot 
be useful. Often the overvaluation of reasoning is used to 
conceal a fundamental irrationality on another level of 
thinking. Intuition, based on the recognition of emotional 
facts, is the only method of discerning the operation of 
fundamental irrationalities, when these are concealed by 
superficial reasoning or systematisation. Psychoanalysis, 
since Freud, has noted the resemblances between the 
apparent orderliness of intellectual systems, such as 
philosophies, and the elegant, systematic, delusions of 
mental disorders such as paranoia. Paranoia projects its 
"chaos", an unconscious phantasy, into an external object 
and builds elaborate, over-rationalised systems of meaning 
in order to defend the self from the fear of the chaos. 
Intuition, although apparently less systematic than 
reasoning, is a necessary component of the production of a 
better understanding of sexual difference, and its cultural 
misrepresentations. Emotional truth has traditionally been 
thought of as part of female knowledge. This aspect of 
tradition, which has coined the term "feminine intuition", 
is a useful one. I suggest that when allied with the 
understanding of general scientific method, and 
psychoanalytic metapsychology, feminine intuition is an 
integral part of feminist theory and self-reflexive 
science. The association of the female form of knowledge 
with intuition derives largely from our predisposition, 
either biologically and psychologically, towards 
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recognising and responding to emotional needs and 
attachments. As linked with the work of mothering, women 
tend to try where possible to nurture or sustain emotional 
attachment. This side of reality is often more obscure to 
men, and is less valued by them. It has been suggested, in 
chapter one, that this devaluation of feminine forms of 
knowledge by men may be based on unconscious envy. Woman's 
capacity to be closely identified with her infant and to 
find, in this emotional interaction, a repetition of the 
lost attachment to the mother of childhood, often seems 
enviable to men who must accept the loss of the childhood 
mother as absolute. 
The use of intuition in the clinical application of 
psychoanalysis is well documented in the substantial 
literature on the concept of countertransference. The 
consequences of recognition of intuitive thought for 
academic disciplines is more difficult to determine. We 
know that the discourses of academic subjects are not the 
products of reasoning alone. Institutional politics, State 
policy, funding, technological changes, and cultural forces 
influence the forms of educational practice. With 
Foucauldian theory and also with deconstructionist 
criticism in the 1970s and 1980s, the critique of the 
autonomy of academic subject areas and scientific method 
began to be formulated. Historical analysis of the origin 
and development of anthropology, has emphasised its basis 
in certain economic and political structures such as 
European imperialism and the colonial administration. 
value of this type of historical analysis is 
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The 
unquestionable; but these decades also produced an 
accompanying ideology which could be described as an attack 
As an on the concepts of "reality", "truth" and "science". 
attack, this ideology went well beyond the simple 
problematisation or questioning of the tacit assumptions of 
these concepts. It often started from the assumption that 
reality and truth should be thought of as effects of 
textual structure, and that science was the ideological 
product of a nineteenth century bourgeois culture. The 
more useful aspects of a questioning of authority led to 
the politics of transformation rather than transgression, 
and to a rethinking of the concept of identity as an 
important new field of political and theoretical 
investigation. It seems that these incentives towards 
critical questioning, despite their divergent forms - from 
counterculture, student politics, to textual analysis and 
theoretical practice, can be linked in so far as they 
represent a particular Oedipal configuration. One 
narrative theme common to many of these forms of radicalism 
was that of an attack on the concept of the father, and a 
common aim was the 'overthrow' of paternal law. This 
unconscious configuration can more easily be seen, with 
hindsight, in many of the practices of the preceding 
decade. (1) 
It is useful to bear in mind this Oedipal structure of 
authority and authorship when examining the 
institutionalised boundaries between academic disciplines 
and sciences today. The boundaries between academic 
disciplines, and sciences, are partly real and partly 
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defensive. The objects of sciences do differ as F . 
, ranCOlS 
Jacob has described, although they are not completely 
autonomous. Sometimes, when there is an increased degree 
of resemblance between the object of one discipline and 
another, the boundaries between the disciplines become 
defensively over-rationalised or over-regulated. Freud 
called this "secondary elaboration". We have seen that the 
defensive use of difference has been particularly evident 
in the relation between anthropology and psychoanalysis. 
To use an analogy from anthropology, the differences 
between academic disciplines can function like totemic 
thinking, each discipline having its own genealogy of 
founding fathers, authors, and authority, just as each 
totemic clan traces its genealogy upwards through its totem 
species. Whereas totemism sets up rules governing the 
interchange of mar i tal partners, 'k insh ip' and exogamy, the 
academic clans are subject to rules governing the 
interchange of ideas and concepts from one discourse to 
another, a discipline's 'specificity'. The underlying 
unconscious phantasy may be similar in these two instances 
of controlled interchange, an unconscious phantasy of 
controlling the sexuality or fertility of the Oedipal 
parents. Similar defensive boundaries exist between 
Marxism and feminism, and indeed wherever feminist practice 
attempts to question masculine values in institutionalised 
knowledge. Feminism has repeatedly argued for, and 
demonstrated the reality of, the inseparability of 
subjective and objective forms of knowledge. This argument 
or insight has been unacceptable to most academic 
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institutions, as they are presently organised. Freud, 
although ultimately a rationalist, produced a science which 
outlined the obstacles in the path of reason. He 
recognised, named and explained the unconscious phantasies 
and thoughts that shape consciousness and our relation to 
reality. Psychoanalysis shows these unconscious thoughts 
and phantasies and the fact of human emotional attachment 
to be the legacy of human evolution, a product of 
paedomorphic evolution and our extended dependence during 
infancy. The resultant Oedipus complex is thus seen as the 
driving force behind human cultural and social achievement, 
or what Freud called "civilisation". 
We have used this theory and have argued for its 
applicability to the cultural formation. We have also 
explored the limitations of Freud's theory of female 
subjectivity. The limitations of Freudian theory are 
identified as the misrecognition of the pre-Oedipal 
structures of subjectivity and the resulting misrecognition 
of the meaning of femininity. Lacanian theory is similarly 
criticised for its exclusive focus on the part played by 
language, the symbolic and the castration complex in 
forming subjectivity. 
An alternative textual analysis of the symbolic 
representation of sexual difference is offered in chapter 
3. The selection of three proto-historic scripts 
facilitates the comparison of different forms of the 
signifier, and supports a critique of the Freudian-Lacanian 
hypothesis of psychic phallic monism. The concept of the 
. ... d 
phallus as primary signifier of difference IS crItIcIse 
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from a historical perspective. The many meanings of female 
symbolism are discussed in terms of pre-Oedipal 
subjectivity. The work of Jones, Klein, Winnicott, Benedek 
and Horney on female sexuality is quoted, showing that some 
post-Freudians have focussed more on the dyadic structures 
preceding the Oedipus complex. The emphasis on the two 
person relationship that is transformed into the Oedipal 
triangle reveals the power of pre-Oedipal thoughts, 
feelings and phantasies in determining adult behaviour and 
identity, and in shaping many cultural and social forms. 
In chapters 1 and 3 we examine the way in which this 
affects the perception, representation and social position 
of women. The prolonged dependence of infants on maternal 
care, experienced and remembered without the intermediary 
of language and symbolism, leaves a profound psychological, 
emotional and physical impact. The fact that women are 
universally treated in an irrational way ranging from 
thoughtlessness to extreme cruelty is evidence of the very 
great difficulty men and women have in fully recognising 
the fact of this early dependence on a woman. Winnicott's 
essay on the mother's contribution to society is used to 
explain this process, as is Klein and Riviere'S study of 
men's envy of women in Hate, Greed and Aggression. 
It was proposed, in the introduction, that when the 
social position of women is understood in the light of 
theories of early dependence the resultant politiCS of 
feminism will be inextricably interlinked with the politics 
of anti-racism. This connection can be demonstrated at the 
level of theoretical and historical analysis, when racism 
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is shown to have roots in the pre-Oedipal unconscious 
phantasies that also determine the representation of sexual 
difference. The economic roots of racist ideologies, in 
the colonial expansion of imperialist Europe well 
documented. The political basis of institutional racism, 
in law, policing, housing, employment, education, medical 
welfare and culture, is also becoming increasingly well 
documented and recognised (2). It is proposed that a 
theoretical understanding of the psychic defence mechanisms 
of "splitting" and "projection" confirms the intuitive 
understanding of racism of those who have been subject to 
it. The intuitive knowledge that one is being irrationally 
hated, or treated as an object of cultural danger, fear or 
contempt is supported and confirmed by psychoanalytic 
theory. We shall discuss the view of anti-semitism as a 
disturbance of the Oedipus complex as proposed by Wangh 
(3). Then Klein and Riviere's analysis of pre-Oedipal 
aggression is used to argue that racism works by projecting 
the experience of aggression onto the external concept of 
'dirt'. 
If we start with the distinction between real or 
imagined differences it must be recognised that the concept 
of race is not a scientific concept. 'Races' do not exist, 
in any biological sense. The categorisation of humans as a 
species includes the differentiation between a number of 
blood types, which can be differentiated absolutely, and a 
range of physical and ethnic variations which are not 
absolute categories. 
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distinct 
division of humans into races, as biologically 
populations, was formally proposed by Linnaeus in 
the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment's rationalist 
The 
attempts at producing a systematic classification of the 
living world led him to classify organism into species and 
sub-species, or 'genus' and 'type'. This taxonomy remained 
in use until the middle of the twentieth century when 
'population' replaced 'type' as a concept and as a method 
of classification. Until then the genus homo was thought 
of as having several subspecies types such as Asiaticus, 
Afer, Americanus, etc. A species was defined as a breeding 
group, and this classification still holds true. But the 
Linnaean classification was conducted by meticulous visual 
observation of the outer appearance of every type of 
organism. Every visual clue was noted and features of 
species such as numbers of leaves, wings, limbs, size, 
shape and colouring were used to distinguish between the 
different types within species and, before Mendelian 
genetics introduced the study of chromosomes, visual clues 
were used to establish the difference between species. 
Much theoretical controversy existed, and still exists, 
over the question of how new species corne into existence. 
Darwin overturned the religious doctrine of the 
immutability of species. But the taxonomy of Homo sapiens 
divided into subspecies and homo Asiaticus, Homo Afer and 
. . f . d Homo Americanus maintained a hold on the sCIentl IC an 
popular imagination. Eventually certain technological and 
political advances changed scientific thinking. The 
political advances were those brought about by anti-racist 
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movements and the Civil Rights activists in the USA in the 
nineteen-sixties. The technological changes were those 
brought about by molecular genetics, enabling species to be 
compared through comparison of genetic information. 
Comparisons can be made of the 'closeness' or 'remoteness' 
of a species from any other, by identifying the exact 
historical time at which a species "branched off" from its 
ancestral population. In other words, in the history of 
science a historical method of comparing species has 
replaced a visual method. Although the genetic material is 
initially identified by being made visible under an 
electron microscope, the classification of genetic 
difference is not made in terms of a logic of visibility. 
This European tradition of the overvaluation of visual 
perception as an arbiter of reality and truth has been 
discussed in chapter 1. It was noted that the cultural 
equation of vision with knowledge, and the psychological 
association between vision and control have much in common. 
The consequences of this analogy have been discussed in so 
far as it has a structuring function in the representation 
of sexual difference. Visual dominance in the realm of 
sense data and knowledge is inextricably connected to the 
theory of phallic monism. perhaps the overvaluation of 
visual perception is also an aspect of the phallic phase of 
psychic development. The way in which psychoanalysis 
explores this dynamic is of great use in understanding the 
unconscious roots of racism. 
Something is projected onto the ethnic other through 
the stigmata of visible difference. 
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Different aspects of 
human subjectivity, disavowed and denied by a dominant 
culture are unacceptable to European narcissism and are 
ascribed to Asian others, African others, West Indian 
others, Semitic others, etc. 
There are certain evident similarities between this 
form of projection and the "fear of WOMAN" described by 
Winnicott. Woman and the ethnic other could be said to be 
held in an analogous position within the system of the 
distribution of power through classifications of visible 
difference. Certainly, each category is subject to being 
identified with anatomical and especially sexual otherness. 
There are a number of studies of the representations 
circulating within European imperialist cultures which have 
noted the assimilation of sexuality to otherness. Where 
sexuality becomes unacceptable to the European ego it 
becomes projected onto every conceivable substitute for the 
id; the working-classes, women, 'races', especially the 
intermediary cultures of the Middle East, 'primitive' 
populations and their culture. Sander Gilman notes the 
repeated reduction of the exotic to the erotic in 
nineteenth century France: 
(zola) projects what is basically an internal 
fear the fear of the loss of power, onto the world. 
The ~white man's burden" thus becomes his sexuality 
and its control, and it is this which is transferred 
into the need to control the sexuality of the Other 
... This need for control was a projection of inne~ 
fears: thus its articulation in visual images was In 
terms which described the polar opposite of the 
European male. (4) 
Certainly the projection of sexuality, with a need to 
control the Other, is a fundamental part of racist 
ideology. stuart Hall (5) has shown how sexual stereotypes 
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of black people as being "closer to the body" or nature are 
part of a language of racism. The envious attribution of a 
'natural' sexual prowess, uninhibited by the demands of 
culture, to an ethnic Other is one aspect of a range of 
sexual fantasies. These include fantasies of seduction, 
possession, rape, all forms of involuntary sexual pleasure, 
expressing guilt over responsibility and control. Hohni 
Bahba (6) uses a Lacanian paradigm to show how the 
stereotype of the colonial Other carries the meaning of the 
'castration' of the European, which must be controlled 
through repetition of the stereotype. 
But unless we are to believe that the social control 
of sexuality is what causes guilt, we must ask what it is 
that causes sexuality to be unacceptable to the European 
ego, and to become its "burden". Also, the mechanism of 
projection should be more closely defined to show how 
projection of fear or guilt takes place. 
Pontalis and Laplanche define projection as: 
an operation whereby qualities, feelings, 
wishes or objects which the subject refuses to 
recognise or rejects in himself are expelled from the 
self and located in another person or thing. 
Projection, so understood, is a defence of a very 
primitive origin which may be seen at work especially 
in paranoia but also in "normal" modes of thought such 
as superstition. (7) 
Accordingly, it is especially the 'bad' aspects of the self 
that tend to be projected externally through splitting and 
denial. In chapter 2 the projection of the "ego ideal" 
onto group leaders, was discussed. The type of projections 
at work in racist ideology are generally more negative. 
account for why sexuality should be experienced as a 
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To 
"burden" or as "dirt" it is necessary to explore the 
connection between sexuality and aggression. Some aspects 
of sexuality are experienced as bad because they reactivate 
memories of the infantile predicament of frustration or , , 
because any form of libidinal excitement may be a psychic 
trauma since it disrupts the homeostasis of the psychic 
economy, which the ego attempts to control. The 'pleasure 
principle' of psychic functioning, based on maintaining a 
constant level of tension in the organism, results in the 
fact that any sudden disruption of that constancy is 
experienced by the ego as a threat and is reacted to with 
aggression. It is not the sexuality itself which is 
experienced as 'bad' but the aggression accompanying any 
disruption of narcissistic homeostasis. Of course, the two 
processes are generally inextricable to some extent, 
especially because adult sexuality reactivates the partial 
drives of infantile sexuality. The first phase of diphasic 
sexuality carries with it the guilt of Oedipal wishes, the 
frustrated desire for the parent of the opposite sex and 
the equally frustrated aggressive wishes toward the parent 
of the same sex. Both the frustration and the aggression 
cause guilt. 
In the sphere of applied psychoanalysis, as applied to 
social, political and cultural problems, the projection of 
sexuality has been more extensively discussed than the 
projection of aggression. This may be for two reasons; 
firstly because applied psychoanalysis has most recently 
been used by theorists of sexual difference and feminism. 
The second reason is that most political theories tend to 
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locate the "forces of power", and therefore its human 
correlate of aggression, in external institutions or 
conditions. social determinism tends to conceptualise 
aggression and violence as a response to external 
frustration, such as social deprivation or provocation. 
psychoanalytic theory locates aggression and the 
destructive impulse as an integral part of psychic 
structure; although within this theory there is significant 
disagreement about the internal causes of aggression. 
Linked to the difference of views over the relative merits 
of an "instinct" centred concept of the subject and the 
view of the subjects as "object related", the disagreements 
about aggression are based on different views of the role 
of instinctual drives. 
Kleinian theory posits the existence of an autonomous, 
innate sadism which is expressed in the form of envy. 
Based on Abraham's view that: "psychoanalytic observation 
of children has established the fact that that set of 
instincts which aims at the destruction and expulsion of 
the object is ontogenetically the elder of the two", 
Klein's concept of aggression resumes Freud's theory of the 
"death instinct". other schools of thought, such as that 
of Winnicott, conceive of aggression as a reaction to 
frustration or "disillusion", but emphasise the fact that 
since the loss of infantile omnipotence is an inevitable 
occurrence, that the aggressive response has an innate 
cause. Whatever the theoretical differences there is 
sufficient consensus within the psychoanalytic view to make 
, 'sl'gnl'fl'cantly different from that of the Its perspectIve 
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social determinist theories. We can therefore identify a 
specific contribution which can be made from this 
perspective. Because aggression is only rarely experienced 
for what it is, and is subject to a range of protective 
defence mechanisms, it is sometimes difficult to remember 
the strength of infantile range from the point of view of 
adult logic and consciousness. Riviere offers a good 
description: 
But what happens if his expectations are not 
fulfilled? In certain degree the baby becomes aware 
of his dependence; he discovers that he cannot supply 
all his own wants - and he cries and screams. He 
becomes aggressive. He automatically explodes, as it 
were, with hate and aggressive craving. If he feels 
emptiness and loneliness, an automatic reaction sets 
in which may soon become uncontrollable and 
overwhelming, an aggressive rage which brings pain and 
explosive, burning, suffocating, choking bodily 
sensations; and these in turn cause further feelings 
of lack, pain and apprehension. The baby cannot 
distinguish between 'me' and 'not me'; his sensations 
are his world, the world to him; so when he is cold, 
hungry or lonely;-there is no milk, no well-being or 
pleasure in the world - the valuable things in life 
have vanished. And when he is tortured with desire or 
anger, with uncontrollable, suffocating screaming, and 
painful burning evacuations the whole of his world is 
one of suffering, it is scalded, torn and racked too. 
This situation which we all were in as babies has 
enormous psychological consequences for our lives. It 
is our first experience of something like death, a 
recognition of the non-existence of something, of an 
overwhelming loss, both in ourselves and in others as 
it seems. And this experience brings an awareness of 
love (in the form of desire), and a recognition of 
dependence (in the form of need) at the same moment 
as, and inextricably bound up with, feelings and 
uncontrollable sensations of pain and threatened 
destruction within and without (8). 
The intensity of this experience exists, in the adult 
unconscious, in the form of a sense of burden, the weight 
1 d rl'ef The rage is of "heavy" feelings such as oss, an g . 
remembered as the fear of loss of control, with the threat 
of catastrophic consequences of uncontrolled action. It 
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was noted, in the Introduction, that the expulsion of 
energy in the nervous system has a t t . pro 0 ype In the organic 
structure of the intestinal canal , before development of 
the embryo differentiates between the intestinal canal and 
the neural canal. This connection between the organic and 
psychosexual worlds is especially evident in the mental 
representation of expulsion of aggression, and in the 
phantasies and symbolism of racism. Visual signs such as 
the dark skin of the negro or the dark hair of the Jew, are 
used by the racist, as representations of what is "dark 
within". This is the unconscious and particularly 
aggression. The unconscious is "dark" because it is 
forgotten and feared and associated with dreaming and 
night, aggression is "dark" because it is associated with 
expulsion through the intestinal canal and defecation. 
Grunberger has expressed a classic psychoanalytic 
interpretation when he classifies racism as a form of 
regression: "Xenophobia, prejudice, and ethnocentrism all 
have their roots in infantile behaviour, in the 
unconscious." (9) Grunberger notes that evidence of the 
unconscious at work can be found in the deeply 
contradictory nature of beliefs, since logic has no 
existence in the primary process. Therefore ideologies 
represent contradictory thoughts side by side: "The Negro 
is as sly and diabolical as he is credulous and naive, the 
Jew is at one and the same time ugly and seductive, hoards 
secret wealth and is given to ostentatious display." (10) 
People on the receiving end of such contradictory 
that they are being treated "like representations are aware 
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shit" or treated "like dirt". This is a well known 
insight, expressed with great anger or bewildered hurt, by 
victims of social oppression or ideological 
misrepresentation. This intuitive insight is an exact 
description of the process at work, the unerring accuracy 
of the unconscious has identified the psychology of the 
oppressor. Moreover, other aspects of pre-Oedipal 
sexuality find expression in the contradictory beliefs and 
stereotypes of the ethnic other. Oral phantasies can be 
found in the fears that immigrant populations are devouring 
national resources, that they are inordinately greedy or 
needy, or dependent. Phallic imagery predominates in the 
projection of a castrated self-image, such as the despised 
woman or the degraded Jew or Negro. Anality predominates 
in fears of 'dirt', contamination. The need for excessive 
control, and in metaphors of indigenous populations being 
'swamped' by the 'out-group'. What takes place at the 
level of the organism is superimposed, symbolically, onto 
the dynamic of groups. 
Just as the ego splits itself into idealised and 
denigrated aspects, Adorno noted that groups tend to split 
into in-groups and out-groups, with everything good 
pertaining to the former and everything bad to the latter. 
Furthermore, wangh's analysis of the genocide of the Jews 
in Nazi Germany notes that: 
The more projection takes place, the more 
debilitated become both the sense of reali~y ~nd the 
sense of identity. An ever widening repudIatIon of 
that which belongs to the self brings about an ev~r 
increasing need to define the limits of the sel~ In 
terms of that which is not-self, through a detaIled 
delineation of the characteristics of the out group. 
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In consequence the ego knows less and less f its own 
feelings and desires, and Supposedly more a~d 
the alien group. (11) more of 
If this psychoanalytic critique of the social 
manifestation of unconscious anal sadism is to be of 
political and practical use it must be shown to be 
compatible with a historical analysis which could also 
account for the dynamic of class conflict and the action of 
cultural systems. 
That is, the narrative structure of the acts of 
homo infantilis must be connected to the narrative of the 
other historical protagonists homo economicus and 
homo symbolicans. Here, a brief analysis of some of the 
complex factors that determined the form of Nazi 
antisemitism will be advanced. Class analysis accounts for 
the social basis of the electorate who voted the Nazi party 
to power, symbolic and cultural analysis reveals the 
ideological themes that dominated the imagery and 
representations within Nazi culture and propaganda, and 
psychoanalysis reveals the psychological roots of racism in 
regressive sadistic activities defending against fears of 
annihilation and against suicidal impulses. 
Although in many European countries antisemitism had 
existed, periodically, since the Middle Ages there had been 
no expression so extreme as the surge of German 
antisemitism which followed the economic crisis of 1929, 
and which culminated in the genocide of six million Jews in 
concentration camps throughout the second world war. 
Wangh notes that antisemitic organised politics, the 
politics of the National Socialist party, was largely the 
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activity of a young and lower middle class. He links the 
popularity of the Nazi party to the effect of the economic 
depression following the fall of the international stock 
market, which resulted in chronic unemployment for the 
working and middle classes throughout Europe. Whereas in 
Germany the working class had already developed a strong 
proletarian identity, with allegiances to scientific 
socialism, the lower middle classes reacted with an abrupt 
loss of class identity, facing permanent or long term 
unemployment without ever having been proletarian. These 
class conflicts are well documented also in the rise of 
Italian fascism and in the popular support of Moseley's 
Blackshirt movement in Britain. The demography is 
revealing:in 1930 the Nazi party won six million votes 
which made it the second largest political party in 
Germany, and between 1930 and 1933 about three million 
young people (six per cent of the electorate) reached 
voting age. The young people did not all vote Nazi 
immediately but by 1934 the party had won forty-five 
percent of the national vote. So the popularity of Nazi 
ideology was secured by a young and mainly lower-middle 
class population. Wangh investigates the distinguishing 
characteristics of this particular generation. Their early 
childhood had been spent in the years of the 1914-1918 
war,when, from a population of 59 million, over eleven 
million men were mobilised to fight at the front. The 
'II' killed in German losses were colossal; over two ml Ion 
action and over seven million severe casualties. In 
addition to this devastation of family life, the Allies' 
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blockade of Germany in 1917 caused a famine bringing the 
nation to a particularly humiliating defeat in the 
following year. The generation in question had thus 
experienced prolonged paternal absence in early childhood 
when their fathers were mobilised during the first world 
war, and during that absence the mothers and children were 
subject to acute economic deprivation, and sometimes 
starvation. Wangh notes that prolonged parental absence is 
invariably experienced, by children, as rejection, and that 
this causes lifelong feelings of unworthiness, loss of 
self-esteem and humiliation. In addition the fathers who 
did eventually return from the army were often disabled, 
and the humiliating conditions of the German national 
defeat were both factors which adversely affected this 
early physical and emotional damage. The traditional 
substitute for paternal protection, the State, had been 
unable to provide any sense of familial security to 
compensate. This generation with such an insecure early 
childhood was again at adolescence sUbjected to massive 
anxiety. When the collapse of the us stock market brought 
economic hardship and chronic unemployment throughout 
Europe. Once again, fathers were unable to provide for 
their families, and had to bear the demoralisation of long 
term unemployment. The young adults were also unable to 
find work and the fresh damage to self-esteem reactivated 
the earlier anxieties of childhood. Recalling Riviere's 
description of infantile rage at unmet needs it is possible 
to imagine the extent and depth of the anxiety in question, 
and when turned towards the ego it was a profoundly 
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suicidal force. 
Throughout Europe, in the 1930s young people joined 
militaristic groups, with the group's esprit de corps 
providing a substitute form of leadership and an ego-ideal. 
It is known that groups formed under emotional pressures of 
anxiety and despair tend to create an elated and 
narcissistic identity. All negative, heavy and bad or 
'dark' attributes, symbolising the despair and grief, are 
projected onto external objects or what Adorno calls the 
out-group. The suicidal despair of this generation of 
Germans was projected and institutionalised through 
practices of ghettoisation, sadistic policing, intimidation 
and, eventually, genocide. Mostly Jews, but also 
Ukrainians, Slavs, gypsies and other groups designated 
races were classified as inferior and became feared as a 
demonic force as Hitler's ideal of the Aryan Yolk was 
increasingly deified. The history of the extermination 
camps has been well recorded, especially by survivors such 
as Primo Levi. The subjective effect of surviving genocide 
has been researched by Bettelheim and others. 
predictably the iconography of Nazi ideology centred 
on the metaphor of the ideal father in Hitler, the 
fatherland, the people and a mythical 'past'. The ideal of 
an immutable and insuperable father was of obvious 
significance to that generation, and many sought paternal 
protection in the uniformity of the party structure. 
, . d 11 
psychoanalytic observation also revels that the 1 ea 
. t' the father was a regressive phenomenon, Incorpora Ing 
fantasy of a fusion of both parents into a single entity. 
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This 'combined parent' imago protects the subject from the 
reality of sexual difference, an Oedipal reality, by 
maintaining the delusion that infantile wishes can be 
realised. The 'phallic mother' or the maternal father is a 
fantasy which maintains a merged ego, and which attempts to 
avoid the superego and feelings of guilt. Grunberger 
notes: 
When Eichmann listened to the enumeration of 
the monstrous crimes of which he was accused he 
remained unmoved; for they were obviously mere words 
without any real meaning or content. But when 
reminded by the judge that he should stand when 
addressed, he offered embarrasse6 apologies, 
stuttered and reddened with shame. In this he felt 
himself guilty, since for a moment he had forgotten 
the rule of respect for his superiors which had been 
taught him throughout his training. (12). 
without the superego, guilt cannot be experienced, the ego 
ideal takes its place and only shame can be felt, like the 
reaction of the pre-Oedipal child before a reprimanding 
parent. True guilt requires an intrapsychic experience of 
loss and grief within an integrated ego. Guilt implies an 
acceptance of moral standards. Shame only requires an 
obedience to external authority. The Nazi ideology 
encouraged and exploited the regressed condition of its 
constituency by allowing aggression and hate to be directed 
at the Jewish community without any sense of guilt. 
Further examination of the iconography of Naziism 
shows more attributes of the Nazi ideal. The ritualistic 
use of torchlight processions, searchlight beams at 
rallies, the swastika symbol of infinite life and the sun, 
the physical appearance of the Aryan ideal, blond-haired 
and muscular, all were associated with lightness, euphoria, 
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sunshine, purity. Their opposites, fear, anxiety were all 
projected onto the Jewish other. Jewish culture, with its 
strong tradition of family life and a paternal divinity, 
must have represented a deeply enviable condition for the 
Christian generation of sons whose own fathers had, 
symbolically and materially, been absent. 
Wangh and Grunberger's analyses both allocate a 
central role to the unconscious roots of racism in 
disturbances of the Oedipus complex, whilst integrating 
this factor within a historical account which recognizes 
class analysis, political and social analysis, and the 
analysis of cultural factors. Racisms are plural and 
differ from one another according to specific conditions. 
Racisms cannot be understood except in terms of the complex 
interaction of social, economic, political and unconscious 
forces. Without in any way detracting from the attribution 
of determinate power to these forces I propose that 
analyses of racism, like analyses of the social position of 
women, have tended to misrecognize the power exerted over 
social forces by psychic structure and unconscious 
phantasy. 
Existing materialist analyses of racism have tended 
to be political histories focusing on the power of 
capitalism, the politics of imperialism and colonialism, 
the economic function of migrant and immigrant populations 
The as unpaid labourers or a reserve army of labour. 
literature on these aspects of the causes of racist 
ideologies is substantial and inclusive. More recently the 
concept of institutionalised racism has been proposed by 
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Dummett as a means of analysing the operation of power in 
ideological structures (13). Dummett shows that racist 
ideology is built into social institutions at levels which 
pre-empt voluntary choice on the part of those people 
working within these institutions. The concept of 
unconscious structure is not explicitly used but is implied 
in Dummett's analysis. The unconscious, intrapsychic, 
structures of racism were first analysed in anti-semitism 
because many practising psychoanalysts were Jewish (it has 
even been suggested that Freud's psychological insight 
arose out of the social and political subordination of the 
Jews in nineteenth century Austria) but the theory is 
'equally applicable to understanding white racism in Britain 
today. 
Psychoanalytic insights have been used to decode 
racisms, for example Fanon's works analyse French racism 
towards Algerians and West Indians. Kovel's work analyses 
white racism in North America. Hall, Bhabha, Majarat, 
Spivak and others have added psychoanalytic insights to 
sociological perspectives wherever necessary and 
appropriate, to reveal the covert racism of apparently 
'neutral' ideological representations (14). They have also 
revealed the unconscious phantasies in contradictory 
stereotypes of people of colour. A more extensive use of 
psychoanalytic concepts, especially those of projection, 
unconscious infantile rage, and sadistic unconscious 
phantasy, denial, fears of 'contamination' and the 
emotional meaning of 'dirt', remains to be devised and 
fully elaborated. A psychoanalytic view has much to 
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contribute to understanding many aspects of 
institutionalised racism, not only in the forms of social 
organisation of groups and their defences against anxiety 
(15), but also in recognising the meaning of metaphors used 
in racist representations. For example, the language of 
racism is often based on metaphors of liquidity; so that 
indigenous black populations or immigrant populations are 
described as 'swamping' white natives, or 'waves' of 
immigration are described: measures are taken to 'control 
the flow' or 'influx' of alien peoples into Britain. To 
understand this, the unconscious significance of Britain's 
geography should be taken into account, Ernest Jones notes: 
The complexes to which the idea of an island 
home tends to become attached are those relating to 
the ideas of women, virgin, mother and womb; all of 
which fuse into the central complex of the womb of a 
virgin mother. This means, of course, one's own 
birthplace ... Every male cherishes the thought that 
his mother is a virgin, this representing the 
repudiation of the father, which psychoanalysis has 
shown to be a normal constituent of the universal 
Oedipus complex ... It is not surprising to find a 
place so closely connected with water as an island 
functioning as a common womb symbol; ... the frequent 
unconscious process of inversion of course aids this; 
a place contained by water instead of a place 
containing water.(16) 
The cultural 'alien', especially the dark-featured, becomes 
the symbol of the dark stranger; the bad father invading 
the womb of the mother. This unconscious phantasy of 
a primal scene fuels the nationalism of the 'sons' 
defending their virgin Britannia from the penetration of 
foreigners. The role of sexuality, as a component of 
unconscious phantasy is also of importance here, the 
cultural alien is often ascribed with an uninhibited or 
uncontrolled sexuality which represents a projected 
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phantasy of the envious and prohibitive intrapsychic 
conflict of the white narcissist. This mechanism is common 
to both the misrepresentation of women and the 
misrepresentation of people of colour. 
Because both racism and sexism are institutionalised 
systems of denial and projection, defending the subject 
against knowledge of their own infantile aggression, they 
have shared roots in intrapsychic conflict. It follows 
that the politics and practices needed in order to change 
these institutionalised forms of culturally condoned 
cruelty must necessarily be linked. There exists an 
integral connection between the politics of feminism and 
anti-racism, and it can be found in their shared 
prioritisation of the politics of representation, including 
the forms of representation in the language of theory. The 
kinds of representations that circulate in theoretical 
discourse, or science, have been explored in terms of their 
ethnocentric and phallocentric assumptions by feminist 
scholars and those challenging racism. 
Feminist practice cannot succeed in transforming 
phallocentric ideology unless women recognise the 
ethnocentric narcissism which supports that ideology. 
Racism cannot be fully overcome until its roots in 
unconscious phantasy are recognised and understood. The 
meanings of racist representations are sustained by the 
unconscious phantasies produced by infantile aggression, 
and it is these that connect the meanings of colour and 
visual difference to a system of positive and negative 
. and debasement, and to a system of values, idealisatIon 
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sexual difference. I contend that I'd 1 ' eo ogles of racism 
operate by condoning the direction of cruelty, without 
guilt, towards a designated 'other'. This operation is 
identical to the operation of the scapegoating of women as 
objects of contempt or aggression that is to be found in 
all cultures. In both systems the inner world of 
subjectivity is given power over social controls, and the 
subjects' deep fears of their own aggression and sadism are 
denied, and are projected onto a group designated as 
'other' by virtue of their visible differences. 
The system of sexual difference is an integral part 
of language and of ideological systems. The hypothesis 
that there is an unconscious mental life is supported by 
facts from history and culture, as well as psychoanalytic 
observation of human behaviour. That this unconscious 
mental life centres around certain prototypical phantasies, 
involving the desire for mastery and knowledge symbolised 
in a sexual sense, is the result of the significance of the 
exceptional human infantile dependence, which is retained 
in the adult in the form of an unconscious mind. This is 
due to the mechanisms particular to human evolution, the 
paedomorphosis that alters the relative rates and timing of 
physical growth and maturation: and the neoteny which had 
resulted in human offspring being dependent on their 
caretakers for a long time and thus liable to form 
psychological and emotional bonds. Whereas most 
explanations of institutionalised sexism and racism have 
sought answers in the historical materialism of Marxist 
analysis or have employed the positivist research methods 
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of classical sociology, I contend that the kind of 
knowledge that psychoanalysis can bring to bear on this 
process of institutionalisation of aggression opens up the 
conceptualisation of history to include what Althusser 
calls the 'omnihistorical' aspects of language and 
ideology. 
I have explored many reasons for reconceptualising 
history in terms of its relation to the pre-historic. I 
contend that without such reconceptualisation a truly 
materialist and historical account of the system of sexual 
difference cannot be provided. Woman's time, or woman's 
history cannot be written entirely within the terms of the 
history of class society, or political economy. Neither is 
it to be written simply as a history of timeless biological 
difference. But a theory of materialism of mind, based on 
a concept of a dynamic interaction of body, mind, language 
and social environment must underlie the writing of the 
history of sexual difference. I have argued that 
'biological essentialism' is a concept which is largely the 
product of social determinist theories, it could be said to 
be the 'other' of social determinism. The dangers of 
biological essentialism are evident in racist and sexist 
ideologies, but these dangers should not prevent us from 
finding what is valuable and necessary in biological 
theory. Its historical perspective, the evolutionary 
theory, provides a context for understanding the relative 
. 11 as the dialectic autonomy of pSYChIC structure, as we 
between psyche and environment. The danger of ignoring 
this theoretical perspective is that the long term causes 
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of change will not be adequately understood 0 t k ' 
r a en Into 
account in social planning, and potentially substantial 
change will be sacrificed to short term or immediate 
changes. 
Finally I speculate on the consequences for theory of 
recognising the existence of the unconscious mind, and of 
understanding the origins of the unconscious mind in the 
interaction between mother and infant before language. 
The prelinguistic forms of knowledge, being least apt 
to be correctly rendered in symbolic form, are the most 
difficult to contain within rationalist and scientific 
forms of language. But they are nevertheless not to be 
conceived of as simply the semiotic "chora", as Kristeva 
has termed it, the 'ratio' of the Symbolic order, or what 
the latter as it were 'leaves out'. prelinguistic forms 
have their own logic and structure, their own narratives 
and meanings, in which we find contained certain 
prototypical phantasies of the types described above. To 
overlook the prelinguistic because its logic is not 
reducible to the logic of conscious symbolic thought is 
wrong and in fact leads to reactionary thought. The form 
of recognition of prelinguistic knowledge is that of 
intuition, the awareness of evidence derived from emotional 
knowledge. Intuition is always present in even the most 
positivist of science, if only to be ignored or displaced, 
as Devereux has argued. However, a more appropriate use of 
intuition can be made if it is used in order to provide 
evidence from the 'inner world' of subjectivity on the 
'ff and if it is meaning of gender and sexual dl erence, 
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integrated with other research methods of general science 
or theory. In the previous chapter on the textual analysis 
of prelinguistic scripts, the phylogenetic prelinguistic, 
the intuitive method is used with the theoretical, and 
these are integrated in an exploration of the meaning and 
symbolisation of sexual difference in a range of 
prehistoric languages, and in contemporary theoretical 
language. I contend that these scripts provide evidence of 
a set of metaphoric associations around the meaning of 
'female' which can loosely be described as deriving from 
the intuitive knowledge that 'femaleness' is an aspect of 
'mother' . Thus female is not the opposite of male; the 
triangular structure of mother, male, female, which 
underlies the dual opposition of male and female is also 
discerned in the theoretical language of psychoanalysis. 
Theories of phallic monism are criticised and it is 
suggested that theories of female psychic specificity are 
more correct and more useful than those of phallic monism. 
Intuitive knowledge is derived, it has been 
suggested, from emotional experience, but differs from that 
experience in that emotions cause an active form of 
experience leading to expression or action, whereas 
intuition could be said to be the knowledge produced by the 
transformation of emotion into thought. Intuition is also 
mainly derived from prelinguistic experience from which it 
derives its characteristic of being 'uncanny'. The 
1 . 11 a product of the prelinguistic is, psycho oglca y, 
wordless dialogue, or interaction, between mother and 
infant. Thus the prelinguistic aspect of adult 
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subjectivity refers to representations of th' t IS S ate of 
emotional attachment, of bonding or nurturance. Because 
this early experience is completely repressed at the time 
of the castration complex, and in men this early attachment 
becomes substituted for a sexual attachment to a woman as 
partner, there is a tendency for most theory which is 
written by men to repeat this process on the level of 
theory. In other words, the significance of the mother-
infant bond becomes repressed, and is thus thought to be 
obscure, intuition is also described as obscure, and in its 
placed a relation of opposition, of otherness, is 
substituted, which produces the fantasy that objectivity is 
the opposite of subjectivity. 
The misrecognition of the significance of the 
mother-infant bond as the early basis of all subsequent 
human knowledge is conducted at great cost. It results in 
what Winnicott has termed the fear of "WOMAN", the basis of 
the social subordination of women, and in the idealisation 
of maleness and fathers. In western European culture we 
have an institutionalisation of forms of knowledge, in our 
educational and academic institutions, which has produced 
knowledge that is almost always conceptualised in terms of 
fathers. Not only are these institutions almost entirely 
staffed by men, but more importantly the traditions of 
authority, of authorship, the lineage of antecedents 
operate through a patriliny of founding fathers which I 
t t ' toteml'c The patriliny have described above as, a Imes, . 
of knowledge in theoretical discourse is particularly 
evident in the stringent regulation of the boundaries 
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theory between disciplines. Whereas the best scientific 
acknowledges that the objects of science are not 
autonomous, and that the scientific languages themselves 
are not absolute, but are metaphors, the anxiety that is 
generated by attempts to connect the objects or languages 
of two adjacent sciences is intense. This is evident in 
the history of the debates between anthropology and 
psychoanalysis as explored in chapter 2. Feminist thought 
has demonstrated the inextricable links between 
subjectivity and objectivity, and must now begin to 
recognise that these links are based on the early tie 
between mothers and infants. With a better understanding 
of the unconscious mind feminist theory can explore the 
effect of this fact of sexual difference of the 
institutionalised forms of knowledge that exist today. The 
self-reflexivity that is increasingly being demanded of all 
positivistic forms of knowledge will become an integral 
part of the recognition of the significance of the system 
of sexual difference as it now begins to transform all 
existing forms of theory. Unless the reality of psychic 
conflict can be internalised and recognised as an internal 
fact there can be no possibility of an equal and mutual 
collaboration between men and women. The social and 
theoretical recognition of the psychic dependence on women 
is a necessary precondition of any long-standing change in 
social, legal and economic position of women. whether 
social institutions are conceptualised as the phenomenal 
forms of underlying economic or political systems, or 
whether they are conceptualised as determining forces in 
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themselves; the changes that legislation and resourcing can 
bring about are ineffectual without the acknowledgement of 
the fact of this dependence on women. If the fact is 
accepted on a subjective, social and discursive level this 
may then facilitate a realistic conceptualisation of women, 
unimpeded by fantasy, so that human needs may be 
realistically taken into account in theory, in culture, and 
in social and political planning and organisation. 
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all significant action is seen as between fathers and 
sons. The ideology of the student power movement which 
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by Oedipal fantasy. 
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